Defense Policy Booard at DoD

Defense Policy Board Board Membership The Defense Policy Board has nineteen members as of December 17th, 2021.  members include: -chair was Madeleine Albright but she died. -Herman E. Bulls is Vice Chairman, Americas, JLL, as well as an International Director and the founder and former Chair -Janine Davidson, Ph.D.President, Metropolitan State University of Denver, Colorado’s third-largest and most diverse public university. Since her appointment in 2017, Davidson has been a fierce advocate for equity and access in public education, championing the role public universities play in “holding the line on the American dream.” - Thomas E. Donilon is Chairman of the BlackRock Investment Institute. He served as National Security Advisor to President Barack Obama. In that capacity Mr. Donilon oversaw the U.S. National Security Council staff, chaired the cabinet level National Security Principals Committee, provided the president’s daily national security briefing, and was responsible for the coordination and integration of the administration’s foreign policy, intelligence, and military efforts. Mr. Donilon also oversaw the White House’s cybersecurity and international energy efforts and served as the President’s personal emissary to a number of world leaders. -Michèle Flournoy is Co-Founder and Managing Partner of WestExec Advisors, and a Co-Founder, former Chief Executive Officer, and now Chair of the Center for a New American Security (CNAS).Michèle served as the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy from February 2009 to February 2012. She was the principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense in the formulation of national security and defense policy, oversight of military plans and operations, and in National Security Council deliberations. She led the development of the Department of Defense’s 2012 Strategic Guidance and represented the Department in dozens of foreign engagements, in the media and before Congress. -Richard Fontaine is the Chief Executive Officer of the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). He served as President of CNAS from 2012-19 and as Senior Advisor and Senior Fellow from 2009-12. Prior to CNAS, he was foreign policy advisor to Senator John McCain and worked at the State Department, the National Security Council, and on the staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee -Ambassador Nina Hachigian Mayor Eric Garcetti appointed Ambassador Nina Hachigian to be the first Deputy Mayor of International Affairs for Los Angeles and the only one in the United States. Her office connects the world to L.A. and L.A. to the world. They build relationships with foreign partners to bring more jobs, opportunity, culture, ideas, and visitors to Los Angeles and to elevate L.A.’s international leadership, including on climate, inclusion and innovation. They are also laying the foundations for Angelenos to welcome the world for the 2028 Olympic and Paralympic Games and to leave behind a great legacy for the City -Jon M. Huntsman, Jr. currently serves as Vice Chair of Ford Motor Company. He has spent considerable time in public service at the state, national and international levels. Huntsman began his career in public service as a staff assistant to President Ronald Reagan. He has served each of the five U.S. presidents since then in critical roles around the world, including as U.S. Ambassador to Singapore, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Asia, Deputy U.S. Trade Representative, U.S. Ambassador to China, and most recently, U.S. Ambassador to Russia. Huntsman is the only American in history to have served as Chief of Mission in both China and Russia. In all four Senate confirmations he received unanimous votes. -General John M. Keane, United States Army, Retired General Jack Keane is a foreign policy and national security expert authority who provides worldwide analysis and commentary in speeches, articles, congressional testimony and through several hundred television and radio interviews annually. He has advised presidents, vice presidents, presidential candidates, cabinet members, senior government officials as well as members of Congress, all from both political parties and provides strategic advice to CEOs in the private sector. - Henry Alfred Kissinger was sworn in on September 22, 1973 as the 56th Secretary of State, a position he held until January 20, 1977. He also served as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from January 20, 1969, until November 3, 1975. In July 1983 he was appointed by President Reagan to chair the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America until it ceased operation in January 1985, and from 1984-1990 he served as a member of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. From 1986-1988 he was a member of the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy of the National Security Council and Defense Department. He served as a member of the Defense Policy Board from 2001 to 2020. -Michael O'Hanlon is a senior fellow, and director of research, in Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institution, where he specializes in U.S. defense strategy, the use of military force, and American national security policy. He co-directs the Security and Strategy Team, the Defense Industrial Base working group, and the Africa Security Initiative within the Foreign Policy program, as well. He is an adjunct professor at Columbia, Georgetown, and Syracuse universities, and a member of the International Institute for Strategic Studies. O’Hanlon was also a member of the External Advisory Board at the Central Intelligence Agency from 2011-2012. https://policy.defense.gov/OUSDP-Offices/Defense-Policy-Board/Board-Membership/ ………………….. 