recent: Dzmitry Horam, new deputy prosecutor general, is from KGB, born in 1970 in Tbilisi; from September 1993-2009 senior investigator of major crimes, head of the KGB investigative department in Brest region.
From November 2009 to his current position--head of the KGB investigative department of the Republic of Belarus. https://primesolarquotes.com/california/solarbill-amp.html?gclid=EAIaIQobChMIztab8tfa6wIVD5F-Ch2D1geOEAEYASAAEgKygfD_BwE
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11-28-1997 Russian investigative case (against an environmental group) conclusion was based on the list of classified data stated not in the Law of the Russian Federation "On state secrets" but in secret orders of the Rus Defence Minister….One may see the intentions of FSB to act exclusively at its own discretion and not follow orders based on stated Russian law. https://bellona.org/news/russian-human-rights-issues/nikitin-case/1997-11-fsb-vs-the-russian-prosecutor-generals-office
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As KGB officials in Moscow were either fired, harassed or replaced by people without experience, the (ex-Soviet) republican security apparatus suddenly found itself cut off from Moscow and dependent on local political leaders.
Moscow was mainly interested in saving face and the archives of the (Soviet) republican KGB hqs. For the republics these archives represented an unusual dish of the season, consisting of bone of contention and a hot potato and one which they failed to keep on their own tables. Not having access to the archives meant that the new authorities would have difficulties conducting investigations of local KGB and possibly their own activities during the Communist period, although the lack of archives would also reduce the republics' operational capacities. The Russians acquired a powerful weapon for future manipulation of the new countries, some of which tried almost immediately, for understandable historical reasons, to cut off their ties with Moscow. For many regional bosses and security officials it was also a rare opportunity to hide parts of the archives and blame their disappearance on the Russians and then to use the hidden files at their own convenience.
At the beginning, the prospects for co-operation between Russia and the republics were not encouraging. The fragmentation of the USSR was chaotic and acrimonious. The head of the RSFSR KGB, Viktor Ivanenko, declared at the end of August 1991 that “the use of special services, including espionage services” could not be entirely excluded if the relations between Russia and some of the republics reached a high “state of virulence”12. And yet Russia was willing to talk to the special services of those republics which were ready for bilateral and multilateral co-operation.
The most radical of the republics, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, did not want to have anything to do with the old KGB but were willing to do everything by the book so as not to give Moscow any excuses to use illegal methods either to delay their independence or to disrupt their honeymoon with freedom. Russia also had reasons to keep the split with the Baltic republics as peaceful as possible. All three republics had Russian minorities and all three served as a favourite retirement place for the Soviet military and security personnel. In Estonia alone there were 1,000 KGB pensioners, not all of them native Estonian13. In most cases they were there to stay and wanted to have their pensions paid by Moscow, in accordance with bilateral agreements. All three countries saw the USSR KGB as a tool of oppression and their new special services were set up from scratch.
Gorbachev began dismembering the USSR KGB on 26 September 1991 when he transferred the Moscow City and Region KGB from USSR to RSFSR KGB.
The USSR KGB was abolished on 22 October 1991 by USSR State Council and replaced by three separate bodies, the Central Intelligence Service (TsRS), the Government Communication Committee (KPS), already detached from USSR KGB on 29 August 1991, and the largest element, responsible for internal security, the Inter-Republican Security Service (MSB). The MSB was an amalgamation of
KGB Second Chief Directorate (VGU) responsible for counterintelligence, Fourth Directorate (transport), Sixth Directorate (economic counter-intelligence and industrial security), Seventh Directorate (surveillance) and Operational-Technical Directorate.
The new security body also had elements of USSR KGB which were responsible for personnel, finances, supplies, automated databases, eavesdropping facilities and control of the postal services. The “Z” directorate, responsible for monitoring extremist movements and watching dissidents, was disbanded and its staff distributed around the “new” organisations. In the post break-up period the MSB employed 35,000-40,000 people; 90,000 people were working in the republics, many of them legally and otherwise subordinated to Moscow, and 18,000 were transferred to RSFSR KGB from USSR KGB. The Russian KGB became suddenly, and not unexpectedly, a major player with 70 regional directorates at the administrative levels (kray, oblast and autonomous republics) plus the Moscow Directorate and four other local directorates yet to be created. These 75 regional directorates were to employ 22,000 officers. Russia began to interfere more in All-Union security affairs. Although the USSR still existed, the RSFSR State Council felt it necessary to confirm Vadim Bakatin as the head of the MSB and Yevgeniy Primakov as Director of Central Intelligence Service (TsRS). MSB had to work with the increasingly confused and sometimes resentful republics, and RSFSR KGB had no structure which would allow it control, monitor or liaise with the republics. With the balance of power relentlessly shifting from Gorbachev to Yel'tsin, the MSB would, sooner or later, end up as a part of the RSFSR KGB. The MSB was allowed to conduct intelligence activities which would put it on a collision course with both RSFSR KGB--which was trying to build its own intelligence gathering capabilities-- and the TsRS.
On 26 November 1991 Russia’s President Yel'tsin signed a decree transforming RSFSR KGB into Federal Security Agency (AFB) of the RSFSR. The agency had 20,000 staff working in the central apparatus and 22,000 in the regions. Its leadership remained almost unchanged and the organisation retained the “old” Moscow and Leningrad/St Petersburg directorates. The agency's Director, Viktor Ivanenko, announced that intelligence abroad would be conducted by TsRS and the AFB would conduct intelligence work on Russian territory and therefore the new agency would not be setting up agents in foreign countries. AFB’s estimated budget for 1992 was to be 1.5bn roubles. Ivanenko admitted that the problem of division of responsibilities and links with the Bakatin-led Interrepublican Security Service had not been settled14. MSB was still the largest security organisation in the still existing USSR and plans for co-operation with republics were elaborate. Major-General Aleksander Nikolayevich Karbaynov, the spokesman for Vadim Bakatin, said that 6,500 officers were expected to go to the independent republics15.
On 28 November 1991, Gorbachev issued a decree “On Confirmation of the Temporary Status of the Inter-republican Security Service”. The collegium of MSB included the heads of republican security organisations which signed bilateral co-operation agreements with MSB16. On 3 December Gorbachev signed the law “On Reorganisation of the State Security Organs”17, which was in fact confirmation of USSR State Council decision taken in October and already implemented. The day before, on his own request, Bakatin was received by Yel'tsin and asked whether the Russian president could find R150m to fund MSB18.
On 8 December leaders of Russia, Belorussia and Ukraine signed the Belovezha agreement spelling the end of the USSR. On the day of his departure on an official visit to Italy, 19 December 1991, Yel'tsin signed a decree on the merger of MSB, AFB and Ministry of Internal Affairs of USSR, creating Ministry of Security and Internal Affairs of the RSFSR, headed by Viktor Pavlovich Barannikov, Minister of Internal Affairs. After Yel'tsin’s departure Bakatin was presented by Yel'tsin’s office with another decision about further changes in the still existing Soviet and Russian special services. “Plan B” put the All-Union MSB under Russian AFB control whereas the original decree abolished both organisations, putting them under one roof, that of the new all-powerful ministry. The decision was a crude forgery and, after consulting the head of AFB Ivanenko, Bakatin decided to ignore it19. “Plan B”, rejected by Bakatin and Ivanenko, must thereafter have been accepted by Yel'tsin, either to distract attention from the original decree of 19 October, which was also illegal because Yel'tsin had no jurisdiction over the All- Union organisations, or an attempt to “stretch” the same decree by retaining AFB, in the expectation that the creation of the new ministry would be challenged either in the Duma or Constitutional Court. And indeed, immediately after the disappearance of the USSR, on 26 December 1991 the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet adopted a resolution asking the Constitutional Court to declare the creation of the new ministry invalid. On 15 January 1992 the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation declared the decree of 19 October invalid. Yel'tsin responded by setting up on 24 January separate Ministries of Security and Internal Affairs20. The Security Ministry was responsible for: counterintelligence, military counterintelligence, economic security, combating smuggling and corruption, combating terrorism, internal security of the ministry, border troops and relevant scientific and technical problems. The ministry employed 140,000 people21. It inherited from its predecessors surveillance and monitoring capabilities. The deputy head of the operational-technical department of the Security Ministry said in April 1993 that no more than 1,000 telephones could simultaneously be bugged in Moscow and 2,500 in the whole of Russia22.
Yel'tsin was given national endorsement for his reforms in referendum in April 1993. This was the moment when he could have announced new elections to the Parliament, hoping to get a supportive new Duma. He decided to wait, afraid probably that the regional bosses and corrupt politicians campaigning on regional issues would defeat him. Parliament saw his decision as a sign of weakness and began a political war of attrition. In March 1993 Duma deputies demanded an oath of allegiance from the power structures. Barannikov began to make ambiguous statements as to his own duties and obligations, claiming that it was not his responsibility to combat political extremism. For Yel'tsin the members of the Duma were political extremists. Neither Yel'tsin nor his prime minister were provided with information about corruption in federal ministries which somehow found its way to Communist and nationalist press and to selected members of parliament hostile to Yel'tsin.
On 27 July 1993 Yel'tsin called Barannikov to the Kremlin where, after asking him about his financial contacts with a Swiss company owed by an ex-Soviet national, he fired the security minister. Yel'tsin then called the leadership of the Security Ministry to announce that Barannikov was dismissed for violation of ethical standards23. He appointed Colonel-General Nikolay Mikhaylovich Golushko acting Security Minister. The reason given by Yel'tsin as to why he fired Barannikov was his wife's business contacts which the minister used illegally. Barannikov’s tolerance of his wife’s dubious commercial activities, if not his direct participation in them, contradicted his own statements about combating corruption. A year before Barannikov had fired Major-General Fedor Myasnikov, head of counterintelligence and one of his deputies, Major-General Viktor Klishin, for abusing their positions and corruption. What triggered Barannikov’s dismissal was an attack by Afghan extremists on a Border Guard outpost manned by Russian soldiers on the Afghan-Tajik border. The real reason for Barannikov’s dismissal was his growing support for the increasingly confrontational Duma. He responded with an open letter to Yel'tsin, in which he blamed for his dismissal the “ultra-radicals” who demanded from the ministry decisive action to deal with security problems. Barannikov suggested that they had considerable influence on Yel'tsin. He also blamed Mafia-type structures and ideological opponents of state security systems who organised international conferences critical of the security structures24. Barannikov criticised “the entourage that deals neither with economics nor defence and that apparently does not do anything except indulge in political intrigues”25.
The most trustworthy of Yel'tsin’s supporters in the Security Ministry, Deputy Minister Sergey Stepashin, announced at the end of August 1993 that he would propose Nikolay Golushko for the post of security minister. The defence and security committee of the Russian parliament of which he was chairman had no opportunity to discuss any candidates26. Looking back at recent events, Yel'tsin must have decided not to share control over the Security Ministry with anyone. Kryuchkov was one of the main organisers of the Gorbachov-coup; Bakatin had misgivings about the methods he used to reform the special services in December 1991, Ivanenko, the head of AFB, was critical of creating a super-ministry and Barannikov was unreliable and corrupt27. Yel'tsin accepted Golushko as a time-tested security expert who throughout his career had kept away from political infighting. The President was not concerned that between 1974 and 1987 Golushko worked in the controversial 5th Directorate of the KGB or that between 1987 and 1991 he was Chairman of Ukrainian KGB. Yel'tsin began to prepare for changes in the Security Ministry. He dismissed General Pronin who was responsible for security in the ministry and promoted Sergey Stepashin to the position of First Deputy Minister.
On 21 September 1993 Presidential Decree No 1400 dissolved the parliament. The next day vice-president Rutskoy, Yel'tsin's main opponent, announced his new government. He nominated Barannikov as his minister of security. The Public Relations Office of the Russian Security Ministry issued a statement that the ministry was aware of a developing crisis against which it was taking appropriate measures28. Both the ministry and its Moscow City and Moscow region directorates miscalculated the scope and intensity of the showdown between the parliament and Yel'tsin on 3/4 October 1993. Yevgeniy Savostyanov, head of the Moscow directorate, admitted that this was his major mistake as he did not expect the defenders of the White House to use firearms. When some of the defenders of the White House attacked other strategic buildings in Moscow they were allowed to return to their hq in parliament. Savostyanov admitted also that the Security Ministry “did not play its role in averting the events” because of unspecified legal constraints and lack of in-house power structures29. During the shootouts on 3/4 October, Barannikov tried to rally his former subordinates. He made many phone calls and but succeeded only in rallying 18 security pensioners, not 7,000 as he originally claimed30.
Golushko, promoted on 18 September from acting minister to minister, stood by Yel'tsin during the difficult October days. Yel'tsin survived, however, thanks to courageous support of Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD). This support earned Minister of Interior Yerin the Star of the Hero of Russia, a place on Security Council of Russian Federation and made the MVD Yel'tsin’s favorite power structure until the end of his political career. The Security Minister Golushko got a much smaller award, “the Order For Personal Courage”. Regardless of whether Yel'tsin was informed about the impending coup or not, the security organs were blamed.
