an honet Russian fighting in Donbas speaks of MH17

23 Jul 2014    

Rebel commander Alexander Khodakovsky of the Vostok Battalion speaks during an interview in Donetsk.  Photograph: Maxim Zmeyev/Reuters

Khodakovsky:  

"The question is this: Ukraine received timely evidence that the volunteers have this technology, through the fault of Russia.  It not only did nothing to protect security but provoked the use of this type of weapon against a plane that was flying with peaceful civilians.

"They knew that this Buk existed, that the Buk was heading for Snizhne," he said, referring to a village 10km west of the crash site.  "They knew that it would be deployed there and provoked the use of this Buk by starting an air strike on a target they didn't need, that their planes hadn't touched for a week.

"And that day they were intensively flying, and exactly at the moment of the shooting, at the moment the civilian plane flew overhead, they launched air strikes.  Even if there was a Buk, and even if the Buk was used, Ukraine did everything to ensure that a civilian aircraft was shot down.”

4.47pm   The US ambassador to Ukraine has tweeted an image of what the US alleges to be a Russian training facility at which Russia equips separatist forces with heavy weaponry before sending them across the border.

Here is imagery of the #Russian training facility for separatists very near the #Ukraine border. #MH17 

2:18 AM - Jul 23, 2014     https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/23/mh17-day-of-mourning-in-netherlands-as-bodies-arrive-live-updates#block-53cfeeeee4b0348329ae71f4

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9-29-16    In summary, the JIT concluded that a BUK missile was behind the MH17 crash and that the BUK was brought into Ukraine from Russia.  After the crash, the JIT (Joint Investigation Team) claims that the BUK was then sent back to Russia.

The JIT concluded that the BUK was fired from the village of Pervomayskoye (Pervomaiskyi), held by rebel forces at the time of the incident…east of the approaching MH17.

The findings are “being backed by the US data, which evaluated that the launch site was located 6km south to Snezhnoye,” which at that time was controlled by rebel forces, the JIT says.

The US data is not being disclosed for verification.

BUK missiles are not simple little missiles. They require some heavy duty radar equipment to accompany some very large missiles system.

The spokesman for the Russian Defense Ministry Major-General Igor Konashenkov asserts that “No Russian missile systems including ‘BUK’ have ever crossed the Russian-Ukrainian border.”   http://theduran.com/150000-intercepted-phone-calls-provided-ukraines-impartial-secret-services-twitter-tweets-prove-russias-mh17-guilt/

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7-17-17     After July 20, 2014  Col. Vasily Geranin’s name became public once the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) published an intercepted call between Bezler and Geranin on the downed MH17. …Also his apartment in Kubinka, a town located in the Moscow Oblast, was searched and it was said that many more illegal arms and weapons had been found.  At the moment of detention, Geranin was still an active military counterintelligence officer but after being placed under arrest he was fired from the GRU, with the time of his firing being backdated.  The fact that the GRU officer was arrested may be an element of a larger operation conducted by the Russian forces and its aim is to alienate witnesses and to destroy all evidence before the trial planned for autumn this year in the Netherlands.  it was revealed that on the night of July 16 to July 17 Russia introduced some restrictions for civil aviation flights in Russian airspace, nearby the Ukrainian border, at a height below 16,000 metres, which exactly corresponds to the maximum reach of the Buk missile system.   https://warsawinstitute.org/russia-covers-mh17-tracks/

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The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) has collected and shared evidence connected to the crash.

–       17 July 2014: Shortly after the crash of MH17, the SBU posted what is purported to be intercepts of conversations between different separatists discussing a plane that they shot down and later their surprise that the plane was a civilian passenger aircraft. In one of the conversations, a man (identified as separatist Igor “Bez” Bezler) reports to another (identified as Russian GRU colonel Vasyl Geranin) that “We have just shot down a plane.”[8]

       25 July 2014: In an additional intercepted conversation shared by the SBU, two minutes before MH17 was destroyed, one separatist (identified as “Naimanets”) reports to another (identified as Igor “Bez” Bezler) that a plane has been detected flying overhead.[11]

Read more at https://www.globsec.org/news/malaysia-airlines-flight-mh17-selected-evidence/#d3GQADYMJs7B2KWa.99