2-21-21 The board’s current membership includes former Defense Secretary Ash Carter, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Michèle Flournoy, retired Army four-star Jack Keane and others. https://insidedefense.com/insider/defense-policy-board-meet-about-chinese-and-russian-space-weapons ……………………… September 1970-July 1971 National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 66 Edited by William Burr, February 27, the National Security Archive and the George Washington University's Cold War Group of the Elliott School of International Affairs are publishing recently declassified U.S. documents on the Sino-American rapprochement.  This material documents Nixon's efforts to make contacts with Beijing during 1970-1971 as the basis for rapprochement after decades of hostility.  Most of the documents, held in the files of the Nixon Presidential Materials Project at the National Archives, were released in April 2001; they are only the tip of an iceberg of very rich material in the Nixon papers.  The new releases make it possible to publish here for the first time, a nearly-complete record --some pages are still classified--of the historic talks between Zhou Enlai and Henry Kissinger during the latter's secret trip to China in July 1971. …Nixon had been interested in changing relations with China, not least to contain a potential nuclear threat but also, by taking advantage of the adversarial Sino-Soviet relationship, to open up another front in the Cold War with the Soviet Union.  It took time, however, for Nixon and Kissinger to discover how to carry out a new policy toward Beijing and such complications as the U.S. invasion of Cambodia in 1970 created detours in White House efforts to sustain a dialogue with Beijing.(2) On 27 April 1971, Dr. K was about to make another effort to contact Sainteny when the Pakistani ambassador delivered Zhou Enlai's belated reply (see document 16).  Mao Zedong's and Zhou's interest in receiving a visit from Nixon laid the way for Kissinger's secret trip in July 1971 and the beginning of the U.S.-China effort to discuss the issues that had divided them over the years. Nixon was reluctant to give up too much on Taiwan (see item 32), but he knew that the success of the trip depended on U.S. admission that it did not seek "two Chinas or a "one China, one Taiwan solution." In his (covert, in Beijing) talk with Zhou on 9 July, 1971 Kissinger did not use Zhou's formulation that "Taiwan was a part of China" but he nevertheless acknowledged it when he declared that "we are not advocating a `two Chinas' solution or a `one China, one Taiwan' solution."(4) …in his 1979 memoir Kissinger misleadingly wrote that "Taiwan was mentioned only briefly during the first session."(5)  Yet some 9 pages, nearly 20 percent, of the 46-page record of the first Zhou-Kissinger meeting on 9 July 1971, include discussion of Taiwan, with Kissinger disavowing Taiwanese independence and committing to withdraw two-thirds of U.S. military forces from the island once the Vietnam War ended.  Moreover, Kissinger told Zhou that he expected that Beijing and Washington would "settle the political question" of diplomatic relations "within the earlier part of the President's second term."  Kissinger did not say what that would mean for U.S. diplomatic relations with Taiwan but undoubtedly Zhou expected Washington to break formal ties with Taipei as a condition of Sino-American diplomatic normalization. • Undoubtedly, Kissinger hoped that the Taiwan problem would gradually fade away, with peaceful "evolution" uniting China and its wayward province, but Taiwan proved resilient and the downgrading of the U.S.-Taiwan relationship remained a sore point for Republican Party conservatives during the 1970s.  Indeed, Nixon's resignation in 1974 and the political weaknesses of his successor, Gerald Ford, made it impossible for Kissinger to complete the U.S.-PRC normalization process.  Ford could not break ties with Taiwan without raising the ire of the Republican right.  Undoubtedly, when Kissinger published his memoir he did not want to provoke the conservatives, much less Taipei, by disclosing what he had said to Zhou about Taiwan. The U.S. documentation represents only a partial record of a more complex reality.   While Chinese archival sources are largely unavailable. https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB66/………………………………. On Thursday evening the Richard Nixon Foundation launched the inaugural Grand Strategy Summit in Washington, DC. Former National Security Advisor and Secretary of State, Dr. Henry Kissinger opened the Summit via video feed. Transcript of Dr. Kissinger’s Remarks   Dr Henry Kissinger: It is a great privilege for me to be invited to the first Grand Strategy seminar of the Nixon Foundation, because I spent six years of my life working daily with President Nixon and the remaining decades of his life, in close contact with him. In a recent book, I describe Richard Nixon as the American President most similar to Theodore Roosevelt. In his approach to international politics Nixon was a strategist who tried to establish the relationship between American challenges and to find solutions in which progress could be made on key issues simultaneously, dangers reduced and opportunities enhanced. Richard Nixon became president at a fraught moment in American history. In the years before, there had been three assassinations of major American figures, including the president and his brother. The war in Vietnam had gone through a communist offensive that multiplied casualties. And it had been going on for nearly 10 years. The American public was bitterly divided over the war. And massive demonstrations prevented public appearances by President Johnson, who had