On 21 December 1993 Boris Yel'tsin signed Decree No 2233, abolishing Russian Federation Ministry of Security and creating Federal Counterintelligence Service (FSK). The decree was followed by radical reforms amounting to purges. Paragraph 6 of the edict stated that the ministry employees were to be regarded as provisionally employed pending their certification. The Certification Commission was set up. It included the FSK director Golushko, his first deputy Stepashin, Yel'tsin’s national security adviser Baturin and unnamed officials from the presidential and Security Council apparatus. Only the top 200-250 FSK officials were supposed to go through the vetting process. The certification procedure was to be completed by the end of February 199431. A number of counterintelligence employees, including two generals, resigned immediately.
The legal justification for the splitting of Security Ministry said more about Yel'tsin's personal insecurities than his wish to improve the system. Yel'tsin's statement that he wanted do away with a “tool of political surveillance”32 begs the question of why political surveillance had been kept until then. If political surveillance was conducted before the December reforms why was Minister Golushko given the position of director of newly created FSK? Sergey Stepashin was one of Yel'tsin’s closest collaborators and number two in the ministry. Why did he not tell the president about the unacceptable practices of the ministry? If he did not tell the president, why was he not fired, and if he did why did Yel'tsin not react?
The changes allowed Yel'tsin to move Investigation Directorate to General Prosecutor's Office. Later on FSK also lost its own “security” prison Lefortovo to MVD because Golushko refused to keep amnestied instigators of the putsch in prison illegally33. The supervision of General Prosecutor's Office over Investigative Directorate was not what it seemed. The Investigative Directorate was empowered to send their cases directly to the courts, circumventing the prosecutor’s office34. This, it may be argued, was to avoid not always effective, honest or secrecy conscious prosecutors but it also created a system open to large-scale abuse. Several subsections were transferred to Federal Government Communication and Information Agency. The departments responsible for combating organised crime and racketeering were transferred to MVD. In fact MVD acquired most of the tools for political surveillance. An unspecified number of people were transferred from FSK to the Federal Tax Police. FSK retained the directorates responsible for investigating corruption among high ranking officials, economic security, military counterintelligence and counterintelligence support for the now operating separately border troops.
In comparison with its predecessor FSK manpower was cut by 46% to 77,640 people, excluding scientific-technical and medical specialists and guards, maintenance and servicing personnel. The number of administration personnel was halved. The number of employees in the central apparatus was cut to 1,52035. Yel'tsin succeeded not only in trimming the power organ he feared most but in changing its status from ministry to committee, taking it out of Parliament’s reach.
Decree 2233 was followed on 5 January 1994 by Statute No 19 on “The Federal Counterintelligence Service”. The statute made FSK responsible for conducting counterintelligence work in Armed Forces, Ministry of Interior troops, Border Guard Troops, Other Troops and Formations Internal Affairs organs, Federal Tax Police and Customs Organs. The statute allowed FSK to conduct intelligence work and to determine its basic directions but only in co-ordination with SVR. FSK could also develop contacts with foreign special services.
FSK was to conduct signals intelligence (sigint) work and to develop appropriate equipment in conjunction with Ministry of Communication and FAPSI. The Statute tasked FSK with warning the president (and no one else) about any threats to Russia.36
In February 1994 the Duma amnestied the organisers of the October coup. The decision was unpleasant to Yel'tsin but it was legal. Yel'tsin asked Golushko to keep the prisoners longer. Golushko refused and resigned. Yel'tsin changed the wording in his resignation letter so it would look like Golushko was fired and transferred the Lefortovo prison to MVD37. Golushko was replaced by his first deputy, Sergey Stepashin, on 3 March 1994. Stepashin started his career as a political officer in MVD fire brigades. He had been one of Yel'tsin’s staunchest supporters since August 1991 and was certain to follow Yel'tsin’s orders unquestioningly. His arrival at the Lubyanka provoked rumors that FSK would be divided even further, with counterintelligence going to Ministry of Justice, the directorate responsible for security of strategically important facilities and military counterintelligence to Ministry of Defence and antiterrorist component to Ministry of Internal Affairs38.
If there was a real need to rebuild the security organs, Stepashin was the best person to do it because Yel'tsin trusted him. In an interview at the end of November 1994 Stepashin admitted that decisions taken in December 1993 concerning an attempt to make FSK a purely information gathering service were premature39. If FSK was to deal with growing crime, ethnic conflicts, drugs and terrorism, not to mention its counterintelligence duties, it had to be strengthened. Whatever the FSK shortcomings all other power structures were even less competent to tackle increasingly violent crime with foreign links. In June 1994 Sergey Stepashin announced a new, crime fighting division within FSK. He suggested that the division should employ 700-800 investigators40. In the autumn of 1994 Boris Yel'tsin signed a decree bringing back the investigation directorate from General Prosecutor’s Office to FSK. The directorate had about 1,000 people41. Stepashin succeeded also in reclaiming antiterrorist unit from MVD.
Stepashin must have convinced Yel'tsin that FSK employees should be given some form of employment guarantees if the organisation were to recover after the post-October 1993 purges. Aleksander Strelkov, deputy director of FSK, signed a collective agreement with Russian FSK trade union organisations “protecting the economic and social interests of the civilian personnel”. The agreement included a provision that “all matters related to changing FSK structure, its reorganisation and downsizing, will also be considered by the service’s management with direct participation of the trade union and subdivision managemen and with mandatory participation of trade union committee representatives.” FSK trade unions were also to be allowed to monitor social conditions of the organisation's personnel42. …
On 28 July 1999 Shamil Basayev, the best known Chechen field commander, showed a group of journalists 18 men who, he alleged, spied for Russia. Four of them, according to Basayev, were FSB colonels. The FSB issued an official denial, calling Basayev's accusation a “deliberate provocation”66 but a month later Nikolay Patrushev, director of the FSB, said that getting information from North Caucasus was the FSB's main task67. The Russian victory in the latest Chechen conflict will keep FSB in Chechnya very busy, but it may reduce Chechen kidnapping industry for the time being. FSB Public Relations Office announced at the beginning of February 2000 that there were over 500 hostages in Chechnya, including children and foreigners and that 60 groups are involved in kidnappings68.
The first Chechen conflict and Sergey Stepashin's persuasions must have convinced Yel'tsin that FSK should be reformed and strengthened. The president signed the Federal Law of 3 April 1995 “On the Organs of the Federal Security Service in the Russian Federation”. The law changed FSK into Federal Security Service (FSB) and made the new service a much powerful organisation. The law described FSB role in the regions, clarified FSB role in the Armed Forces and other military bodies, gave FSB director ministerial status and the rank of army general,
allowed it, in co-operation with SVR, to conduct intelligence work and to protect Russian citizens and enterprises abroad, obliged FSB to inform the president and prime minister about national threats, gave FSB powers of detention and right to enter any premises or property “if there is sufficient evidence to suppose that a crime is being been perpetrated there”. FSB was not required to obtain a warrant but had to inform the Prosecutor within 24 hours69. It
allowed FSB to set up companies when necessary, permitted FSB to set up special units, carrying firearms and to train security personnel in private companies, described some aspects of remuneration for FSB personnel, established the control structures over FSB70.
allowed it, in co-operation with SVR, to conduct intelligence work and to protect Russian citizens and enterprises abroad, obliged FSB to inform the president and prime minister about national threats, gave FSB powers of detention and right to enter any premises or property “if there is sufficient evidence to suppose that a crime is being been perpetrated there”. FSB was not required to obtain a warrant but had to inform the Prosecutor within 24 hours69. It
allowed FSB to set up companies when necessary, permitted FSB to set up special units, carrying firearms and to train security personnel in private companies, described some aspects of remuneration for FSB personnel, established the control structures over FSB70.
FSB director had 7 deputies. The number of personnel remained officially unchanged. The law was given to Parliament’s upper chamber (the Federation Council) Security and Defence Committee before it was enacted by Yel'tsin. The committee had no observations to make. So under Standing Orders (Article 98) it was not submitted for consideration to the Federation Council, which accepted it automatically71. The committees in both chambers were happy that the new security body which was about to emerge would be given more powers and widen its scope of activities. The price Yel'tsin had to pay for smooth passage of the law through Parliament was to agree that there would be no shake-up of the personnel of FSB. The draft law even included a special article to that effect72.
The edict which completed FSB reforms, for the time being, was Edict 633, signed by Yel'tsin on 23 June 1995. The edict made the tasks of FSB more specific than any previous laws, giving FSB substantial rights to conduct cryptographic work and described the powers of FSB director73. The number of deputy directors was increased to 8; 2 first deputies, 5 deputies responsible for departments and directorates and 1 deputy director heading the Moscow City and Moscow regional directorate.74
Sergey Stepashin resigned on 30 June 1995 after a group of Chechens took hostages in a hospital in Budennovsk in the North Caucasus.75 For three weeks Yel'tsin could not decide who should replace Stepashin. Advised probably by the head of the Presidential Security Service Lieutenant-General Korzhakov, Yel'tsin opted for a safe pair of hands, appointing on 24 June the head of State Protection Office Colonel-General Mikhail Ivanovich Barsukov as new director of FSB. Barsukov was Korzhakov’s close friend and like Korzhakov spent most of his professional life guarding important officials and important buildings. In the post-Budennovsk purges, Barsukov fired Colonel General Anatoliy Semenov, chief of Antiterrorist Directorate; Major-General Romanov, FSB chief in Stavropol Kray, and Lieutenant-General Igor Alekseyevich Mezhakov, Stepashin's deputy in FSB and senior FSB representative in Chechnya. Another immediate result of the events in Budennovsk was the creation of Antiterrorist Centre76. Viktor Zorin was appointed as its head. The Centre boasted that in 1996 alone it prevented 400 terrorist acts.77
In January 1996 a group of Chechens commanded by a little known commander Salman Raduyev took over a hospital in Kizlyar and after taking hostages moved to the village Pervomayskoye. In his position as FSB director Barsukov was appointed by Yel'tsin to head the operational staff responsible for dealing with the kidnappers. The operation was not a success. Numerous units were badly co-ordinated, had inadequate maps and communication equipment. The soldiers taking part in the siege of Pervomayskoye were not even properly fed78. A large group of kidnappers, including Raduyev, escaped and General Barsukov held a press conference at which he announced his astonishment at the speed with which Chechen kidnappers ran away from federal forces and added an unprecedented racist remark about the Chechen nation79. In spite of his evident incompetence Barsukov survived six more months.
FSB had to compete for resources with organisations protecting the President. In the post August 1991 purges KGB Protection Directorate responsible for guarding state and Party officials was taken over, first by President Gorbachev and later by President Yel'tsin. In 1992 Yel'tsin set up an independent Main Protection Directorate (GUO). The directorate was in charge of protecting Yel'tsin and other state officials. In case of emergency GUO was to command the 27 Motor Rifle Special Purpose Brigade, Kremlin Regiment, 119th Air Assault Regiment and Alfa and Vympel special forces teams. After the clash with Parliament in 1993 Yel'tsin authorised the creation of an organisation which would protect only him. On 11 November 1993 he signed a decree setting up the Presidential Security Service as military unit No11488. In July 1995 Yel'tsin formally incorporated GUO into the Presidential Administration. As an independent legal entity, GUO was answerable only to the President80.
SBP was created in 1993. It was planned to have 1,400 officers and 100 civilians, but in reality its staff reached only about 1,000. Its Protection Centre employed more than 100 people. The salaries of the SBP personnel were far above the average. A colonel in SBP would earn the equivalent of $1,000 a month and additional perks. It was also the only special service in Russia not obliged to present its account books to the Central Bank. It was allowed to collect and process information about domestic and foreign threats. In 1994 the SBP, on Yel'tsin’s insistence, established a department “P” responsible for combating corruption among the staff of Russian government. The service was empowered to deal directly with Russia’s judicial bodies. At the beginning of 1996 the SBP and Main Military Procuracy conducted an operation at Moscow “Sheremetevo-2” airport confiscating a large shipment of jewels coming from London and worth $3m. The whole operation took a year to plan. In the mid 1990s SBP set up a female bodyguard section to guard wives of visiting foreign heads of state and the female members of Yel'tsin’s family. Chief of SPB had the powers of a federal minister. In June 1996 GUO was transformed into Federal Security Service (FSO) and on 2 August 1996 SBP was subordinated to FSO. The Protection Centre merged with FSO Operational-Technical Department. In the mid 1990s GUO, and then FSO, had officially 20,000 to 22,000 people in its ranks. In reality 44,000 people were working for GUO in 1996.
When on 19 June 1996 officers of Presidential Security Service (SBP) detained two of Yel'tsin’s presidential campaign workers carrying $500,000 in cash, the head of SBP, Korzhakov, asked Barsukov for an operational team from FSB to investigate the affair. Yel'tsin fired them both the next day. Barsukov's most positive contribution to the development of FSB was a transfer from FAPSI of unspecified communication operations81. With departure of Korzhakov and Barsukov the political importance of the security empire build around the president was reduced to what it was originally set up to do, namely guard and protect him. Their numbers were reduced to 40,000 in 1998 and to 30,000 in 199982. SBP personnel was reduced from 4,000 in 1995 to 900 in 1999. For comparison USSR KGB 9th Directorate responsible for protecting Soviet officials employed 8,700 people83.