–       17 July 2014: RFE/RL’s Ukrainian Service describes a VKontakte post attributed to separatist leader Igor “Strelkov” Girkin published on VKontakte at 17:50 Moscow time (less than two hours after MH17 was destroyed and shortly before reports began surfacing that the downed airliner was in fact MH17) in which he writes: “In the vicinity of Torez, we just downed a plane, an AN-26. It is lying somewhere in the Progress Mine. We have issued warnings not to fly in our airspace. We have video confirming. The bird fell on a waste heap. Residential areas were not hit. Civilians were not injured.” The post was later removed from the VKontakte site.[13]

–       8 November 2014: In its report “Origins of the Separatists’ Buk: A Bellingcat Investigation,” Bellingcat, a group of citizen journalists that investigates current events using open source information such as videos, maps and pictures, attempts to determine who (i.e. pro-Russian separatists, the Ukrainian military or others) was in control of the particular BUK system believed to have destroyed MH17. Bellingcat’s MH17 investigation team finds that “there is undeniable evidence that separatists in Ukraine were in control of a Buk missile launcher on July 17th and transported it from Donetsk [Russia] to Snizhne on a transporter. The Buk missile launcher was unloaded in Snizhne approximately three hours before the downing of MH17 and was later filmed minus one missile driving through separatist-controlled Luhansk.”[17]

–       19 March 2015: Jeroen Akkermans, a correspondent for RTL News, visited the open MH17 crash site in November 2014 and collected metal fragments that were determined to belong to the payload of a 9M317 BUK missile. The ammunition fragments were turned over to the Dutch Safety Board for use in its own ongoing investigation into the cause of the MH17 crash.[20]

–       16 May 2015: Dutch NOS national TV and leading daily De Volkskrant jointly published their findings on the probable route the Buk installation traveled in Ukraine on the day of the downing of MH17 (17 July 2014). The NOS website story includes an interactive feature describing in detail the route followed by the trailer carrying Buk, as well as the route followed by the Buk itself (after it was unloaded from the trailer) to the location from where the fatal missile was fired (a hilltop called Saoer Mogila, near Pervomajsk).[24] On the news show Nieuwsuur on 16 May, NOS correspondent Gert-Jan Dennekamp said that all info is pointing to the conclusion that the Buk missile was supplied by Russia and was fired from rebel-held territory southeast of the crash site.[25]

https://www.globsec.org/news/malaysia-airlines-flight-mh17-selected-evidence/#d3GQADYMJs7B2KWa.99

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7-18-14  The Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) has released audio purporting to show pro-Russian militants in eastern Ukraine discussing receipt of sophisticated antiaircraft weapons and the crews to man them from Russia.

The SBU believes the weapons were used to shoot down a Malaysia Airlines passenger jet on July 17, killing some 300 people.

The first of the newly released conversations purportedly took place on July 14 between a commander in the self-proclaimed "Luhansk People's Republic" and an alleged officer of Russian military intelligence (GRU) by the nickname of "Oreon."

In that conversation, the Luhansk commander says, "We already have the Buk and we will shoot them [Ukrainian military planes] down" and Oreon responds, "Yes, I know that.”   https://www.rferl.org/a/ukraine-mh17-audio-buk-russia/25462008.html

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With Sergey Dubinsky’s identity as “Khmuryi” confirmed beyond all reasonable doubt, both in his additional discovered posts and confirmation from his friend Ivan Okhlobystin, we can now provide additional analysis regarding Dubinsky’s role in the transport of Buk 332 on July 17, 2014 through eastern Ukraine.  As this analysis will show, Dubinsky was a key–or perhaps even the key–figure in organizing the transport of Buk 332 from Donetsk to a field south of Snizhne on the day of the tragedy.  Furthermore, this additional analysis confirms the authenticity of the intercepted telephone conversations involving Dubinsky published by the SBU on July 18, 2014.  Some details of these calls were previously under dispute or unclear, such as references to downed jets and Gvozdikas in a call between Dubinsky and “Botsman,” but a closer look reveals that even minor details in the calls can be verified through open source materials.

The following sections will provide both a summary and detailed analysis of the five calls involving Sergey “Khmuryi” Dubinsky published by both the SBU and JIT, along with additional commentary on some of the additional details provided in a slightly extended version of a call published by the JIT.