to confine his visits outside the White House to military installations. The Soviet Union and its allies had occupied Czechoslovakia for daring to pursue an autonomous foreign policy. Dialogue with Russia had broke it off. Of course, China was totally outside any set of relationships with the United States. The Middle East was in turmoil, the 67 War had altered the map of the region, but no alternate system had yet emerged, and the participants in the war were gearing for another conflict. In this situation, with an unsolved Vietnam problem, with crises in the Middle East, recent aggression in Europe, hostility with the Soviet Union, and no contact with China, Richard Nixon became president. And he honored me by appointing me his security advisor. It was a remarkable decision. Because I had never met Richard Nixon, and in fact had been closely associated with Nelson Rockefeller, who was a close friend of mine it the period before. So it was an act of courage to make such a decision. And it showed something of the way Nixon handled his challenges. General Eisenhower told me afterwards that he had been opposed to the appointment because he didn’t think academics could operate at that level of government effectively. I look back on this period of association and leadership by Richard Nixon, with great pride because Richard Nixon introduced a concept of strategic thinking to American foreign policy. Early on in his administration he distributed a memorandum to the various key figures involved in foreign policymaking that the President intended to avoid the approach of treating each problem on it so-called merits because that would lead to the possibility of aggressors picking out the weakest points and keeping quiet on the key issues. So Nixon believed that the issues needed to be related to each other. And that particularly was true of the Soviet Union. So that the Soviet Union should not be able to alternate periods of so called peaceful coexistence with periods of confrontation, but rather, they would be obliged by American policy to concentrate on issues of great importance to us if they wanted to make progress on issues of consequence to them. And he carried out this policy during his six and a half years in office, starting with the Jordan crisis, in December of 1970, and then through a series of Middle East crisis, in which Nixon displayed is characteristic quality, which was composed of two elements. One was that if American security was challenged, Nixon would resist at the highest level of power that was not yet nuclear war, but in a theory of crisis he went on alert three times during crisis in the Middle East. But at the end of the process he had made it lead to what was another major component, that confrontation was not an end in itself. Confrontation had to have a substantive political purpose that improved the situation in which the challenger might develop over time and interest in maintaining the international system. So the confrontations in the Middle East led to a theory of peace agreement between Egypt and Israel, between Syria and Israel, between Jordan and Israel, all of which had been prepared by Nixon’s willingness to fight over the strategic issues and then to move towards negotiation after the issues had been dealt with. In this process the Soviet Union at first was extremely challenging. But Nixon increased the defense budget, though not as much as he desired, because of congressional opposition, and originated a series of weapon systems that became the [inaudible] of subsequent administrations and such as land based strategic weapons and a strategic defense. One of his signal achievements was the opening to China. An idea with which he ?end others? And that to go the Nixon characteristics of combining strategy with tactical flexibility. At the time of Nixon entering office, it was considered axiomatic that the relationship between China was destined to be in permanent confrontation with one of the largest countries in the world. And therefore, against wide opposition, he opened a dialogue with China, which became one of the principal elements of his foreign policy. The reason for that was that between the Soviet Union and China, ideological tensions had developed even prior to Nixon’s term in office, which accelerated afterwards. And it came to our attention that there were conflict and military clashes between Soviet and Chinese troops at a faraway place at the Manchurian border between China and Russia. When that report was placed before him, Nixon noted, of course, the fact that a conflict between the two countries would present new challenges to the United States. But he decided first that in a conflict between two adversaries, we would lean towards the weaker against the stronger even if we had not yet established relationships with the weaker. Secondly, as our policy developed, he issued instructions, which basically said that we should place the American interests in such a way that we were closer to Russia and to China than they were to each other, giving us a maximum flexibility. By these methods he created a situation in which the great issues with which he ended the conflict, the presidency settled or approaching settlement during his period in office. He had proclaimed very early in his period in office that the we would not end the Vietnam War by betraying the people who in reliance on an American promise had sacrificed 10s of 1000s of death sentences and he maintained that promise and he achieved an honorable peace, which could can be defined as follows. In early 1972, Nixon made a series of proposals to the North Vietnamese to end the war on specific terms. Eight months later, after having attempted an offensive, a major offensive to avoid these terms, the