In August 1991 Alfa refused to attack the Russian Parliament. After the August 1991 coup Bakatin called the commanders of both elite teams, Alfa and Vympel, to tell them that they were subordinate only to Gorbachev. After USSR ceased to exist Yel'tsin took over both teams. In 1992 they were transferred to newly created Main Protection Directorate (GUO). In October 1993 80 Alfa officers and about 100 Vympel officers were on standby under the command Lieutenant-General Mikhail Barsukov, but when ordered by Yel'tsin to attack Parliament they refused. As a punishment they were resubordinated to MVD at the end of 1993. Out of 500 members of the Vympel team, 320 moved to other establishments and 120 decided to quit. Both teams were returned to FSB in August 1995 to join the new antiterrorist centre. In Budennovsk and Pervomayskoye Alfa was badly commanded and badly supported. In December 1995 the team liberated a group of Korean tourists taken prisoners by a gunman. …
Until August 1999 the fight against terrorism was organised and supervised on three levels: the government, responsible for the supervision of the antiterrorist struggle, bodies directly involved in combating terrorism, namely FSB, MVD, SVR, FSO, MOD and FPS, bodies carrying out preventive measures such as the Ministry of Nuclear Energy, Ministry of Transport and Ministry of Emergency Situations.
All the antiterrorist forces were co-ordinated by Interdepartmenal Antiterrorist Commission. Commission was responsible for setting up operational staff in each individual case and no one was permitted to overrule its decision during the operation. FSB had at its disposal Directorate A (the former Alfa unit), responsible for taking measures against terrorists on means of transport and buildings. Directorate B (the former Vympel unit) was to react in strategic installations, which is what they were originally trained to do for their missions abroad. Both Directorates were expected to act together in large scale operations. Special operations departments were set up by FSB in 11 cities86.
The badly led FSB was to some degree a victim of its own success in the Soviet period when as KGB it had no problems with funding or recruitment and when it was forced to cooperate with other Soviet organisations it was either put in charge of joint operations or supervised from the sidelines. FSB's Soviet predecessor never had to deal with a conflict on the Chechen scale and was not trained for such eventualities. It was not prepared for combating organised crime because there was “no organised crime” in USSR. By the time all forms of crime known to other countries around the world appeared in Russia, torn by conflicting social, political and economic interests, Yel'tsin was not interested in creating a unified and effective security system because such a system could threaten him. Security bosses selected by him were not supposed to be very competent because that would be a threat as well. The principal actors in the Chechen drama on Russian side were Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Internal Affairs. FSB was an important player in Chechnya but it had to combat organised crime, terrorism, drug smuggling and corruption on the territory of the whole Federation as well. Russia had no other organisation with experience, facilities or personnel to deal with the crime wave87.
Russia’s economic problems were getting worse and the crime wave was getting bigger. It frightened potential investors and creditors. Yel'tsin wanted to have a security technocrat at the helm of FSB. On 20 June 1996, the day he fired Barsukov, Yel'tsin promoted a little known deputy director of FSB, Nikolay Dmitrevich Kovalev, to Acting Director and later to Director of FSB. Kovalev began his career in Moscow Directorate of KGB and was later transferred to 5th Directorate where he concentrated on foreign radio stations broadcasting in Russian. He later served in Afghanistan and after coming back worked for a while in the Moscow Directorate, from where in October 1994 he was promoted Deputy Director of FSK. Kovalev did not seek promotion, was not involved politically, did not lobby for the job and was not one of the front runners for it. In 1994 he was in charge of a successful operation against the Italian Mafia’s attempt to smuggle large sums of counterfeit dollars to Russia. Yel'tsin was worried about economic crime so Kovalev was offered a position he never asked for88. He was promoted over Viktor Zorin, First Deputy Director, who was not given the job because he was regarded as Chernomyrdin’s man and was too close to some of the Communist Party members. He also had unspecified financial links with two banks and an oil company and was accused of being indiscreet when dealing with the Germans. Yet professionally, as the supervisor of anti-terrorist operations he had consistently and aggressively fought for good equipment for his operators. Another candidate, Deputy Director Anatoliy Safonov, had ties with a number of Siberian companies and a town house worth $200,000. Anatoliy Trofimov, another Deputy Director of FSB, was regarded as politically active, which had a detrimental effect on his managerial and operational achievements. Trofimov, in his position as head of FSB Moscow Directorate, had attempted to investigate the case of the money box for which Korzhakov and Barsukov were fired. He was fired in his turn on 20 February 1997 for unspecified serious infringements89. The accusation could have been triggered by the arrest of three of his subordinates for dealing in drugs. The arrest was made by MVD, which then leaked the information to the press. Trofimov was fired two days after the media reported the arrest90. Another candidate for Barsukov’s position was Valeriy Timofeyev, Chief of FSB Academy. He had no enemies but no supporters in Yel'tsin’s close circle of confidants91.
The situation of apolitical Kovalev became more complicated when in August 1996 Boris Yel'tsin nominated a retired paratrooper, General Aleksandr Lebed, Secretary of the Security Council. Inexperienced, honest and brutal, Lebed helped Yel'tsin to win the July election and was rewarded with this powerful and sensitive position. Lebed's track record and his memoirs92 written almost like a political manifesto petrified democrats and criminals alike. The first group thought that their newly won freedoms would be trampled on and the latter that they would not be able to go on milking the Russian economy and might be investigated and imprisoned for what they had already done. Yel'tsin's close circle included people representing both groups. Lebed’s nomination coincided with Yel'tsin’s edicts creating within FSB the Long Term Programs Directorate (UPP). The unit was to be headed by Colonel Khokholkov. The directorate was to make forecasts concerning Russia’s security problems and to develop the most modern methods, using up to date technology to combat crime. When the report about the new body was leaked the FSB stated that the unit was not yet fully operational.93 Those leaking the information accused General Lebed of running his own mini-KGB. FSB Public Relations Office felt obliged to reject the accusation but had to admit the existence of the UPP.
Shortly after his appointment Aleksandr Lebed mentioned a list of 30 FSB generals to be dismissed. In October 1996 the Russian media were told by an unspecified source within Yel'tsin’s close circle that the list, compiled by banker Boris Berezovskiy and passed to the president, did not exist.94 The apparently groundless suspicion must have been real enough to FSB officials, because when on 23 October 1996 Prime Minister Chernomyrdin, accompanied by Anatoliy Chubays head of the Presidential Administration, and Sergey Stepashin spoke to the leadership of FSB, the first question asked, after the Prime Minister’s speech, was about the impending dismissal of 30 FSB generals. Chernomyrdin assured FSB leadership that there would be no dismissals95. Yel'tsin must have felt very insecure if he sent to FSB headquarters not only his Prime Minister but the two people he trusted most. The last prime minister to visit the Lubyanka was Aleksey Kosygin in the 1970s. A commentator with a KGB background told RTR TV that after talking to members of the special services he concluded that most special services officers had voted for Lebed in the last election96.
The economic security of Russia was a fashionable subject at the beginning of 1997. Kovalev was sent to the Economic Forum in Davos to reassure the world that the Russian economy was in good hands and that potential investors and their money should feel safe in Russia. FSB acquired the Economic Counterintelligence Directorate within the Counterintelligence Department. Among its many tasks, the directorate was to control contacts between Russian defence enterprises and foreigners and to prevent strategically important Russian companies being taken over by foreigners. The directorate was also responsible for watching Russian banks, whose activities were seen as damaging to Russian interests, and high-ranking officials and state employees suspected of having bank accounts in the West. FSB's Public Relations Centre announced in May that its activities benefited Russia by $33 million; however they did not provide a breakdown of the total sum or a description of individual cases of economic security vigilance97.
On 22 May 1997 Boris Yel'tsin signed Decree No 515 on the new structure of FSB98. The rumors about dismissals continued. Two of Kovalev’s first deputies, Viktor Zorin and Anatoliy Safonov, were allegedly fired and other members of the central apparatus were also threatened with dismissal99. In fact Safonov moved to chair the newly created Russian-Belorussian Union’s Security Committee and Zorin became head of Main Directorate of Special Programmes (GUSP), the most secret of all security organisations answerable only to the president100. The official reason for yet another reform was “optimisation of the system of control inside FSB”101.
On 24 May FSB Public Relations Office was forced to make vague comments on the decree, which suggests that they were not told about its details. In the next statement a member of the office staff admitted that FSB received a copy of the edict but then added that their superiors had forbidden them to discuss some points of the edict because it concerned presidential staff.102 On 28 May unnamed FSB personnel questioned the professional competence of those who composed the edict. The new edict abolished a position of one first deputy director. The FSB was therefore run by the Director, a First Deputy Director, Five Deputy Directors – heads of FSB departments, one Deputy Director of Moscow City and region directorate, and 11 members of a collegium which had to be approved by the president.
FSB structure was changed; 14 directorates were replaced by 5 departments and 6 directorates: Counterintelligence Department, Anti terrorist Department, Analysis, Forecasts and Strategic Planning Department,
Personnel and Management Department, Operational Support Department, Directorate of Analysis and Suppression of Activity of Criminal Organisations, Investigation Directorate, Operational-Search Directorate, Operational-Technical Measures Directorate, Internal Security Directorate, Administration Directorate, Prison “Lefortovo” and Scientific-Technical centre.103
The reforms of May 1997 resulted in abolition of all vacant posts n FSB and forced some generals into retirement, who would otherwise have been kept on. FSB was not to recruit civilian personnel and the number of places offered by FSB Academy was cut back. Experienced investigators moved from FSB to MVD, to work for the courts or transferred to the operational structures of FSB with fixed hours and possibilities for moonlighting. The salaries in FSB at the beginning of 1998 had fallen so low that this became “practically the main problem” for the personnel. A colonel in FSB with 15 years seniority earned R2,200 a month, a lieutenant received R1,500104. The salaries of SVR employees were 50% higher; those of FSO 150% higher. FSB leadership planned to employ many of the redundant officers on a freelance basis but the financial crash of August 1998 dramatically worsened the organisation’s financial status. In September 1998 FSB staff received half of their salaries and distribution of meal allowances had stopped at the beginning of the year.105 In July 1997 Kovalev commanded 45,000 operatives106. The total number of FSB employees at the end of 1997 was 80,000107, 4,000 less than in August 1995108. In mid 1994 Stepashin was quoted saying that he could not be expected to “look into the souls of his 100,000 staff”109.
On 4 July 1997 Boris Yel'tsin signed a decree ordering cuts in FSB central apparatus by 20%, to 4,000110. The decree was to be implemented by the end of the year but it was either annulled or the figures required were reached by natural attrition and transfers. For budgetary reasons Yel'tsin planned to subordinate FPS to FSB. The rumours about the merger circulated at the end of 1997 and at the beginning of 1998 were not unfounded. When on 30 December 1993 the border troops where detached from Security Ministry their well connected and capable head Andrey Nikolayev defended its corner successfully. To protect Russia’s porous frontiers Nikolayev succeeded in reinforcing border guards’ fire power and improving counterintelligence and intelligence operations.
Personnel and Management Department, Operational Support Department, Directorate of Analysis and Suppression of Activity of Criminal Organisations, Investigation Directorate, Operational-Search Directorate, Operational-Technical Measures Directorate, Internal Security Directorate, Administration Directorate, Prison “Lefortovo” and Scientific-Technical centre.103
The reforms of May 1997 resulted in abolition of all vacant posts n FSB and forced some generals into retirement, who would otherwise have been kept on. FSB was not to recruit civilian personnel and the number of places offered by FSB Academy was cut back. Experienced investigators moved from FSB to MVD, to work for the courts or transferred to the operational structures of FSB with fixed hours and possibilities for moonlighting. The salaries in FSB at the beginning of 1998 had fallen so low that this became “practically the main problem” for the personnel. A colonel in FSB with 15 years seniority earned R2,200 a month, a lieutenant received R1,500104. The salaries of SVR employees were 50% higher; those of FSO 150% higher. FSB leadership planned to employ many of the redundant officers on a freelance basis but the financial crash of August 1998 dramatically worsened the organisation’s financial status. In September 1998 FSB staff received half of their salaries and distribution of meal allowances had stopped at the beginning of the year.105 In July 1997 Kovalev commanded 45,000 operatives106. The total number of FSB employees at the end of 1997 was 80,000107, 4,000 less than in August 1995108. In mid 1994 Stepashin was quoted saying that he could not be expected to “look into the souls of his 100,000 staff”109.
On 4 July 1997 Boris Yel'tsin signed a decree ordering cuts in FSB central apparatus by 20%, to 4,000110. The decree was to be implemented by the end of the year but it was either annulled or the figures required were reached by natural attrition and transfers. For budgetary reasons Yel'tsin planned to subordinate FPS to FSB. The rumours about the merger circulated at the end of 1997 and at the beginning of 1998 were not unfounded. When on 30 December 1993 the border troops where detached from Security Ministry their well connected and capable head Andrey Nikolayev defended its corner successfully. To protect Russia’s porous frontiers Nikolayev succeeded in reinforcing border guards’ fire power and improving counterintelligence and intelligence operations.
