11-26-1998 MOSCOW -- The founder of the Soviet secret police was called the Man with the Crystal Soul because of his purity in the wielding of terror against the enemies of Bolshevism. Today in post-Soviet Russia the agency that grew out of
A trail of extortion, kidnappings and murder, all in the pursuit of criminal gain, leads directly to the inner offices of the Lubyanka, headquarters of Russia's fearsome security police, Col. Alexander Litvinenko and four of his associates said at a news conference last week. …
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''Naturally no one wants to believe something that terrible,'' says Aleksei Kartofelnikov, a bus driver who happened on the unidentified agents on the night of Sept. 21. ''There is something lingering inside us,'' he added, like a suspicion that he and others can neither suppress nor satisfy. ''And unfortunately we in this country have been brought up over the last 70 years to expect such things -- that those in power do what they like.’’…
''I personally don't believe it (Ryazan bomb of 9—22-1999) was an exercise,'' says Klara Rysyova, a pensioner who was bundled against the cold as she carried out the garbage this week. ''But what is the truth? How are we to know?’'
Boris A. Prebylov, a retired engineer paused while beating a carpet to reflect. ''It's sad to think that our lives don't mean anything to someone who would just stamp us out like some king acting for the sake of his own global greatness. I personally don't believe it was an exercise because the local security officials were taking their investigation so seriously, interrogating everyone here and looking for clues.’' Forty-eight hours after the discovery of the bomb touched off evacuation and panic in Ryazan, Nikolai Patrushev, the director of the Federal Security Service, stunned the nation by stating on television that the episode had a hoax perpetrated by his agency to test public vigilance. 'This was an exercise,'' Mr. Patrushev said. ''This was not an explosion. The sacks contained sugar.’'
The bomb was configured as several large bags of powdery material connected by wires to a timing device and a shotgun shell detonator. Lt. Col. Sergei Kabashov of the local police precinct told journalists ''Our preliminary tests showed the presence of explosives.'' Though top officials of the security service denied that, Mr. Patrushev said, ''Exercises should be as close as possible to what happens in real life.’'
''There are no people in the Russian secret services who would be capable of such a crime against their own people,'' Mr. Putin, then a newly appointed prime minister, said during that tumultuous season of war and terrorism. ''The very allegation is immoral.’’…
In Moscow today: ’'all the people'' involved in the terrorist attacks on the Moscow apartment buildings ''are known. Some of them have been detained and already brought to justice, and others are being actively searched for,'' said Viktor Zakharov, a spokesman for the FSB.
''In principle the truth should take the upper hand, but what truth?'' asked Mr. Prebylov, going back to beating his carpet. ''It may be that this all fit into a scenario where the government was preparing the population for the war in Chechnya. But I don't know how the F.S.B. could prepare the public without some instructions. It is possible that the government did not know. It may be that a single person at the top was behind it.’' https://www.nytimes.com/2002/02/13/world/russian-tycoon-s-bombshell-can-it-be.html
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7-22-1999: Aleksandr Zhilin, a prominent military journalist and retired Air Force colonel, publishes an article entitled “Storm in Moscow” in the Moskovskaya Pravda newspaper. According to unnamed sources, Zhilin reports that a group of government figures in President Yelstin’s administration are plotting to destabilize Russian politics by committing spectacular acts of terrorism and other crimes. This alleged plan aims to discredit Mayor of Moscow Yury Luzhkov, a possible candidate in the up-coming presidential elections of 2000. “From trustworthy sources in the Kremlin the following has become known. The administration of the president has drafted and adopted (individual points have been reported to Yeltsin) a broad plan for discrediting Luzhkov with the aid of provocations, intended to destabilize the socio-psychological situation in Moscow. In circles close to Tatyana Dyachenko [Yeltsin’s younger daughter], the given plan is being referred to as ‘Storm in Moscow.’ […] As is confirmed by our sources, the city awaits great shocks. The conducting of loud terrorist acts (or attempts at terrorist acts) is being planned in relation to a number of government establishments: the buildings of the FSB, MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs], Council of Federation, Moscow City Court, Moscow Arbitration Court, and a number of editorial boards of anti-Luzhkov publications….
