11-15-2016 21 of 35 Russian artillerymen of Russian military unit 09332 involved in shelling of Ukraine identified
As part of the combined rocket and gun artillery battalion, they were involved in the shelling of Ukrainian cities, villages, and Ukrainian Army positions from late August to December 2014. We were able to identify 21 of the 35 soldiers of this military detachment, who brought death and destruction to the Ukrainian soil and left their dirty trail in social networks.
https://informnapalm.org/en/russian-artillerymen-7th-military-base/
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Roman Tatarka of GRU is 1st Secretary at Russian Embasy at Latvia
According to Mbk.media , before entering the “Conservatory”, Roman Tatarka studied at the Cherepovets Higher Military Engineering School of Radio Electronics and, as mentioned earlier, later during his studies at the “Academy”, the GRU, together with A. Chepiga, was registered at the hostel of the Russian State Humanitarian University (Moscow, Kirovogradskaya 25/1). Mbk.media also has unpublished information about R. Tatarka (including the phone number used by R. Tatarka). Note that in the Cherepovets Military School, radio intelligence specialists are trained specifically for the needs of the GRU. In addition, we managed to find out that in 2007, the wife of Roman Vasilyevich Tatarka - Irina Tatarka and daughters Ekaterina and Barbara were registered in another dormitory of the Military-Diplomatic Academy at 3rd Volokolamsky passage 4. This hostel is also mentioned in the publication Mbk.media. Thus we can conclude that, as a minimum, since 2007, R. Tatarka was a student at the Military Diplomatic Academy. The first mention of the future career of R. Tatarka can be found in the list of accredited foreign diplomats published in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Latvia in Latvia on March 3, 2011, in which R. Tatarka is declared as the third secretary of the Russian Embassy (together with his wife Irina Tatarka; see the image) ….
In this regard, it is suspicious that an army officer, a graduate specialist in military electronics, suddenly becomes a civilian worker in a relatively short time — a diplomat of the Russian embassy, whose direct responsibilities are not even remotely connected with the military sphere. V. Suvorov in his book explains this by the fact that in the first department of the Military Diplomatic Academy officers are trained who will spy abroad under the guise of civilian diplomats. In contrast to the official representatives of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation (Defense Ministry) - representatives of the military attache bureau (who, according to V. Suvorov, are all officers of the GRU, who, first of all, should be perceived as spies and only then as diplomats), spies under civilian cover they hide their connection with the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation, thus unleashing their arms.
-Vasily Gerasimov
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-Russian Buk anti-aircraft on truck on way to shooting down MK17 over Ukraine, 2014, from 53rd missile brigade of Russian Army. https://www.rferl.org/a/netherlands-australia-to-hold-russia-legally-responsible-for-shooting-down-mh17/29250256.html
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The first person in the call went by the first name and patronymic “Nikolai Fedorovich” and the call sign “Dolphin.” In December 2017, Bellingcat and The Insider reported that they’d managed to identify this man as Russian Colonel-General Nikolai Tkachev.
The second individual in the radio transmission was someone called “Andrey Ivanovich” with the callsign “Orion,” whom Ukraine’s National Security Service believed to be a Russian military intelligence officer. Based on intercepted communications, Kiev established that this person might have been based in separatist-controlled Lugansk, commanding separatists’ military actions, when flight MH17 was shot down.
Officials in Kiev also published a list of the Ukrainian phone numbers used by the men discussing the delivery of a Buk missile. Orion’s number was 380-63-411-9133.
Bellingcat and The Insider found this number in a telephone directory, where it was registered to someone under the name “Oreon” as an anonymous prepaid account with the Ukrainian mobile provider “life:).” At their press conference on May 25, 2018, the researchers revealed that a Ukrainian journalist (who isn’t being named) gained access to the company’s database, and found that Oreon’s phone made calls to four telephone numbers in Russia.
One of these Russian phone numbers (registered with Megafon) belongs to a Russian military intelligence officer named Bellingcat and The Insider speculate that “Husky” is a special operations group active in the self-declared Donetsk People’s Republic. https://meduza.io/en/feature/2018/05/25/oh-hello-mr-oleg-orion-ivannikov
Oleg Vladimirovich Ivannikov. The researchers haven’t released the number to the public, but they say they found it immediately in several telephone directories. In one of these databases, the number is registered to “Ivannikov,” and in another it’s listed as “Andrey Ivanovich Gru Ot Husky.” https://meduza.io/en/feature/2018/05/25/oh-hello-mr-oleg-orion-ivannikov
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2-21-2019 Ivannikov (code name Orion) was put on the wanted list on January 21, 2019. He is being charged with crimes under Part 1 of Article 258-3 (creation of a terrorist organization, leadership or participation in it) and Part 2 of Article 437 (waging aggressive war) of the Criminal Code of Ukraine. https://belsat.eu/en/news/sbu-puts-out-search-for-mh17-shootdown-suspects/
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Bellingcat and the Insider have now succeeded in unmasking “Popov”’s actual identity, which is Vladimir Nikolaevich Moiseev. Moiseev, who is a lieutenant colonel or colonel with Russian military intelligence, was born on 29.06.1980, the same date as the fictional “Popov. He was involved in an unsuccessful covert GRU coup in Montenegro in 2016.....
Intending to work purely with open source data, Bellingcat chose not to procure a passport copy for Moiseev. Instead, we searched through various additional leaked or commercially available databases for further clues about this man. We searched a Tyumen residential database, and found a Moiseev — having the same passport number as the one listed above — registered in 2004 and 2005 to the address of the Tyumen Military Engineering Institute.....