FSB was to conduct its own investigations. Yel'tsin first accepted the proposed merger because he was told that it would allow him to save 10% of funds allocated to FPS. On 21 January 1998 he even signed an instruction ordering the government to prepare a draft edict on operational subordination of FPS to FSB. The order was later rescinded111. This did not stop Yel'tsin from reducing FSB manpower which at the beginning of 1998 was 75,000 people. The supporting staff was cut. Soon after Kovalev took over, the FSB announced a “shop-a-spy” telephone line. Anyone could dial 224-35-00 and tell a member of a specially selected FSB group about a crime or betrayal or even confess his own transgressions113. The group immediately took several hundred phone calls and accepted 30 of them as serious after filtering out hoaxers and nutters. Four of the 30 serious phone calls were made by foreigners. Five phone calls were treated as extremely serious114. In January 1998 Aleksandr Zdanovich, head of FSB Public Relations Office, said that the confidential telephone lines received more than 900 calls and that 46 of them were relevant to FSB work115. Nikolay Kovalev claimed in July 1998 that the confidential hotline had had 1,000 phone calls. The FSB found 87 of them of interest. The FSB’s 64 territorial bodies were equipped with similar confidential telephone lines and received more than 300 “relevant” tips116. In September 1998 FSB announced that in the course of the year the confidential lines had received 1,300 calls. 5% of them were made by people mentally disturbed and 5% of information received could be described as productive117. In St Petersburg FSB confidential line was set up at the end of October 1997 and in two months received 400 phone calls, of which 95 were of direct interest for FSB and 100 others for other law enforcement agencies118.
Since 1996 FSB has been working on establishing Consultative Council of Russian FSB, a body which would allow it to liaise and cooperate with private security companies of its choice and to develop better contacts with Russian business community. The Council included FSB officers and representatives of private investigative and security companies and was expected to improve the security of the business community. FSB was ordered by Yel'tsin to organise special squads to protect investors and their investment. The new squads were also to control commercial structures to uncover law-breakers. A statement to that effect was issued by Nikolay Kovalev, accompanying Yel'tsin on official trip to Helsinki in March 1997.119 The plan was not entirely realistic but of all solutions available, setting up the Council was probably the best. It would also allow FSB to look at private security and investigative companies, which are usually run by former special services officers. FSB announced only that the Council’s activity was to be based on state interest and its overall mission would be to assist authorities in defence of society and individuals120. The project had, in theory at least, enormous potential. In mid 1998 Russia had 2,500 banks and 72,000 commercial organisations with their own security services121. Some of these companies had their own security organisations which could compete in size with those of a medium country. The giant Gazprom employs 20,000 people in its security system, including 500 people working in the central staff122. In the general atmosphere of economic and political insecurity even the largest companies could not afford not to be represented on the Council. The Council had great potential to become a mix of security companies’ semi-private club, a stock exchange of information and job centre. The unwilling could always be persuaded. Russia, after all, is a superpower when it comes to possession by private companies and individuals of unauthorised spy equipment, the value of which was estimated by the end of 1997 to be $150-170 m123. FSB had ways and means to lean on private companies by revoking permits, certificates and licences. Its own biggest problem was not that private companies would not want to cooperate but that the Council would be used to get information from Lubyanka or that that the more talented and successful FSB officers would be head-hunted by private enterprises. Constant reforms of the special services and corresponding reshuffling of their leaders were reported, discussed and criticised because of accompanying public squabbles and personalities involved. While it did not attract as much publicity, Yel'tsin paid equal attention to electronic means of reinforcing his position. According to unnamed Russian lawyers, in 1995 there were 7.5m “victims” of unsanctioned telephone tapping in Russia. About 50 people worked on every shift monitoring telephone conversations at the Kutuzovskaya telephone exchange. One of Yel'tsin’s first decrees in 1996 was “On Controlling Developers and Users of Special Means Intended For Covert Information Gathering”, empowering FSB to co-ordinate all eavesdropping operations of Russian Special Services124. The Ministry of Communication order No 9 of 31 January 1996 “Organising Work To Support Operational-Investigative Work of Mobile Communications Networks” contained rules for radiowave mobile communication operators on installing technical means of support for operational investigative measures and was accompanied by specific technical requirements approved by FSB125. That did not mean FSB or FAPSI would automatically listen to all mobile radio communications, but the order would allow them to do so without need of major investment or further authorisation.
In June 1997 Yuriy Skuratov, then Russia’s general prosecutor, quoted a list of organisations permitted to conduct phone tapping by their operational investigative activity rules adopted in 1995. These were MVD, FSB, GUO, SBP, FPS, SVR, Tax Police and Custom Service. The list does not include FAPSI126. The tapping of a telephone line was expensive because 6 operators were needed for round-the-clock tapping of one line. The total cost of tapping of one telephone line was in the mid 1990s estimated at R100,000,000 for six months127. At that time a student at FSB Academy was paid R600,000 a month; an officer in the antiterrorist centre R1,500,000 and a FSB general a little more than R3m128.
The FSB has been trying to force the Russian internet service providers to install interception equipment on their servers. It is called the System of Operational Intelligence Measures (SORM in Russian). FSB has been aiming to establish three control levels: full control, allowing for constant monitoring of the information flow, random, listing outgoing and incoming flows of information, passive, limited monitoring of a specific area129. Those Internet users who feel threatened by FSB can be reassured that its monitoring and financial capacities would be stretched to breaking point very quickly. After all, the telephone tapping facilities in Moscow were by 1998 assessed at 5,000-8,000 phone calls a day for intercity or international lines130. Nevertheless selected users could be monitored constantly. The special services had already requested to enforce compulsory installation of SORM in 1991. The appropriate law was drafted in 1998 and it seems that by 1999 all major telephone exchanges had SORM system installed.131 The opponents of SORM system acknowledge that FSB is legally entitled to listen to telephone conversations, but they argue that legally an organisation tapping a telephone line needs a warrant for a specific line and specific time. The SORM system allows blanket telephone surveillance without warrant or time limit.
On 27 March 1998 Boris Berezovskiy, one of the richest men in Russia, owner of a media empire, close confidant of Yel'tsin family and the presumed source of many security leaks, requested a meeting with FSB director Nikolay Kovalev. Berezovskiy explained to Kovalev that a week earlier he had been contacted by Lieutenant-Colonel Aleksandr Litvinenko from FSB Directorate of Analysis and Suppression of Activity of Criminal Organisations (URPO), who told him that several members of URPO planned to assassinate him. Berezovskiy had already been a target of an assassination attempt and treated the threat very seriously. Litvinenko and three of his FSB colleagues who confirmed his story had already reported it to Yevgeniy Savostyanov, deputy head of Presidential Administration responsible for special services. When Kovalev called the four officers and ordered them to write a report they refused, saying that the conversation about killing the tycoon was “frivolous”. The FSB began its own investigation and Kovalev suspended all the suspects until the end of the investigation. In May FSB investigators concluded that the accusations against URPO leadership were groundless and Kovalev reinstated them in May 1998. Berezovskiy did not give up even after Kovalev’s dismissal on 25 July 1998. One of the richest and most influential Russian businessmen was preparing for another battle with FSB and no one could stop him because of his contacts with the Yel'tsins. On 13 November Berezovskiy wrote an open letter to the new director of FSB, Vladimir Putin, repeating the accusations. Four days later Lieutenant-Colonel Litvinenko and his colleagues repeated the accusation at a press conference and the next day, on a visit to Tbilisi in his capacity as CIS Executive Secretary, Berezovskiy announced that Russia’s General Prosecutor’s Office and FSB were criminal organisations. Boris Yel'tsin did not react, Vladimir Putin did. On 19 November 1998 in a TV interview Putin denied Berezovskiy’s accusations, said that he had known Berezovskiy for many years and he respected him, but then added “Boris Abramovich, do your job. Boris Abramovich is the CIS Executive Secretary, isn’t he?”132 The next day, 20 November, Yel'tsin called Putin and demanded that Berezovskiy’s accusations were to be treated seriously and the case was to be taken by General Prosecutor’s Office. Putin was also told to submit a report on the whole case by 20 December 1998. On 23 November Russia’s largest TV channel ORT, controlled by Berezovskiy, showed an interview with a group of serving FSB officers, who were willing to give their names and to describe how their department (URPO) planned to kidnap one of the brothers Dzhabrailov, Moscow-based Chechen businessmen. The officers claimed that there were no written orders but that Nikolay Kovalev knew about the operation. Kovalev sued Berezovskiy four days later133. Berezovskiy’s accusations looked like a political game for several reasons. The URPO was set up on the basis of Long Term Programs Directorate (UPP) which was in the past accused by unknown officials around
Yel'tsin of being Lebed’s mini KGB. The head of the UPP
was then Colonel Khokholkov
and head of the URPO was
Major-General Khokholkov.
The alleged order to kill
Berezovskiy was given in
December 1997. Why did it
take Lt-Col. Litvinenko and
his collegues so long to inform
either Berezovskiy or anyone
else who would take the case? Has the officer in charge of
one of the most efficient
security substructures, URPO,
asked for a progress report
from Litvinenko? How could
Litvinenko know that Nikolay
Kovalev knew about the
assassination order if it was
not given in writing or by
Kovalev himself and in his
presence? Litvinenko already
knew Berezovskiy, had
worked for him and boasted
about their friendship. All
four accusing officers
moonlighted as Berezovskiy’s
bodyguards134. The officers
claiming that they were given
orders to kill Berezovskiy
spoke also at length about the
seemingly non-related issue of
FSB’s unorthodox attempt to
liberate two FSB officers
kidnapped by Chechens. The
alleged attempt involved
kidnapping Dzhabrailov,
brother of a controversial
Chechen Moscow-based
businessman. The officers
spoke about operational
details of the whole
undertaking, expressing
anxiety about the methods
they were ordered to use135.
Putting aside the sudden
moral qualms of the group,
their willingness to talk about
operations against any
Chechens, especially about
such a controversial figure as
Dzhabrailov at a time when
Chechens were not popular
yet remember Berezovskiy’s attempts to negotiate the release of several hostages in Chechnya. FSB was against his involvement
in any negotiations because
his methods and money
encouraged potential kidnappers and served his own interest. Two of the accusers were about to be
reprimanded for unrelated transgressions by the superiors they accused of plotting Berezovskiy’s murder. In September 1995 Litvinenko
was involved in an unusual
case of a stolen garment sold
by Marya Tikhonova, a
daughter of Yel'tsin’s then
chief of staff Sergey Filatov.
The target of the investigation
was not Tikhonova but
Filatov136. Boris Berezovskiy
was allowed by Yel'tsin and
his entourage to continue his
private vendetta after the first
FSB investigation. In April
1998 Yel'tsin made him
Executive Secretary of the
CIS. He was not fired when
the second investigation
ordered by Yel'tsin and
supervised by Putin found no
substance in Litvinenko’s
accusations. After his
dismissal from FSB Litvinenko
found work as an adviser of
the CIS Executive Secretariat,
where he was arrested in the
spring of 1999 on unrelated
charges. Litvinenko’s
colleagues who supported his
accusations were fired from
FSB and found jobs on Boris
Berezovskiy’s staff137. The
URPO was disbanded and
General Khokholkov was fired
although Major-General Yuriy
Bagrayev of Main Military
Prosecutor’s Office stated
publicly that the statements
made by Litvinenko and his
colleges against their
superiors were baseless.
Khokholkov was offered a
job at State Tax Office. His
directorate was closed down
soon after his appointment
and he was not offered
another job138.
Nikolay Kovalev won the court case against Berezovskiy in April 1999 but did not ask for any material compensation because he was “not convinced of clean origin of Berezovskiy’s money”139. In September 1999, in an interview with the Italian daily Repubblica, Berezovskiy claimed that generals once responsible for Yel'tsin’s security, Barsukov and Korzhakov, commissioned a series of murders.140
Rumours about Kovalev’s dismissal continued. He was fired on 25 July 1998. The main reason for his dismissal was his investigation of corruption in FAPSI. The investigation allowed his enemies to convince Yel'tsin that Kovalev’s ultimate goal was to take over FAPSI and that he was becoming too powerful. Yel'tsin signed Kovalev’s dismissal while on holiday in Karelia141. Before Kovalev’s departure Yel'tsin restructured FSB once again. On 6 July 1998 he signed a decree approving a new FSB structure, with a new Department of Economic Security142. The changes introduced by Yel'tsin left the Counterintelligence Department with two sub-directorates: Counterintelligence Operations and the newly created Information and Computer Security Directorate. The Directorate of Economic Counterintelligence became a separate department within FSB and Military Counterintelligence Directorate was given more autonomy. FSB also acquired a directorate responsible for protection of the Constitution.
On 26 August 1998 Yel'tsin signed a readjusting decree authorising FSB to have two first deputies, a deputy director with the rank of state secretary, six deputy directors responsible for individual departments and one deputy director, the head of Moscow and Moscow Oblast Directorate. FSB Collegium was increased from 11 to 17 in August 1998. All its members have to be approved by the President143. 6 October 1998 brought another presidential decree abolishing the post of state secretary, but upgrading the status of the head of the St Petersburg FSB, making him a deputy director of FSB. This position went to Viktor Cherkasov144. In November 1998 FSB Computer and Information Security Directorate became an independent body within FSB. At the end of 1998 FSB leadership thus consisted of Director, 2 First Deputy Directors, 8 deputy directors, 6 responsible for FSB departments, 2 for Moscow ….