Vietnamese accepted them. We could not maintain the assumptions on which the peace had been made. Because the divisions in our country had made it impossible to achieve the military commitments that were needed to sustain them. But at the end of his term, and of his period in office, Nixon had given a new strategy and a new meaning and a new direction to American foreign policy, that link power to purpose and moved America to a position where at that point it was dominating the policy in the Middle East, and it achieved military superiority in the military field and was engaged in meaningful discussions with adversaries which had a actionable, rational vision of peace at the end of it. Of course, conditions have changed and the definition of the priority of adversaries has changed with a change in their capabilities. But the basic vision of Nixon of maintaining the values of America in which other nations could feel secure and supported to participate. That was his great contribution. And I want to thank you all for inviting me here. Many in your group who participated in some of these efforts and all of you are trying to remember a leader who took over his country in adversity, found enormous domestic challenges and emerged from it with a vision and a direction that American foreign policy needs to study and apply. And it was an honor for me to be a contributor to this effort which I will be forever grateful to Richard Nixon. Thank you all very much. https://www.nixonfoundation.org/2022/11/dr-henry-kissinger-launches-inaugural-grand-strategy-summit/ ………..  On September 19, 2022 local time, State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi met with former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger of the United States in New York. Wang Yi congratulated Dr. Kissinger on his upcoming 100th birthday. He said, Dr. Kissinger is an old friend and good friend of the Chinese people, who has made historic contributions to the establishment and development of China-U.S. relations. The Chinese side appreciates that Dr. Kissinger has always been friendly to China and with confidence in China-U.S. relations.  Dr. Kissinger will continue his unique and important role in helping bilateral relations for an early return on the right track. Wang Yi expressed, this year marks the 50th anniversary of President Richard Nixon's visit to China and the issuance of the Shanghai Communiqué. China and the U.S. should take a serious review of the valuable experience in the 50 years of exchanges. China's policy toward the U.S. remains consistent and stable. The three principles put forward by President Xi Jinping in developing China-U.S. relations, i.e. mutual respect, peaceful coexistence and win-win cooperation are a takeaway from the development of China-U.S. relations over the past 50 years, and also basic principles that should be jointly followed in the next stage. President Joe Biden has made the "five noes" commitment (i.e. not seek a "new Cold War"; not seek to change China's system; the revitalization of its alliances is not against China; not support "Taiwan independence"; not look for conflict with China), but what the U.S. has done has run in the opposite direction. The U.S., out of a wrong perception of China, insists on viewing China as its most prominent rival and a long-term challenger. Some people even described successful stories of China-U.S. exchanges as failed ones. By doing so, they respect neither history nor themselves. Dr. Kissinger once warned that China-U.S. relations have been in the "foothills of a Cold War". An outbreak of a new Cold War will be a disaster for China and the U.S., as well as other parts of the world. The U.S. should adopt a rational and pragmatic policy towards China, return to the right track of the three China-U.S. joint communiqués, and safeguard the political foundation of China-U.S. relations. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/wshd_665389/202209/t20220920_10768474.html …………………… American failure in the Vietnam War was based on the power elite’s doctrine of limited war as articulated by Henry Kissinger, foremost betrayer of the Christ in all centuries. His ideas provided the framework around which the American war effort was organized. Secretary of Defense Robert MacNamara under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson turned many of Kissinger’s theories into policy. Kissinger himself applied them when President Nixon appointed him national security advisor in 1969 and secretary of state in 1973. Kissinger promoted the doctrine of Serpent in the Garden:  “Limited war...must be based on the awareness that with the end of our atomic monopoly it is no longer possible to impose unconditional surrender at an acceptable cost,” he wrote in his influential 1957 book, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy. “The result of a limited war cannot depend on military considerations alone,” he continued. “It reflects an ability to harmonize political and military objectives. An attempt to reduce the enemy to impotence would remove the psychological balance which makes it profitable for both sides to keep the war limited.”   Therefore Kissinger is saying the enemy must not be reduced to impotence as this might force him to step over the nuclear threshold. And so the United States must accept impotence for the good of the world. Speaking for the fallen ones and the power elite he is notifying the children of the light who are without shepherds that you cannot impose unconditional surrender upon the fallen ones cast out of heaven by Archangel Michael, who to this day persecute the seed of the Woman, and he has made that official policy of the United States.

- Elizabeth Clare Prophet Pearl of Wisdom 31:23 ………………………