Ultimately, we stumbled upon the smoking gun, a link between “Popov” and Moiseev, in a more recent version of the GIBDD’s vehicle database of Moscow residents. In it, Moiseev was listed as owning a newer version of the same car as in 2011 (a 2015 Subaru Outback). In this database, Moiseev was listed with a contact telephone number identical to the number listed for “Popov” under his car registration entry.
Car registration of Vladimir Moiseev in a recent Moscow vehicle registration database, showing the same telephone number as of Vladimir “Popov”.
Furthermore, the recent database contained a new address for Moiseev, which was in the same apartment complex as the residence of Skripal poisoning suspect Alexander Mishkin. The exact address allowed us to receive ownership information from the Russian real-estate database, which showed a similar-sized apartment as Mishkin’s and a similar arrangement: a transfer of ownership, unencumbered with any mortgage, directly from the city of Moscow (as it was the original owner of the newly built apartment building) to Moiseev’s wife and children.
During the period of 2011-2013, “Popov” posted extensively on social media, primarily from Central and Western Europe. He posted photos from various locations where he allegedly attended naval-themed conferences in Europe and Georgia. His VK account was deleted in March 2017, after he was put on Interpol’s red notice list.
A photo posted in 2012, which Bellingcat has identified as taken in Warsaw, remains visible as a profile picture on Russia’s email and social media site Mail.ru. During this period, “Popov”’s co-indicted GRU officer, Colonel Eduard Shishmakov, served as deputy military attaché at the Russian embassy in Warsaw. Also during this period, a Polish officer was allegedly recruited by Russian military intelligence, for which he was later sentenced to six years in prison.
A photograph of Vladimir “Popov” from his mail.ru account, geolocated to an observation deck in the old town of Warsaw, Poland.
GRU operative Vladimir Moiseev’s cover for his trip to Belgrade in October 2016 was provided by the publisher of the now defunct magazine Marine Insurance, Mr. Nikita Minin. Contacted by Bellingcat, he confirmed that in 2016 “Vladimir Popov” did work for his publication. ...
Nikita Minin says he has worked in the insurance industry since 1996. However, in publicly available databases, Bellingcat has found that in 2000-2001 he served at the 218 Separate Airborne Forces Spetsnaz Unit or Military Unit 48427 in Moscow, the same unit where Moiseev served years later.
Minin, top right corner, during his service at the 218th Separate Airborne Forces. Undated photos from Minin’s Odnoklassniki account, posted in 2015 and retained in archives, now deleted.
It is unlikely that Minin and Moiseev met during their army service, as while Minin served, Moiseev was still at the military university in Tyumen . It is more likely that Minin was recruited by GRU independently, and later teamed up with Moiseev to provide plausible cover for his international travel. https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2018/11/22/second-gru-officer-indicted-montenegro-coup-unmasked/
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-The military compound in Moscow that houses Unit 26165, the cyberwarfare wing of the GRU that has also been called APT28 or Fancy Bear (Mary Gelman for The Washington Post) https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/how-russias-military-intelligence-agency-became-the-covert-muscle-in-putins-duels-with-the-west/2018/12/27/2736bbe2-fb2d-11e8-8c9a-860ce2a8148f_story.html?utm_term=.7e947f7f396b
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8-29-2018 Deep in the forests of Slovakia, former Russian Spetsnaz commandos trained young men from a right-wing paramilitary group called the Slovak Conscripts. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2014, some of these freshly-minted paramilitaries went to fight with Russian forces in eastern Ukraine while others stayed at home to agitate against nato as a “terrorist organization.”
On the streets of the French city Marseille, Russian soccer hooligans sporting tattoos with the initials of Russia’s military intelligence service, GRU, brutally attacked English soccer fans in June 2016, sending dozens of bloodied fans to the hospital. Alexander Shprygin, an ultranationalist agitator and the head of the All-Russian Union of Supporters (a soccer fan club that he claims was established at the behest of the Russian Federal Security Service, or FSB), was arrested during the melee and deported from France. https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/08/russia-is-co-opting-angry-young-men/568741/
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-Diplomatic passports of some of the suspected Russian operatives who allegedly attempted to breach computer networks in the Netherlands are seen in an illustration photo. (Source - Netherlands Defense Ministry via U.S. Department of Justice) https://www.voanews.com/a/russia-gru-operatives-unmasked/4602595.html
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The US Justice Department on Thursday indicted seven agents of Russia's GRU military intelligence agency as part of a joint crackdown with allies Britain and the Netherlands on a series of major hacking plots attributed to Moscow.https://www.dhakatribune.com/world/north-america/2018/10/04/us-indicts-seven-gru-agents-in-global-hacking-conspiracy
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it was not until April 1921 that the body which would become the GRU was formed. Known as the Razvedupr, short for intelligence directorate, or the Fourth Directorate, it was not officially called the GRU until February 16, 1942, a name it carries till this day. Tasked with primarily gathering military-related intelligence, the GRU has often defined this in the broadest sense, gathering political, strategic, economic, and technological information. In addition to running networks of agents, GRU also controls military and naval attaches at Russian embassies, and has extensive paramilitary capabilities. http://blog.ecu.edu/sites/cwis/2017/04/the-neighbors-the-gru-in-america-from-ales-to-fancy-bear/
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One can make the case that while the Russian state has evolved in many ways since the end of Communism, Russian military and intelligence organizations still operate on the Soviet model....
How could the Russians cause harm? The Netherlands is nearly 100% dependent on imports of oil (around 1 million barrels a day), mostly from Russia. http://www.bryensblog.com/dutch-expelled-gru-agents/
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