Dubinsky in Intercepted Calls Published by the SBU

Intercepted phone calls published by the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) reveal numerous details about Dubinsky’s role around the transport of Russian Buk 332 on July 17, 2014. The day after the downing, the SBU identified Khmuryi (Dubinsky) as “Sergey Nikolayevich Petrovsky, born 1964, officer of the Russian GRU, Igor ‘Strelok’ Girkin’s deputy of intelligence, who was in Donetsk at the time of the intercept.”  We now know that some of these details are true, and some are a bit off–namely, the year of birth (1962, not 1964) and his last name (Sergey Nikolayevich Dubinsky, not Petrovsky, which was his pseudonym in the DNR). Additionally, in one uploaded version of the conversations, the SBU duplicated information from a previous call (see summary of the fifth call).  The SBU provides the number of the telephone that was intercepted: +38 063 121 3401.  Two of the original videos published by the SBU can be accessed here (Ukrainian) and here (English). Dubinsky speaks at the following times in the video: 1:33 – 3:52, 4:15 – 5:22.

Summary of the first call (9:08am):

In the first conversation, Dubinsky speaks with “Buryatik,” a separatist soldier who has never been identified with certainty.  Buryatik asks Dubinsky (Khmuryi) where to load a Buk-M1 (which is called a “beauty,” “Buk,” “B,” and “M” at different points), which was taken by Buryatik from an unidentified location to Donetsk.  After asking where to unload and hide the Buk from the truck it was towed on, Buryatik confirms to Dubinsky that the Buk came with a crew.  Dubinsky tells Buryatik that there is no need to unload and hide it, but instead said that it has to go “to there” now.

Analysis

• The time of this call (9:08am) is provided in the English version of the SBU video, along with the JIT’s video from March 30, 2015.
• It is unclear from the call if this “crew” (экипаж) came with the Buk from Russia, was a group of separatist soldiers, or was a mix of the two.
• The destination for the Buk mentioned by Dubinsky is presumably a field south of Snizhne, or another place meant to provide air defense cover to the area.  This is quite logical for the time, as Ukrainian jets conducted airstrikes in the area around Snizhne at that time.  The most well known example of this was an airstrike hitting an apartment building in Snizhne on July 15, killing 12 civilians.  Satellite imagery further documents the presence of a Su-25 ground attack fighter in the area on July 16, 2014 (see coordinates 47.951409, 38.828687).
• A video published on March 30, 2015 by the Dutch-led Joint Investigation Team reveals a few extra seconds from this call, as detailed at the end of this article.

Summary of the second call (9:22am):

In the second phone conversation, which begins at 2:12 in the embedded video above, Dubinsky agains speaks with Buryatik.  He asks if he brought one or two Buks.  Buryatik explains that there was a mix-up with the transfer, as they did not have or were not willing to give/loan a second vehicle to transfer another Buk with.  “They” unloaded the Buk from the truck they transported it on, and the Buk crossed the border on its own and was then transported with a truck. Dubinsky then tells Buryatik that the Buk will be going to its destination with tanks from the Vostok Battalion.

Analysis

• The time of the call (9:22am) is provided in the English version of the SBU video.
• Dubinsky expected a second vehicle with the delivery, though it is unclear what this would have been.  It would be safe to assume that Dubinsky helped coordinate the transfer and use of the Buk, as he had some previous idea about what would be delivered, and Buryatik knew to call him for where the Buk would be moved or hidden.
• It’s not entirely clear what situation occurred when Buryatik described “the mix-up that they had” (у них там пошла непонятка).  It is possible that he expected another transport vehicle to be used to take another Buk, or that “they” would conduct a portion of the transport themselves.
• The identity of “they” is unclear, referring to those in Russia who brought the Buk to the border.  Buryatik never gives many identifying details, but we know that they had contact with the separatists, may have included crew members (see analysis of previous conversation), and they transported the Buk to the border.
• The exact crossing point for where the Buk crossed the border under its own power (“она своим ходом (…) перешла через полоску”), or where the transport vehicle was parked on the Ukrainian side of the border, is unclear.  Of the possible candidates, an illegal border crossing point between Severnyi, Ukraine and Donetsk, Russia at 48.352967, 39.942758 seems most likely.  For more information, see page 47 the Bellingcat report “Tracking the Trailers” and pages 11-13 of the Bellingcat report “Russia’s Path(s) to War“.
• In an interview with the now-defunct separatist news outlet icorpus (but saved on the blog El Murid), Dubinsky mentioned how he was allowed to take 3-4 tanks from the Vostok Battalion on the day of the downing of MH17: “…when I was going to Stepanivka, right before the Boeing crash, [Vostok Battalion commander] Khodakovsky called me for some reason instead of Igor Ivanovich [Girkin, “Strelkov”], and told me: “If you need to, you can take 3-4 of my tanks.”  And I took them, because I did need to.“
• The transport of the Buk with the Vostok tanks did not take place exactly as explained.  Arnold Greidanus and Ukraine@War (also see here) have done extensive analysis on the Vostok convoy that travelled along roughly the same route as the Buk, but at different times. Two videos of the Vostok convoy can be seen below:

Summary of the third call (9:23am):

Dubinsky speaks with a different person, “Sanych,” in the third call, starting at 2:43 in the previous embedded video. The SBU describes him as a fighter of the DNR and a deputy of Khmuryi (Dubinsky).  In the call, Dubinsky tells Sanych that “my Buk-M” will go with “your guys,” and that the Buk is on a transport vehicle now.  He asks Sanych about where to take it to place it in a military convoy.  Sanych says to take it to the Motel roundabout.

Analysis

• The time of the call (9:23am) is provided in the English version of the SBU video.
• Buk 332 was parked at the Motel roundabout for some time (as filmed by a driver in this video), before it left eastward through Makiivka (filmed here), Zuhres (filmed here), Torez (photographed here), and finally Snizhne (filmed here).
• It is interesting that Dubinsky referred to the Buk as “my Buk,” again indicating that he was a key figure involved in acquiring and transporting the weapon from Russia.
• A key part of these intercepted calls is how we can see which separatists knew different instructions.  Here, Dubinsky does not know where Buk 332 should be taken to send it off in a convoy, but he does know the ultimate destination and that it will be with or near Vostok tanks.

Summary of the fourth call (9:54am):

Dubinsky speaks with a new, unidentified person who is only described as a “DNR terrorist.”  Dubinsky tells this person to call a man called “Bibliotekar” (The Librarian), and that he will find “you know what” at the Motel roundabout.  The unidentified person affirms that he knows what “you know what” is.  Dubinsky then instructs him to take “only those who came back, how ever many you need for the escort, and leave the rest behind here.”  He then tells him to go to a spot near Pervomayskoe, and check a map for directions to the area.  Once the unidentified soldier reaches the area near Pervomayskoe, Dubinsky tells him to set up and unload the remaining people he has with him.  His tasks is to be in reserve and to guard the Buk-M that the person is transporting.  He closes the call by saying that a man named Gyurza (The Viper) will also be at this location.

Analysis

• The time of the call (9:54am) is provided in the English version of the SBU video.
• The question of Bibliotekar’s identity has never been answered with any satisfaction.  Many have investigated the question, but no one has answered who he is for certain.  Some have guessed that he is a Russian soldier, perhaps from one of the intelligence services, though without any specific individual in mind. Others have pointed to Fyodor Berezin, who once served as a Soviet air defense officer, was called the “Russian Tom Clancy” by the New Yorker because of the science fiction and military books he authored, and served as the Deputy Defense Minister in the DNR in 2014.  That said, it’s unclear if Berezin was in Donetsk at the time, and may have been in Luhansk, per his own LiveJournal posts. However, it would be a mistake to assume that “The Librarian” must be the call sign for a literary or bookish person–for example, “Bibliotekar” is a type of monster in the popular Ukrainian video game/Russian book series “Metro 2033,” which is where Arseny “Motorola” Pavlov’s “Sparta Battalion” took its symbol from. Resolving the issue of Bibliotekar’s identity would also settle some of the central questions surrounding the downing of MH17.
• It is unclear exactly what Dubinsky refers to when he says only “those who came back,” but it is possible that he is referring to the fighters in Girkin’s ranks who came back from Sloviansk about two weeks before the downing of MH17.  These men would likely have more fighting experience than those who had only been in Donetsk and nearby cities.
• The people described by Dubinsky are likely those who followed Buk 332 in the escort from Donetsk to Snizhne, though not all of these vehicles were still in the convoy by the time it reached Snizhne.  For example, in the Makiivka video from around 11:00am, the escort vehicles include a black Peugeot 3008, a UAZ-469 jeep, a grey 2010 Toyota RAV4 with a modified spoiler, and a dark blue Volkswagen minivan.  In the Snizhne video, shot just a few hours before the downing, only one vehicle is still escorting the Buk.
• There are two “Pervomayskoe” villages located next to each other, and just down the road from the location where Buk 332 launched the missile that downed MH17. One village, closest to the launch site, is “Pervomaysky,” while another village just one field to the north is “Pervomayske.”  It is unclear which one Dubinsky was talking about, but a separatist checkpoint was located in between Pervomaysky and the launch location, likely indicating that this was the village he had in mind.
• The identity of Gyurza is not entirely clear, as it is a common call sign for soldiers.  He was likely Dubinsky’s deputy in the DNR’s intelligence service.  Novaya Gazeta reported in 2015 that Gyurza was a former French foreign legionnaire, but this claim has not been independently confirmed.