On 5 December 1998 from his hospital bed Yel'tsin dismissed several of his top officials. The head of the Presidential Administration Valentin Yumashev was replaced by former military counterintelligence expert, FAPSI deputy head of personnel and director of Russian Border Troops Colonel-General Nikolay Bordyuzha. The head of FAPSI, General Starovoytov and special services supervisor in his administration Yevgeniy Savostyanov were also fired. Savostyanov was replaced by Major-General Makarov, another military counterintelligence specialist. Makarov worked for FAPSI until 1994 when he left to work for private company146. One of the most significant reforms of FSB in 1998 was the return of Military Counterintelligence Directorate as a separate element. The directorate was even given its old number, “3”, which it had before. After August 1991 coup the new Minister of Defence Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov asked for military counterintelligence to be moved to Ministry of Defence. Vadim Bakatin originally agreed but the problem was never solved to the Ministry of Defence’s satisfaction.147 After USSR KGB was abolished politicians hesitated what to do with Military Counterintelligence Directorate. Sergey Stepashin who was then a RSFSR deputy and Chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Defence and Security Committee admitted at the beginning of November 1991 that the problem of military counterintelligence had not yet been resolved but added “The Defence Ministry must have its own.”148 During the October 1993 events White House supporters attacked the Moscow Military Counterintelligence building where they seized weapons and demanded that officers in charge order all Military Counterintelligence cells in the armed forces to enforce the White House supporters’ wishes149. They failed but Yel'tsin and his supporters must had asked themselves why their opponents had succeeded in entering the Military Counterintelligence building. Whatever the real reason, that was the end of discussion about the transfer to MOD. There were however rumours that military counterintelligence could become another separate security body150. Counterintelligence work has changed dramatically during the 1990s. Russia had pulled out from the Warsaw Pact countries, from most of the former Soviet republics and Mongolia and had no large units stationed in the far abroad countries. Its weapons were still of enormous interest to many foreign countries but the biggest problems were chaos, lack of money, undisciplined soldiers, unprotected weapon storage, and individuals and groups both foreign and local wanting to buy or steal weapons and explosives. The head of Military Counterintelligence responsible for Moscow Military District, Major-General Anatoliy Kachuk, described counterintelligence and intelligence work as the primary tasks of his department. Catching spies is glamorous, catching thieves especially in Russia is not. The modern thieves in the Russian armed forces may still like to steal petrol and alcohol but the real money comes from successful theft of weapons and explosives. General Kachuk said that between mid 1995 and 1997 there were 70 documented attempts at theft from subunits and depots in Moscow MD. In addition, the regional FSB bodies confiscated 51 firearms, 50,000 rounds of ammunition, 250 grenades and 28 kg of explosives. Several cases quoted by General Kachuk suggest that the supporters of creation of a military police force might have a point. An attempt by an intoxicated cadet from Tula artillery school trying to sell an AK-74 to local criminals, for example, should really be a police matter151.
In 1996 the Duma Defence Committee submitted a plan of how Military Police should fit into MOD. The plan rejected a “garrison-district” model and suggested a regional-territorial model152. The project never took off, however, because Yel'tsin was afraid that it would reduce his powers. It was also rejected by the military, who were afraid that the judiciary and the local authorities would be entitled to interfere with their affairs, and it would weaken the power of commanders. It would almost certainly guarantee the involvement of MVD and would provoke turf conflicts with military counterintelligence. Colonel-General Aleksey Alekseyevich Molyakov, head of Military Counterintelligence Directorate of FSB, admitted that the situation in the army remained one of Russia’s most acute problems, which he ascribed to lack of money, “Chechen syndrome” and unauthorised use of weapons.153 Asked about his relationship with Defence Minister Sergeyev, Molyakov described it as constructive. The structure of the Directorate begins at battalion level. Each branch of the Armed Forces and each army, fleet, corps and division has a military counterintelligence directorate or department (likewise KGB vis-a-vis military). Their priority tasks are counteraction of foreign intelligence services, protection of the Armed Forces against sabotage and terrorism, protecting, within their competence, weapons of mass destruction, illegal sales of weapons and corruption within the armed forces. Molyakov claims to have about 6,000 subordinates. The Law On Operational Investigative Activities allows Directorate to recruit collaborators within the sphere of its operations and Directorate also has collaborators in foreign countries in accordance with statute on military counterintelligence organs. The number of collaborators working for his organisation is estimated at 50,000. Molyakov described the directorate’s work on protecting Russia’s nuclear weapons as one of the most important tasks. Military Counterintelligence Directorate conducts its activities in military formations of MVD, FAPSI, FPS and other forces. This is sometimes euphemistically called “operational support”154. The directorate is also responsible for issuing travel permissions for the uniformed members of Russia’s power structures. In 1996 5,000 servicemen from all power structures, including FAPSI, applied for permission to travel abroad. Information from the directorate goes to FSB, where it is distributed to President, Prime Minister, Security Council and leaders of Federal Assembly chambers155. In recognition of his work in January 1998 General Molyakov was appointed head of Military Inspectors Directorate at State Military Inspectorate of Russian Security Council.
Like all the heads of the security structures and substructures General Molyakov had to supervise several controversial cases. Cases which involve environmental pollution by the military, financial mismanagement and theft in the armed forces, and technical military publications always bring out the worst in military counterintelligence organs. What is secret and what is not is often decided by people who are not in touch with modern life or who follow their own narrow interests. The case of Grigoriy Pasko is a good example of this. Captain 2nd Rank Grigoriy Pasko, a journalist of the Pacific Fleet newspaper “Boyevaya Vakhta”, was arrested on 20 November 1997 on his return from a trip to Japan. Customs officials found secret documents in his luggage and he was charged with treason. In a letter smuggled to the local press Pasko claimed that he was framed. The whole case began to sound increasingly bizarre when Rear-Admiral German Ugryumov, FSB chief for the Pacific Fleet, was quoted as saying that he was not accusing Pasko of being a spy or working for a foreign power, although Pasko was officially accused of trying to pass secret information to a “certain international organisation”.157 What enraged the local authorities was that Pasko was trying to prove that of $125m given to Russia by Japan for a nuclear waste processing plant, only $25m were spent and the rest disappeared without trace with, according to Pasko, the approval of Pacific Fleet top brass. Pasko was finally found guilty of abusing his credentials when collecting sensitive information and sentenced to three years imprisonment, but covered by a recent amnesty he was not detained. The disappearance of the $100m was not investigated158.
Retired naval officer Aleksandr Nikitin was arrested on 6 February 1996 and charged with espionage, for supplying a Norwegian environmental group Bellona with information about Russia’s illegal dumping of radioactive material in Murmansk and Arkhangelsk. The Norwegians were particularly interested in Russian depleted nuclear fuel dumped 45km from the Norwegian border. When commenting on Nikitin’s case, FSB director Kovalev said that although Bellona did not task Nikitin with anything illegal, he on his own initiative had used a false identity card to get into a secret facility to obtain the information.159 Nikitin was later acquitted.
The author of the article “Missiles over the Sea” which appeared in two consecutive issues of the unrestricted “Tekhnika I Voruzhyeniye” military periodical was threatened with criminal charges because according to the FSB it contained military secrets. In his defence, the author insisted that the article contained his own analysis based on open source material. An external expert who advised the FSB that the article included secrets was an author of a book with similar info160. One of the least glorious pages of the recent history of the 3rd Directorate was its attempt in May 1998 to force Colonel Mikhail Bergman to take part in a smear campaign against his former commander Aleksandr Lebed. Bergman refused and was threatened with being framed as an Israeli spy161.
With the second Chechen conflict Acting Prime Minister Putin reinforced Third Directorate’s position in the armed forces and all other military formations by signing a Statute on FSB structures in the armed forces and other bodies. The statute reaffirms the presence of military counterintelligence directorate of FSB in all military bodies in Russia, including formations set up in wartime. This covers Russian formations and organs based outside Russia. Military counterintelligence are allowed to conduct intelligence relevant to safety of Russian military formations. Third Directorate is permitted to cooperate with Russian intelligence organs. Military counterintelligence bodies are to protect special communication equipment in all military structures and participate in decisions relevant to foreign travel of military and civilian personnel of these structures as well as treatment of foreign nationals and stateless persons on Russian soil. The structure and number of military counterintelligence personnel in military bodies is determined by FSB director after a recommendation by 3rd Directorate of FSB162. …
Like everything else in the Soviet Union the KGB was highly centralised. All decision-making was done in Moscow. All strategic analytical and technical work was conducted in Moscow and local security officials were frequently Russian. The republican security structures were able to conduct counterintelligence and limited intelligence work across their borders or against visiting foreigners. In the not so distant past even these activities were co-ordinated and monitored from Moscow and planned according to Moscow’s wishes and directives. Military counterintelligence organs belonged to KGB, not to the Soviet Armed Forces and were even more centralised. Almost all technical aspects of counterintelligence work were Russian, including cryptography. Top KGB leadership was Slavic. The non Slavic republican security bosses had no experience in management at national level. The new rulers and security bosses were very often old Communists repainted in their national colours. Even those among them who were fascinated by democracy and the free market economy could not understand them. The republics were linked with Russia economically and ethnically. The republican special services found themselves short of personnel, short of necessary equipment, short of appropriate training facilities and relevant teaching personnel, short of ideas and finally short of funds. Russia was willing to help, but its own special services were constantly being restructured, its economy was in a dive and its organs were themselves experiencing difficulties with personnel retention.
One of the substantial problems concerning the co-operation with CIS special services is not only their different political, commercial and security interests but also different legal systems, which may allow the citizens of the countries once belonging to the USSR to sell Russian secrets, an act which is not punishable in their own countries. Special services of the FSU republics involved in combating international crime are often interested in co-operation with Russia but mutual distrust provokes occasionally justified accusations of spying and violating of co-operation agreements. As early as 19 October 1991 the Russians held talks with republican security representatives on creating an inter-republican security system163. At the end of November 1991 Vadim Bakatin, at this stage the head of the new Inter-republican Security Service (MSB), announced that Russia had signed agreements with security services from Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, that agreements with Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan were ready, and agreements with Azerbaijan and Armenia were being prepared . Not all the agreements were officially announced and some included a section which stated that the signatory countries would not carry out subversive acts against each other and did not regard each other as potential adversaries. Such agreements were signed with Uzbekistan and Ukraine. Some of the republics were also ready to cooperate with Moscow on electronic intelligence gathering. Moscow also trained intelligence students from several republics. In mid 1992 Major-General Sergey Stepashin, Deputy Security Minister, announced that Russia had signed agreements on co-operation and interaction of Russian Security Ministry and its counterparts in the majority of the former union republics except the Baltic states164. As the head of FSK Sergey Stepashin said in April 1994 that Russia had made representations to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan about attempts by special services of the two countries to recruit Russian citizens. He added that five members of the Georgian special services had been detained by FSK and sent back to Tbilisi. Four years later the head of FSB Moscow Directorate Colonel-General Aleksander Vasilevich Tsarenko mentioned that in spite of the CIS Almaty Treaty which forbids the signatories to spy on each other, the presence of several CIS special services in Moscow was felt with discomfort165.
The heads of the security bodies of the twelve CIS states met for the first time on 15 March 1995 in Odintsovo near Moscow. The participants agreed that they would meet regularly and set up a co-ordinating secretariat in Moscow. The next such conference was to take place at the end of May 1995 in Tbilisi, where a treaty specifying specific forms of co-operation was to be signed. All participants accepted the need to cooperate in combating organised crime, terrorism and drugs and weapons smuggling. Some participants suggested not only an exchange of information but also joint operations166. The following CIS security summit took place in the Tajik capital Dushanbe at the beginning of April 1996. The participants agreed to set up a single data bank for special services to combat terrorism and drug trade. The participants also took a decision to set up a standing co-ordination council and technical committee working on a data bank167. The leaders of CIS countries’ special services met again in Moscow on 14 April 1997. The participants discussed the joint databank on organised crime on the territory of the former USSR. The new CIS crime data bank contains information on organised crime, drug trafficking, arms smuggling and non-proliferation of nuclear components and has two main parts. The first has information accessible to all interested special services. The second contains operational information. If one of the services does not want certain information to reach a third party an appropriate “no access” procedure can be applied. All special services have equal rights when it comes to access to the database. The technical side is taken care of by reputable foreign companies and has relatively easy security access.16 8 Just before his dismissal in 1998 Nikolay Kovalev said that 15 protocols had recently been signed with various CIS special services on fighting organised crime, smuggling of strategic raw materials, nuclear weapons components and ensuring security of the railroads. It was announced in July 1998 that the first part of the CIS Special Services Databank had been completed169.
The meeting of heads of the CIS security services in Kishinev in October 1997 aimed at improving co-ordination against terrorism and protection and safety of nuclear sites. At this meeting Nikolay Kovalev informed the participants that spies were at work in Russia170. Some of the participants must have wondered if what they heard was meant to be a warning or simply a lecture like in old times.
The CIS law enforcement bodies, tax services, border guards and customs services met in Moscow at the beginning of December 1997 to improve co-ordination between member countries and the services171. The following week Moscow hosted a security conference, “The Russian special services past and present” at FSB Academy, with 160 specialists coming from Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine172. The CIS Council of the heads of security and special forces met again on 30 September and 1 October 1999 in St Petersburg at the 6th Session of the Council. The participants discussed co-operation in combating terrorism. An Uzbek delegation took part in the meeting for the first time. Nikolay Patrushev, new director of FSB, was unanimously elected “Chairman of the Council of the Heads of security services and special forces of the CIS member states”173.