The article will go unnoticed immediately after publication but will be much-discussed two months later after the September apartment bombings (see September 9, 1999, September 13, 1999, and September 22-24, 1999). The BBC will report on September 30, “Zhilin’s article is interesting because it was written before the bomb explosions. At the very least it says a lot about the fevered political atmosphere in Russia that some people take these theories [of a government conspiracy] seriously.” [BBC, 9/30/1999]
In March 13, 2000 the Russian independent weekly Novaya Gazeta publishes a bombshell that re-ignites the Ryazan incident controversy (see September 22-24, 1999). A soldier named Alexei Pinyaev describes how during the autumn of 1999 he was stationed near Ryazan, a city about 100 miles south of Moscow, and given guard duty at a military warehouse. He says it contained large sacks marked “sugar” but when he and another soldier surreptitiously opened one of the bags to sweeten their tea, the powder tasted vile. They showed the powder to their commander who then turned it over to a bomb expert. The expert identified it as hexogen. Immediately afterwards, several high-ranking FSB officers arrived from Moscow and accused the soldiers of divulging state secrets. To the soldiers’ relief, they were not sent to prison but simply told to forget the whole matter and they were later sent to Chechnya. The story causes an uproar, finally forcing the government to respond to the Ryazan controversy (see March 23, 2000). [SATTER, 2003, PP. 30]
9—22-1999, Ryazan: The two young men and a woman are carrying large sacks into the basement. The residents notice that the car’s plate has been partially covered with paper, although they can still see a Moscow license plate number underneath.
In its February 14-20, 2000 issue the Russian newsweekly Novaya Gazeta: the bomb-squad officer, terror99.ru]
3-23-2000 FSB’s Zdanovich: “The theme was activated on the eve of the presidential election with the most fantastic details in order to accuse the FSB of planning a real explosion with the death of people. This is actively used in the political struggle.” (The presidential election is only one week away.) A soldier named Alexei Pinyaev has claimed that he worked at a nearby base where hexogen was reportedly kept in sacks marked “sugar” (see Fall 1999). The commander of the base denies that there was any soldier named Pinyaev, but the Novaya Gazeta reporter who had found Pinyaev then shows pictures of him and plays a recording of his interview. The FSB will not let its three agents appear in public or allow journalists to interview them.
3-6-2002: Nikita Chekulin, an explosive expert, says he was recruited by the FSB, large quantities of hexogen were purchased through his research institute, the Russian Conversion Explosives Center (Rosconversvzryvtsenter), and shipped under false labels in 1999-2000 out of military bases to cover organizations linked to the FSB. Chekulin says the FSB suppressed a governmental investigation into the scheme. [BBC]
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Cheka killings happened in basements of prisons and public places. No other governmental body supervised them. While records are hard to confirm, it is believed at least 10,000 to 15,000 people were often arbitrarily killed by the Cheka during this period. The real number could possible go up to a million as some argue. The murdered were class enemies, landlords, scientists, priests or often just those who were just caught in the net. Dzerzhinsky was accepting of collateral damage, saying "The Cheka should defend the revolution and defeat the enemy, even if its sword accidentally falls on the heads of innocents.”
As the historian and retired FSB officer Alexander Zdanovich said: "Dzerzhinsky founded a security service, one of the most powerful in the 20th century. It would be counterproductive to paint a portrait of this extraordinary man in black only.”
“When confronted with evidence criminals in almost every case confess; and what argument can have greater weight than a criminal's own confession.” -Dzerzhinsky In another telling quote he explained how he saw the purpose of the Red Terror, defining it as "the terrorization, arrests and extermination of enemies of the revolution on the basis of their class affiliation or of their pre-revolutionary roles.” https://bigthink.com/politics-current-affairs/how-kgb-founder-iron-felix-justified-executions
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