Summary of the fifth call:

The fifth and final call, from the late afternoon or evening of July 17, 2014, is between Dubinsky and “Botsman,” identified by the SBU as an officer of the Russian GRU. Dubinsky tells Botsman that “we are near Marinovka” and things are not going too well.  He says that things aren’t so great because they are under constant Grad fire, and that they had recently shot down a Ukrainian Su-25 jet.  He mentions that his forces received a Buk-M that morning and that things will be easier now.  Dubinsky goes on to say that Ukrainians are trying to escape from Zelenopolye, but to break through they have to go through Dubinsky and his forces.  He also mentions that “yesterday” (July 16) they shot down two Su-25s, and another today.  At the end of the call, Dubinsky says that “in a couple of hours” he’s headed to Donetsk, and that three Gvozdikas are waiting for him in Donetsk.  He will then take the Gvozdikas back to “here” (Marinovka).

Analysis

• The time of the call is given as 9:08am and Dubinsky is described as in Donetsk–both of which are clearly false.  The SBU almost certainly copied the top part of the first call for making the introduction frame for this call, only changing “Buryatik” for “Botsman”.  Dubinsky describes his current location as Marinovka in this call, and the call was conducted after the morning and a shootdown with the Buk.  The exact time of the call is unclear, but was likely in the late afternoon or very early evening soon after the downing of MH17, but before it became widely known that a passenger jet was actually downed.

• The identity of Botsman has never been determined, but Dubinsky describes a series of men who used the call sign in a September 13, 2015 post on Glav.su.   He mentions a Botsman who was a deputy to Bezler, another who was the deputy commander of the 3rd Brigade from Horlivka, and a third in the “Viking” battalion of the DNR.  Of these three, the first is the most likely candidate for the person on the call.
• There was indeed a large-scale battle near Marinovka shortly before the downing of MH17.  On July 16, the day before the downing, a video appeared showing Igor “Strelkov” Girkin and Aleksandr Borodai in a field just northwest of Stepanivka, speaking about the fighting near Marinovka.  A Strela-10 anti-aircraft missile system is visible in the video.  Separatist forces moved into Marinovka during the day of July 17, and reportedly captured at least a portion of the village on the 16th.

• The shot down and damaged jets described to Dubinsky can be partially identified.  He mentions downing two “Sushkas” (Su-25 jets) the day before the call.  On July 16 at around 1pm, two Su-25s were hit, but only one was actually downed.  Reports from separatist sources on that day indicate that the Su-25s were bombing near Savur-Mohyla– just a few kilometers from the eventual MH17 launch site, Marinovka, and the location where Strelkov conducted an interview with an anti-aircraft missile system in the background.  Dubinsky was mistaken about the third “Sushka” that was shot down on the day of the call, as it was not a fighter jet he had first thought.  The only plane that was shot at or downed that day was Malaysian Airlines Flight 17.
• We are able to identify the three Gvozdikas that Dubinsky mentions:  three unnumbered and unmarked 2S1 Gvozdikas that travelled from Luhansk to Donetsk on July 15, 2014.  A convoy accompanying these three Gvozdikas was filmed and photographed numerous times, as described in this Bellingcat investigation.  These three Gvozdikas were seen on July 15 in central Donetsk around 7:00pm.  Three of the same vehicles in this July 15 convoy–an UAZ-469, a 2010 Toyota RAV4, and a dark blue Volkswagen minivan–were in the convoy on July 17 that accompanied Buk 332 through eastern Ukraine.  