The second part of the last decade also saw more bilateral meetings and agreements between Russia and its southern neighbours. Russian and Azeri security chiefs met in Moscow in May 1997 to discuss co-operation in combating economic crime and terrorism174. A Kazakh delegation of security officials visited Moscow at the beginning of December 1997. The head o FSB praised cooperation between secret services of the two countries. After a tip-off from their Kazakh colleagues, FSB had been able to close down “a training course organised by a group of Kurds in Russia”175. Vladimir Putin visited Kyrgyzstan in mid September 1998 to discuss security problems with his Kyrgyz counterparts176. At the end of January 2000 the FSB and their Ukrainian counterparts the SBU at a working meeting in Kiev agreed to co-operate in combating organised crime, terrorism, smuggling and recruitment of mercenaries177. A delegation headed by FSB deputy director Colonel-General Vladimir Pronichev visited Georgia at the beginning of February 2000 to talk about joint action against terrorism, the situation on the Russian (Chechen)-Georgian border and about security problems at Russian military bases in Georgia178. Considering the timing and position of General Pronichev, the head of the amalgamated Antiterrorist Department and the Directorate of Constitutional Security, the main reason for the visit must have been infiltration of the Russian- Georgian border by Chechen fighters.
Like many other special services, FSB and predecessors had to look for new ways to use their skills and experience in the post Cold War world but in contrast with them it did not have to look far or for long. Imbued with patriotism, nationalism, Marxism-Leninism and profound ignorance of democratic systems many high-ranking security officers saw their role as pursuing foreign spies and being decently rewarded for their efforts. Instead they were constantly pushed to chase and investigate petty crooks, domestic Mafia, ethnic, religious, political extremists and selected politicians, for which they were neither adequately rewarded or appreciated. Russia in the meantime was becoming a very fine place in which to steal something. It had natural resources, non ferrous metals sometimes hidden in the strategic reserve’s super secret storage sites, sophisticated weapons and many scientific achievements. Vulnerable at first to a multinational contingent of foreign and domestic crooks, Russian business quickly adapted to the situation, becoming more corrupt and brutal than their partners and clients. On the other end of the economic scale highly educated and skilful scientists, constructors and technicians had become poor and resentful. Members of both groups were ready to steal what foreign buyers were willing to buy. In general, the first group wanted to become rich, the second to survive. Several countries have been trying to acquire Russian military technology and scientific achievements both legally and illegally, provoking understandable anxiety which often deteriorated into full- blown Soviet-style paranoia, fed by impressive looking but often irrelevant statistics. Factors which complicate the issue further are the loose interpretation of law and the existing rules, and imprecise use of terminology by Russian security officials.
Details of the threat from foreign spies supported by outlandish statistics are made officially available to the media on a regular basis but even the official MVD paper “Shchit I Mech” stopped publishing comprehensive crime statistics several years ago. In July 1992, Sergey Stepashin the Chairman of the RF Parliament Defence and Security Committee said that foreign intelligence services were working even more brazenly against Russia than before179. In December 1993 Major-General Venyamin Vladimirovich Kashirshikh, deputy chief of the Counterintelligence Directorate of the soon to be renamed Security Ministry, said that some Western special services had very quickly changed the situation in the former Eastern Bloc and some parts of the FSU. Many unnamed countries were now working against Russia. They were mainly interested in scientific information.180 The Russians were not afraid of foreign armies but of hostile foreign intelligence services. They were convinced that after the collapse of the USSR the CIA sent on average 15 agents to each independent state of the FSU181.
In 1994, FSK caught 22 Russian nationals working for foreign special services. It stopped about 60 attempts by Russian nationals to transfer secret materials to representatives of foreign states. FSK would not elaborate as to the difference between “working for” and “transfer” or whether “transfer” meant selling. An unnamed FSK spokesman said that foreign special services were widening their subversive and intelligence activities. He said that foreign special services were mainly interested in nuclear weapons, other modern weapons, reforms of defence systems, advanced technologies and fundamental science studies.
The Russians noted also increasing activity by East European and Baltic intelligence services which they said were controlled by their Western counterparts. The activities of special services of unnamed Moslem countries were also on the rise. 90 foreigners working as experts and advisers in Russia were identified in 1995 as having “foreign special service status”182. Thanks to FSK’s work more than 500 accidents had been avoided. The activities of more than 40 armed formations pursuing political goals were uncovered. FSK became aware of 200 mercenary recruiters, 80 of them foreigners. It also gave data concerning its crime fighting successes and the financial value of some of its achievements183. Yuriy Baturin, national security adviser to Boris Yel'tsin, expressed his concern about espionage efforts of North Korea and China in Russia. Russia was especially concerned with the North Korean nuclear programme. In KGB document No 363-K addressed to the leadership of the USSR, Chairman Kryuchkov warned as early as 22 February 1990 that Pyonyang had produced its first nuclear device but had no plans to test it as it would not be able to conceal it184. Moscow was also apprehensive about the spread of Chinese organised crime in the Far East. Baturin said in 1994 that Moscow was interested in an agreement with Kazakhstan which would permit Russia to organise tighter security on its borders185. In July 1994 an unnamed member of the Russian Parliament quoted an unnamed representative of the GRU and declared during close hearings that Turkey, Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan showed interest in the Central Asian republics186. In October 1994 Chairman of Duma’s Security Committee, Viktor Ilyukhin, said that foreign intelligence services were stepping up their activities as Russian security services showed signs of decay. Ilyukhin added that even the intelligence services of Finland and Sweden had become more active in the border area with Russia. He accused German intelligence service of opening intelligence stations in the Baltic republics, criticised USA for its activities in Magadan and Yakutiya and warned, as if hesitating which was more dangerous, that 35,000 businesses in Russia were forced to pay protection money to 135 Russian criminal organisations which had 100,000 criminals at their disposal187. According to Major-General Aleksandr Mikhaylov, head of the FSB PR centre, the Turkish, Polish and German intelligence services were stepping up their activities on Russian territory.188
In 1996 Kovalev spoke of 28 Russian citizens being convicted of espionage in 1995. There were 11 similar convictions by mid 1996. The number of successful interventions of the FSK/FSB to stop Russian citizens selling secrets to foreign bidders increased to 100.189 In a series of statements and interviews given before the anniversary of the Russian security services Nikolay Kovalev said that FSB had identified and placed under surveillance 400 professional secret agents of foreign countries and 39 of their Russian collaborators. He concluded that FSB continued to work against activities of foreign intelligence services within Russia190. In 1997 30 foreign intelligence officers were expelled from Russia and 7 Russian citizens collaborating illegally with foreign powers were apprehended191.
Speaking at FSB collegium meeting on 4 March 1998 Kovalev said that 29 foreign intelligence agents had been exposed in Russia in 1997, 18 Russian citizens were prevented from passing “important state information” and that 400 foreign special services personnel had not yet done anything illegal but were being monitored192. He did not say whether “exposed” meant arrested, detained, expelled or warned, if the “important state information” was actually secret. At the end of the month Kovalev added that although counterintelligence remained FSB’s main activity, economic security, combating terrorism and investment protection were at the top of its priority list194.
During a 1997 graduation ceremony at FSB Academy Nikolay Kovalev stated that activities of foreign special services in Russia were comparable to the WWII period195. The Soviet Union and then Russia regarded the intelligence services of USA, UK, Germany, Israel and France as the most dangerous. In the post Cold War changes Moscow discovered that for political, economic, military and even religious reasons it had become a target of smaller and poorer countries. In July 1997 the Russians accused Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Egypt, Jordan and Tanzania of “stepping up” their intelligence activities in Russia196 and at the end of the year added Pakistan, Iran, China and Saudi Arabia to this and the usual list of foreign intelligence services operating in Russia197.
FSB director Colonel-General Nikolay Patrushev announced in January 2000 that in 1999 the illegal activities of 65 officers of foreign intelligence services had been cut short and that 30 Russian nationals willing to sell secrets to foreigners were thwarted.198 The number of Russians willing to sell secrets had grown into epidemic proportions, lamented the daily Segodnya in February 199. On occasion FSB releases the names of those caught spying for foreign powers and discusses individual cases, deriding the discrepancy between the money they asked for and the value of what they were selling. The total sum asked by, or offered to, two officers from the Strategic Rocket Forces, three officers working for the GRU Centre for Space Reconnaissance, three Ministry of Foreign Affairs employees and one scientist accused of spying for foreign powers was laughably small.
A Russian national selling a secret may indeed be greedy and dishonest, but he will wonder how the losses incurred by Russia as a result of his betrayal compare with wholesale plunder of the country by corrupt, incompetent and arrogant politicians, state officials and businessmen. In spite of adversarial relations with the special services of several Western countries, the Russian security structures were also ready to cooperate. Co-operation between Western special services and KGB began in the early 1990s. The USA and West Germany were particularly keen to work with USSR against organised crime and drug trafficking. The Americans forecasted correctly that USSR might in the future experience drug problems familiar to those in several Western democracies; the Germans were about to merge with the GDR, inheriting Soviet and East German “stay behind” criminal structures. The Germans also experienced problems with some members of the ethnic German community emigrating from the USSR to Germany. The walls between East and West were crumbling and there was a need for law enforcement bodies to cooperate. The only organisation authorised and competent to talk about security co-operation in Russia was KGB. MVD knew only about domestic crime, had modest foreign contacts, little experience in dealing with transnational crime and was not to be allowed to learn. Foreigners were not to be trusted and only KGB knew how to deal with them.
The combination of Western greed and ideological liberalism permitted a large group of Russia’s undeserving rich to settle in or to visit practically any country of their choice. Co-operation with Russian special services ceased to be an option and became a must. Several KGB generals visited the USA and the heads of both FBI and CIA were invited to Moscow. By mid 1994 FSK had bilateral agreements with Germany, Turkey, Greece, Poland, China, France and Czech Republic and exchanged liaison officers with Germany, France, Poland and Czech Republic. The Russians were surprised and unhappy that the USA did not want to sign a similar agreement. A high ranking Russian security team went to Turkey on at least three occasions and in 1996 bought from the Turks mobile phone eavesdropping equipment200. At the beginning of 1997 FSB co-operated and exchanged information with 30 countries. By the end of the year it had contacts with 80 countries and official representatives.201
As with CIS countries FSB was particularly active in establishing bilateral contacts with the far abroad countries in the second part of the last decade. At the beginning of February 1997, during a visit of FSB director Nikolay Kovalev to the World Economic Forum in Davos, the Russian and French special services agreed on exchanging information on terrorist acts using explosives in Moscow and Paris. A week later Kovalev received the head of the Romanian Information Service Virgil Magureanu to discuss the co-operation of both services in fighting terrorism and organised crime. After British Home Secretary Michael Howard held talks with the director of FSB Nikolay Kovalev on combating terrorism and organised crime, smuggling drugs, weapons and radioactive materials in January 1997, the heads of the FSB and British Security Service met in Moscow in November to discuss further co-operation202. After the Red Mercury affair and mutual public accusation, the co-ordinator of the German special services Berdt Schmidbauer met Nikolay Kovalev and the head of the SVR Vyacheslav Trubnikov on 15 April 1998203.
Kovalev’s last trip abroad as Director of FSB was to Israel. The Russians were concerned about growing Islamic extremism assisted by foreign countries and organisations, especially in Chechnya. The Israelis worried about nine Russian institutes selling sensitive technology to Iran. Both countries agreed to talk about extradition procedures for wanted criminals. In August the Russian Ambassador in Israel, Mikhail Bogdanov, asked Tel Aviv for an exchange of intelligence information on Islamic extremists204. With Vladimir Putin’s assured victory in the 2000 Presidential election Russian Mafia bosses may decide to move to other countries to enjoy their richly undeserved earnings, in which case the value of FSB connections for other special services in Europe and North America could go up. Nikolay Kovalev warned the Davos forum in 1997 that the West was not familiar with the way Russian criminals operate and that the western law enforcement bodies were not accustomed to working with such a “system of coordination.”
Putin’s appointment on 25 July 1998 as new director o FSB was a logical step on Yel'tsin’s political chessboard. Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin graduated from Leningrad University in 1975 and joined the KGB. He had planned to join KGB since he was a boy. After completing secondary education he applied to join KGB and was told to get a degree first206. After graduating and attending specialist security courses Putin worked in the counterintelligence department of Leningrad Directorate of KGB. At the end of 1970s he was transferred to the intelligence department of the directorate207, when he was supervised by General Oleg Kalugin for at least a year.208 Putin’s immediate boss in Leningrad, Feliks Dmitrevich Sutyrin, was transferred to the Intelligence Academy in Moscow at the end of the 1970s. Putin began his studies at the same Academy in either 1982 or 1983209. The transfer to the Intelligence Academy was an important promotion and opportunity. He spent a year improving his German and was sent to the GDR in 1985210. Among the Warsaw Pact countries the GDR was always singled out for special attention from Moscow. The country was divided into 14 districts, each district had a directorate of the Security Ministry of the GDR and each such directorate had a group of KGB officers attached to it. Putin served four years in the Dresden group, where he was promoted twice211.
The reforms of FSB went on before and after Putin’s nomination as head. In April 1998 two directorates of the 4th, Economic Security, Department were divided into several subdivisions and many officers were dismissed. Several heads and the deputy heads of two directorates were also fired212. In the first interview given to the media after he was nominated to the post of FSB director, Putin said that some substructures of the organisation could be merged and that the computer department within the organisation would be strengthened213. In August 1999 Boris Yel'tsin merged the 2nd Department responsible for combating terrorism with the Constitutional Security Directorate, with overall command retained by the head of the 2nd (Antiterrorist) Department General Pronichev. General Zotov, the head of the Constitutional Security Directorate and his first deputy General Zubkov were made redundant214. A Separate Department responsible for the safety of nuclear facilities was set up in FSB in October 1999215.