This article was collaboratively researched and written by the Bellingcat  MH17 Investigation Team, with contributions from the Conflict Intelligence Team.  https://www.bellingcat.com/news/uk-and-europe/2017/03/02/the-role-of-sergey-dubinsky-in-the-downing-of-mh17/comment-page-1/

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Our first short glimpse into Khmuriy showed that he needed a much closer look.  So we went to Velyka Novosilka village, located in the west of Donetsk Oblast. That is in Velyka Novosilka, where Sergey Dubinskiy spent his childhood.  He also had lived there for several years before the Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine. People who know Dubinskiy have told us about his “timeline of achievements” and much more.

From their words, Dubinskiy’s family was well known in Velyka Novosilka.  The terrorist’s father, Mykola, worked as an engineer, his mother, Kapitolyna, was a teacher.  Both are deceased.

In the eighties and nineties Sergey served in the Soviet Army, and then in the Russian Army. In 1985-1987 he was the deputy commander, and then the commander of the reconnaissance company of 181st Motorized Rifle Regiment in Kabul, Afghanistan.  He was even awarded Order of the Red Star and Order for Service to the Homeland in the Armed Forces of the USSR.

In 1997 Sergey Dubinskiy retired and lived on a pension with his family in Rostov Oblast (Russia) till 2002. Later he divorced. He has a daughter of the first marriage and an illegitimate son. In spring 2002, being a retired lieutenant colonel, he was recalled for military service by the personnel department of the North Caucasian (now – Southern) Military District (SMD), to serve in North Caucasian Combined Forces of Russian Army. In 2002 – 2004 he served as a company commander of the 974th headquarters company (military unit #22727), and as the reconnaissance commander of 194th commandants tactical group. In 2004 he retired again, but his personnel record got lost, so on paper he remained in service. At the same time he succeeded to apply for and receive a pension, however, a Russian court ruled to claim it back (this episode became the starting point for Khmuriy in his Donbas war story).

– In 2005 moved in to live to his mother in Velyka Novosilka village. His ex-wife kept the flat, which he received from the Army, so he had no place to live in Russia, Dubinskiy’s childhood friend said. – He lived with his mother at: 56, Sovetskaya St., apt 11. He had no life there. He was blowing pension on alcohol and women in few days. Then he would putting the lug on his mother (her pension) or would try to tap his friends and neighbors. He was drinking heavily, so neighbors called him Drunk Roger. After a period in Velyka Novosilka, Dubinskiy moved to a summer house in Storozheve village. He lived there approximately till June, 2014.

In 2011 – 2012 Dubinskiy faced a run of bad luck. A spot audit at SMD military units found that his pension payments were not properly documented. The ensuing legal proceedings resulted in a court ruling obliging Dubinskiy to pay back the money received. After that ruling Dubinskiy appealed to SMD headquarters for restoring of his personnel record and properly document his military discharge and pension payments. To solve these issues, in March 2012 he visited the SMD personnel department. There he was directed to the commander of military unit #11659 (the 22nd Special Forces Brigade of Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of Russian General Staff) for reinstating in service and proper military discharge procedure.

In April Dubinskiy finally achieved his aim and retired, this time in the rank of colonel. Thus, during all this time actually spent in Ukraine, Dubinskiy was fictitiously employed at his military unit.  Apparently, Dubinskiy had such privileges for a reason.  With that, he had been enrolled in the ranks of the invisible GRU force in Ukraine, which was under manning and preparation for aggression against Ukraine.  Dubinskiy rapidly went to Russia in June 2014, whereas his Second Chechen War buddy, Igor Strelkov-Girkin promptly appeared in Slovyansk as the Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) Army Deputy Commander, with. On the occupied Ukrainian territory, Dubinskiy formed a special forces company and an intelligence department headquartered in Kramatorsk.  He went on to forming and heading so-called Main Intelligence Directorate of the DPR, on the basis of these groups.

In the beginning of 2015 Dubinskiy left the DPR and moved out to Russia.... However, we know that after Dubinskiy’s departure to Russia his track was lost.  For a while.  Until we succeeded to find his new address in Russia, where he lives with his family:

Russia, Rostov Oblast, Aksaysky District, Bolshoy Log village, Molodezhnaya St., 4B (the house coordinates: 47°18’15.8″N 39°54’49.7″E).

Material prepared by Oleh Baturin and Dmitry Lisunov, Europrostіr, NGO; translated by Evgeniy Kalashnik, edited by Artem Velichko  https://informnapalm.org/en/focus-russian-major-general-suspect-mh17-case/