As a former professional security expert Vladimir Putin may be tempted to undertake another major reform of FSB although Security Council Secretary Sergey Ivanov in February 2000 denied rumours that the FSB, the FPS and FSO were going to merge216. Speaking on 5 November 1998 to the Duma deputies, Vladimir Putin said that the Ministry of Finance allocated so little money to the organisation that even the best of his officers were leaving the force. He called for increased salaries and moral support217. He got a promise that the salaries in FSB would be increased by 25% in 1999218. On 9 August 1999 Yel'tsin appointed Putin acting Prime Minister. He was replaced by Lieutenant-General Nikolay Petrushev.
The SFB’s comparatively modest salaries do not put off many candidates competing for a place in the FSB Academy. A former KGB School, the Academy, situated at 62 Michurinskiy Prospect in Moscow, had at the beginning of the 1990s to change its curriculum, rewrite its manuals and operate with a reduced budget. In 1993 Deputy Security Minister Vasiliy Frolov, speaking at the beginning of the academic year ceremony, said that in spite of the financial problems there would be no money-savings in training the necessary personnel219. The Academy went through lean years at the beginning of the 1990s and in 1992 there was only a little more than one applicant for a place, but by 1997 there were 10 candidates for each place. The Academy has Counterintelligence, Language and Special Departments and an Institute of Cryptography, Communications and Information Technology. It trains students in 11 specialisations including: investigators, lawyers, operatives with foreign languages, interpreters, cryptographers, experts in security of information systems and experts in security of telecommunication systems. The Academy trains specialists for “practically all” power structures220.
Head FSB Counterintelligence Directorate Valeriy Pechenkin said in 1997 that while many experienced personnel left the FSB ranks, young people joining the organisation are highly motivated and do so for patriotic reasons221. In 1997, 600 students graduated from the FSB Academy222.
The best example of how a security service may lose its direction was given by Vadim Bakatin when he announced that the KGB had collected 580 volumes of information on Professor Sakharov223. All the ingredients for future abuses of power are still present in Russian society and even more so in security structures. Threat assessments are too often made by high ranking officials fomed by the old Soviet thinking and with little or no knowledge of the surrounding world. The Draft National Security Concept of 1997, approved by the Russian Federation Security Council, said that “the threat of large scale aggression being unleashed against Russia in the next five to 10 years is unlikely” but warns against “the penetration of Russian, state organs of power and administration, political parties, banking institutions, security facilities and industrial enterprises by foreign intelligence services”. These services conduct “disinformation activities with a view to getting the wrong political decisions made”224.
In 1997 the Federation Council Defence Committee was one of the proponents of the reunification of all special services and organised a roundtable discussion where a member of the committee Nikolay Ryzhak, formerly Major-General and deputy head of the Third Main Directorate of the KGB, complained that Russia had become a Mecca for foreigners, including “hordes of spies”, and that no one was monitoring the movements of foreigners any more.225 Ryzhak said several months later that every person born in England (sic) received a medical card which contains all information about that person, even fingerprints, adding “This is why it is so difficult for our illegal immigrants to take root in England226.
Edict on Secrecy, No 61 of 24 January 1998, lists among secrets dual technology, a vaguely formulated but lengthy list of economic links with CIS countries, including the volume of shipments between Russia and the CIS of rare metals and other, unspecified materials of strategic importance, as well as “information revealing volumes of deliveries of reserves of strategic types of fuel”. The last item covers three ministries, including the Russian Ministry of Agriculture.227 To emphasise the threat, respectable statistical methods are used to calculate losses to the national economy resulting from emigration of Russian scientists. The Russian Ministry of Science and Technology came out with an assessment to show that Russia’s losses for every specialist leaving Russia would be about $300,000 and that through emigration Russia might suffer losses of up to $20bn. How this figure was reached considering Russia's growing unemployment and inefficient The lack of common sense and clear thinking in FSB was in evidence after two explosions in Moscow on 22 September 1999. Bags of suspicious looking mixture with a detonator were found in an apartment building in Ryazan’. The house was inspected at the request of the residents. FSB Director Nikolay Patrushev was obliged to explain that it was all an exercise and the sacks contained sugar. An unnamed FSB officer was quoted three hours later as saying “we are shocked and bewildered by Patrushev’s statement”229. The FSB apologised that afternoon, claiming that the whole incident was the result of the Vikhr antiterrorist exercise. According to FSB statement identical devices were planted in several other cities230. The FSB had continued the exercise even after the two huge blasts in Moscow. An MVD report after the inspection stated that the sacks contained hexogen231.
The obsession with secrecy occasionally leads to an arrest for which the FSB is always blamed, without anyone asking who issued the arrest warrant and for what reason, or why the warrant was not challenged. One such case was the arrest of a scientist Mirzoyanov, who raised the alarm about violation by Russia of a chemical weapons ban treaty. In autumn 1999 the FSB accused a well known Vladivostok based maritime scientist Vladimir Soyfer of revealing state secrets to foreign organisations. The district court of Vladivostok ruled that Soyfer was not a spy and that the documents seized by the FSB during house searches and his passport must be returned to him232. Soyfer was arrested because two contradictory laws were incorrectly interpreted by FSB234. The FSB lost the case, apologised but decided to appeal.
The second Chechen war forced the Russian government and the FSB to pay more attention to information warfare. The smoother, more consequential and harsher information and propaganda campaign conducted by Moscow suggests that during the last few months a substantial amount of money and manpower has been channelled into the operation. The FSB, which at this stage of the conflict is one of the main providers of information for the government from the conflict area, must have developed its public relations and media section considerably. Although the creation of a special structure within the FSB dealing with information and propaganda has been denied by the head of its PR Office General Zdanovich235 its successes, be it to the detriment of a free flow of information, are so evident that the temptation to create it in the near future might become irresistible.
Since 1996 FSB has been working on establishing Consultative Council of Russian FSB, a body which would allow it to liaise and cooperate with private security companies of its choice and to develop better contacts with Russian business community. The Council included FSB officers and representatives of private investigative and security companies and was expected to improve the security of the business community. FSB was ordered by Yel'tsin to organise special squads to protect investors and their investment. The new squads were also to control commercial structures to uncover law-breakers. A statement to that effect was issued by Nikolay Kovalev, accompanying Yel'tsin on official trip to Helsinki in March 1997.119 The plan was not entirely realistic but of all solutions available, setting up the Council was probably the best. It would also allow FSB to look at private security and investigative companies, which are usually run by former special services officers. FSB announced only that the Council’s activity was to be based on state interest and its overall mission would be to assist authorities in defence of society and individuals120. The project had, in theory at least, enormous potential. In mid 1998 Russia had 2,500 banks and 72,000 commercial organisations with their own security services121. Some of these companies had their own security organisations which could compete in size with those of a medium country. The giant Gazprom employs 20,000 people in its security system, including 500 people working in the central staff122. In the general atmosphere of economic and political insecurity even the largest companies could not afford not to be represented on the Council. The Council had great potential to become a mix of security companies’ semi-private club, a stock exchange of information and job centre. The unwilling could always be persuaded. Russia, after all, is a superpower when it comes to possession by private companies and individuals of unauthorised spy equipment, the value of which was estimated by the end of 1997 to be $150-170 m123. FSB had ways and means to lean on private companies by revoking permits, certificates and licences. Its own biggest problem was not that private companies would not want to cooperate but that the Council would be used to get information from Lubyanka or that that the more talented and successful FSB officers would be head-hunted by private enterprises. Constant reforms of the special services and corresponding reshuffling of their leaders were reported, discussed and criticised because of accompanying public squabbles and personalities involved. While it did not attract as much publicity, Yel'tsin paid equal attention to electronic means of reinforcing his position. According to unnamed Russian lawyers, in 1995 there were 7.5m “victims” of unsanctioned telephone tapping in Russia. About 50 people worked on every shift monitoring telephone conversations at the Kutuzovskaya telephone exchange. One of Yel'tsin’s first decrees in 1996 was “On Controlling Developers and Users of Special Means Intended For Covert Information Gathering”, empowering FSB to co-ordinate all eavesdropping operations of Russian Special Services124. The Ministry of Communication order No 9 of 31 January 1996 “Organising Work To Support Operational-Investigative Work of Mobile Communications Networks” contained rules for radiowave mobile communication operators on installing technical means of support for operational investigative measures and was accompanied by specific technical requirements approved by FSB125. That did not mean FSB or FAPSI would automatically listen to all mobile radio communications, but the order would allow them to do so without need of major investment or further authorisation.
In June 1997 Yuriy Skuratov, then Russia’s general prosecutor, quoted a list of organisations permitted to conduct phone tapping by their operational investigative activity rules adopted in 1995. These were MVD, FSB, GUO, SBP, FPS, SVR, Tax Police and Custom Service. The list does not include FAPSI126. The tapping of a telephone line was expensive because 6 operators were needed for round-the-clock tapping of one line. The total cost of tapping of one telephone line was in the mid 1990s estimated at R100,000,000 for six months127. At that time a student at FSB Academy was paid R600,000 a month; an officer in the antiterrorist centre R1,500,000 and a FSB general a little more than R3m128.
The FSB has been trying to force the Russian internet service providers to install interception equipment on their servers. It is called the System of Operational Intelligence Measures (SORM in Russian). FSB has been aiming to establish three control levels: full control, allowing for constant monitoring of the information flow, random, listing outgoing and incoming flows of information, passive, limited monitoring of a specific area129. Those Internet users who feel threatened by FSB can be reassured that its monitoring and financial capacities would be stretched to breaking point very quickly. After all, the telephone tapping facilities in Moscow were by 1998 assessed at 5,000-8,000 phone calls a day for intercity or international lines130. Nevertheless selected users could be monitored constantly. The special services had already requested to enforce compulsory installation of SORM in 1991. The appropriate law was drafted in 1998 and it seems that by 1999 all major telephone exchanges had SORM system installed.131 The opponents of SORM system acknowledge that FSB is legally entitled to listen to telephone conversations, but they argue that legally an organisation tapping a telephone line needs a warrant for a specific line and specific time. The SORM system allows blanket telephone surveillance without warrant or time limit.
On 27 March 1998 Boris Berezovskiy, one of the richest men in Russia, owner of a media empire, close confidant of Yel'tsin family and the presumed source of many security leaks, requested a meeting with FSB director Nikolay Kovalev. Berezovskiy explained to Kovalev that a week earlier he had been contacted by Lieutenant-Colonel Aleksandr Litvinenko from FSB Directorate of Analysis and Suppression of Activity of Criminal Organisations (URPO), who told him that several members of URPO planned to assassinate him. Berezovskiy had already been a target of an assassination attempt and treated the threat very seriously. Litvinenko and three of his FSB colleagues who confirmed his story had already reported it to Yevgeniy Savostyanov, deputy head of Presidential Administration responsible for special services. When Kovalev called the four officers and ordered them to write a report they refused, saying that the conversation about killing the tycoon was “frivolous”. The FSB began its own investigation and Kovalev suspended all the suspects until the end of the investigation. In May FSB investigators concluded that the accusations against URPO leadership were groundless and Kovalev reinstated them in May 1998. Berezovskiy did not give up even after Kovalev’s dismissal on 25 July 1998. One of the richest and most influential Russian businessmen was preparing for another battle with FSB and no one could stop him because of his contacts with the Yel'tsins. On 13 November Berezovskiy wrote an open letter to the new director of FSB, Vladimir Putin, repeating the accusations. Four days later Lieutenant-Colonel Litvinenko and his colleagues repeated the accusation at a press conference and the next day, on a visit to Tbilisi in his capacity as CIS Executive Secretary, Berezovskiy announced that Russia’s General Prosecutor’s Office and FSB were criminal organisations. Boris Yel'tsin did not react, Vladimir Putin did. On 19 November 1998 in a TV interview Putin denied Berezovskiy’s accusations, said that he had known Berezovskiy for many years and he respected him, but then added “Boris Abramovich, do your job. Boris Abramovich is the CIS Executive Secretary, isn’t he?”132 The next day, 20 November, Yel'tsin called Putin and demanded that Berezovskiy’s accusations were to be treated seriously and the case was to be taken by General Prosecutor’s Office. Putin was also told to submit a report on the whole case by 20 December 1998. On 23 November Russia’s largest TV channel ORT, controlled by Berezovskiy, showed an interview with a group of serving FSB officers, who were willing to give their names and to describe how their department (URPO) planned to kidnap one of the brothers Dzhabrailov, Moscow-based Chechen businessmen. The officers claimed that there were no written orders but that Nikolay Kovalev knew about the operation. Kovalev sued Berezovskiy four days later133. Berezovskiy’s accusations looked like a political game for several reasons. The URPO was set up on the basis of Long Term Programs Directorate (UPP) which was in the past accused by unknown officials around
Yel'tsin of being Lebed’s mini KGB. The head of the UPP
was then Colonel Khokholkov
and head of the URPO was
Major-General Khokholkov.
The alleged order to kill
Berezovskiy was given in
December 1997. Why did it
take Lt-Col. Litvinenko and
his collegues so long to inform
either Berezovskiy or anyone
else who would take the case? Has the officer in charge of
one of the most efficient
security substructures, URPO,
asked for a progress report
from Litvinenko? How could
Litvinenko know that Nikolay
Kovalev knew about the
assassination order if it was
not given in writing or by
Kovalev himself and in his
presence? Litvinenko already
knew Berezovskiy, had
worked for him and boasted
about their friendship. All
four accusing officers
moonlighted as Berezovskiy’s
bodyguards134. The officers
claiming that they were given
orders to kill Berezovskiy
spoke also at length about the
seemingly non-related issue of
FSB’s unorthodox attempt to
liberate two FSB officers
kidnapped by Chechens. The
alleged attempt involved
kidnapping Dzhabrailov,
brother of a controversial
Chechen Moscow-based
businessman. The officers
spoke about operational
details of the whole
undertaking, expressing
anxiety about the methods
they were ordered to use135.
Putting aside the sudden
moral qualms of the group,
their willingness to talk about
operations against any
Chechens, especially about
such a controversial figure as
Dzhabrailov at a time when
Chechens were not popular
yet remember Berezovskiy’s attempts to negotiate the release of several hostages in Chechnya. FSB was against his involvement
in any negotiations because
his methods and money
encouraged potential kidnappers and served his own interest. Two of the accusers were about to be
reprimanded for unrelated transgressions by the superiors they accused of plotting Berezovskiy’s murder. In September 1995 Litvinenko
was involved in an unusual
case of a stolen garment sold
by Marya Tikhonova, a
daughter of Yel'tsin’s then
chief of staff Sergey Filatov.
The target of the investigation
was not Tikhonova but
Filatov136. Boris Berezovskiy
was allowed by Yel'tsin and
his entourage to continue his
private vendetta after the first
FSB investigation. In April
1998 Yel'tsin made him
Executive Secretary of the
CIS. He was not fired when
the second investigation
ordered by Yel'tsin and
supervised by Putin found no
substance in Litvinenko’s
accusations. After his
dismissal from FSB Litvinenko
found work as an adviser of
the CIS Executive Secretariat,
where he was arrested in the
spring of 1999 on unrelated
charges. Litvinenko’s
colleagues who supported his
accusations were fired from
FSB and found jobs on Boris
Berezovskiy’s staff137. The
URPO was disbanded and
General Khokholkov was fired
although Major-General Yuriy
Bagrayev of Main Military
Prosecutor’s Office stated
publicly that the statements
made by Litvinenko and his
colleges against their
superiors were baseless.
Khokholkov was offered a
job at State Tax Office. His
directorate was closed down
soon after his appointment
and he was not offered
another job138.
Nikolay Kovalev won the court case against Berezovskiy in April 1999 but did not ask for any material compensation because he was “not convinced of clean origin of Berezovskiy’s money”139. In September 1999, in an interview with the Italian daily Repubblica, Berezovskiy claimed that generals once responsible for Yel'tsin’s security, Barsukov and Korzhakov, commissioned a series of murders.140
Rumours about Kovalev’s dismissal continued. He was fired on 25 July 1998. The main reason for his dismissal was his investigation of corruption in FAPSI. The investigation allowed his enemies to convince Yel'tsin that Kovalev’s ultimate goal was to take over FAPSI and that he was becoming too powerful. Yel'tsin signed Kovalev’s dismissal while on holiday in Karelia141. Before Kovalev’s departure Yel'tsin restructured FSB once again. On 6 July 1998 he signed a decree approving a new FSB structure, with a new Department of Economic Security142. The changes introduced by Yel'tsin left the Counterintelligence Department with two sub-directorates: Counterintelligence Operations and the newly created Information and Computer Security Directorate. The Directorate of Economic Counterintelligence became a separate department within FSB and Military Counterintelligence Directorate was given more autonomy. FSB also acquired a directorate responsible for protection of the Constitution.
On 26 August 1998 Yel'tsin signed a readjusting decree authorising FSB to have two first deputies, a deputy director with the rank of state secretary, six deputy directors responsible for individual departments and one deputy director, the head of Moscow and Moscow Oblast Directorate. FSB Collegium was increased from 11 to 17 in August 1998. All its members have to be approved by the President143. 6 October 1998 brought another presidential decree abolishing the post of state secretary, but upgrading the status of the head of the St Petersburg FSB, making him a deputy director of FSB. This position went to Viktor Cherkasov144. In November 1998 FSB Computer and Information Security Directorate became an independent body within FSB. At the end of 1998 FSB leadership thus consisted of Director, 2 First Deputy Directors, 8 deputy directors, 6 responsible for FSB departments, 2 for Moscow ….
On 5 December 1998 from his hospital bed Yel'tsin dismissed several of his top officials. The head of the Presidential Administration Valentin Yumashev was replaced by former military counterintelligence expert, FAPSI deputy head of personnel and director of Russian Border Troops Colonel-General Nikolay Bordyuzha. The head of FAPSI, General Starovoytov and special services supervisor in his administration Yevgeniy Savostyanov were also fired. Savostyanov was replaced by Major-General Makarov, another military counterintelligence specialist. Makarov worked for FAPSI until 1994 when he left to work for private company146. One of the most significant reforms of FSB in 1998 was the return of Military Counterintelligence Directorate as a separate element. The directorate was even given its old number, “3”, which it had before. After August 1991 coup the new Minister of Defence Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov asked for military counterintelligence to be moved to Ministry of Defence. Vadim Bakatin originally agreed but the problem was never solved to the Ministry of Defence’s satisfaction.147 After USSR KGB was abolished politicians hesitated what to do with Military Counterintelligence Directorate. Sergey Stepashin who was then a RSFSR deputy and Chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Defence and Security Committee admitted at the beginning of November 1991 that the problem of military counterintelligence had not yet been resolved but added “The Defence Ministry must have its own.”148 During the October 1993 events White House supporters attacked the Moscow Military Counterintelligence building where they seized weapons and demanded that officers in charge order all Military Counterintelligence cells in the armed forces to enforce the White House supporters’ wishes149. They failed but Yel'tsin and his supporters must had asked themselves why their opponents had succeeded in entering the Military Counterintelligence building. Whatever the real reason, that was the end of discussion about the transfer to MOD. There were however rumours that military counterintelligence could become another separate security body150. Counterintelligence work has changed dramatically during the 1990s. Russia had pulled out from the Warsaw Pact countries, from most of the former Soviet republics and Mongolia and had no large units stationed in the far abroad countries. Its weapons were still of enormous interest to many foreign countries but the biggest problems were chaos, lack of money, undisciplined soldiers, unprotected weapon storage, and individuals and groups both foreign and local wanting to buy or steal weapons and explosives. The head of Military Counterintelligence responsible for Moscow Military District, Major-General Anatoliy Kachuk, described counterintelligence and intelligence work as the primary tasks of his department. Catching spies is glamorous, catching thieves especially in Russia is not. The modern thieves in the Russian armed forces may still like to steal petrol and alcohol but the real money comes from successful theft of weapons and explosives. General Kachuk said that between mid 1995 and 1997 there were 70 documented attempts at theft from subunits and depots in Moscow MD. In addition, the regional FSB bodies confiscated 51 firearms, 50,000 rounds of ammunition, 250 grenades and 28 kg of explosives. Several cases quoted by General Kachuk suggest that the supporters of creation of a military police force might have a point. An attempt by an intoxicated cadet from Tula artillery school trying to sell an AK-74 to local criminals, for example, should really be a police matter151.
In 1996 the Duma Defence Committee submitted a plan of how Military Police should fit into MOD. The plan rejected a “garrison-district” model and suggested a regional-territorial model152. The project never took off, however, because Yel'tsin was afraid that it would reduce his powers. It was also rejected by the military, who were afraid that the judiciary and the local authorities would be entitled to interfere with their affairs, and it would weaken the power of commanders. It would almost certainly guarantee the involvement of MVD and would provoke turf conflicts with military counterintelligence. Colonel-General Aleksey Alekseyevich Molyakov, head of Military Counterintelligence Directorate of FSB, admitted that the situation in the army remained one of Russia’s most acute problems, which he ascribed to lack of money, “Chechen syndrome” and unauthorised use of weapons.153 Asked about his relationship with Defence Minister Sergeyev, Molyakov described it as constructive. The structure of the Directorate begins at battalion level. Each branch of the Armed Forces and each army, fleet, corps and division has a military counterintelligence directorate or department (likewise KGB vis-a-vis military). Their priority tasks are counteraction of foreign intelligence services, protection of the Armed Forces against sabotage and terrorism, protecting, within their competence, weapons of mass destruction, illegal sales of weapons and corruption within the armed forces. Molyakov claims to have about 6,000 subordinates. The Law On Operational Investigative Activities allows Directorate to recruit collaborators within the sphere of its operations and Directorate also has collaborators in foreign countries in accordance with statute on military counterintelligence organs. The number of collaborators working for his organisation is estimated at 50,000. Molyakov described the directorate’s work on protecting Russia’s nuclear weapons as one of the most important tasks. Military Counterintelligence Directorate conducts its activities in military formations of MVD, FAPSI, FPS and other forces. This is sometimes euphemistically called “operational support”154. The directorate is also responsible for issuing travel permissions for the uniformed members of Russia’s power structures. In 1996 5,000 servicemen from all power structures, including FAPSI, applied for permission to travel abroad. Information from the directorate goes to FSB, where it is distributed to President, Prime Minister, Security Council and leaders of Federal Assembly chambers155. In recognition of his work in January 1998 General Molyakov was appointed head of Military Inspectors Directorate at State Military Inspectorate of Russian Security Council.
Like all the heads of the security structures and substructures General Molyakov had to supervise several controversial cases. Cases which involve environmental pollution by the military, financial mismanagement and theft in the armed forces, and technical military publications always bring out the worst in military counterintelligence organs. What is secret and what is not is often decided by people who are not in touch with modern life or who follow their own narrow interests. The case of Grigoriy Pasko is a good example of this. Captain 2nd Rank Grigoriy Pasko, a journalist of the Pacific Fleet newspaper “Boyevaya Vakhta”, was arrested on 20 November 1997 on his return from a trip to Japan. Customs officials found secret documents in his luggage and he was charged with treason. In a letter smuggled to the local press Pasko claimed that he was framed. The whole case began to sound increasingly bizarre when Rear-Admiral German Ugryumov, FSB chief for the Pacific Fleet, was quoted as saying that he was not accusing Pasko of being a spy or working for a foreign power, although Pasko was officially accused of trying to pass secret information to a “certain international organisation”.157 What enraged the local authorities was that Pasko was trying to prove that of $125m given to Russia by Japan for a nuclear waste processing plant, only $25m were spent and the rest disappeared without trace with, according to Pasko, the approval of Pacific Fleet top brass. Pasko was finally found guilty of abusing his credentials when collecting sensitive information and sentenced to three years imprisonment, but covered by a recent amnesty he was not detained. The disappearance of the $100m was not investigated158.
Retired naval officer Aleksandr Nikitin was arrested on 6 February 1996 and charged with espionage, for supplying a Norwegian environmental group Bellona with information about Russia’s illegal dumping of radioactive material in Murmansk and Arkhangelsk. The Norwegians were particularly interested in Russian depleted nuclear fuel dumped 45km from the Norwegian border. When commenting on Nikitin’s case, FSB director Kovalev said that although Bellona did not task Nikitin with anything illegal, he on his own initiative had used a false identity card to get into a secret facility to obtain the information.159 Nikitin was later acquitted.
The author of the article “Missiles over the Sea” which appeared in two consecutive issues of the unrestricted “Tekhnika I Voruzhyeniye” military periodical was threatened with criminal charges because according to the FSB it contained military secrets. In his defence, the author insisted that the article contained his own analysis based on open source material. An external expert who advised the FSB that the article included secrets was an author of a book with similar info160. One of the least glorious pages of the recent history of the 3rd Directorate was its attempt in May 1998 to force Colonel Mikhail Bergman to take part in a smear campaign against his former commander Aleksandr Lebed. Bergman refused and was threatened with being framed as an Israeli spy161.
With the second Chechen conflict Acting Prime Minister Putin reinforced Third Directorate’s position in the armed forces and all other military formations by signing a Statute on FSB structures in the armed forces and other bodies. The statute reaffirms the presence of military counterintelligence directorate of FSB in all military bodies in Russia, including formations set up in wartime. This covers Russian formations and organs based outside Russia. Military counterintelligence are allowed to conduct intelligence relevant to safety of Russian military formations. Third Directorate is permitted to cooperate with Russian intelligence organs. Military counterintelligence bodies are to protect special communication equipment in all military structures and participate in decisions relevant to foreign travel of military and civilian personnel of these structures as well as treatment of foreign nationals and stateless persons on Russian soil. The structure and number of military counterintelligence personnel in military bodies is determined by FSB director after a recommendation by 3rd Directorate of FSB162. …
Like everything else in the Soviet Union the KGB was highly centralised. All decision-making was done in Moscow. All strategic analytical and technical work was conducted in Moscow and local security officials were frequently Russian. The republican security structures were able to conduct counterintelligence and limited intelligence work across their borders or against visiting foreigners. In the not so distant past even these activities were co-ordinated and monitored from Moscow and planned according to Moscow’s wishes and directives. Military counterintelligence organs belonged to KGB, not to the Soviet Armed Forces and were even more centralised. Almost all technical aspects of counterintelligence work were Russian, including cryptography. Top KGB leadership was Slavic. The non Slavic republican security bosses had no experience in management at national level. The new rulers and security bosses were very often old Communists repainted in their national colours. Even those among them who were fascinated by democracy and the free market economy could not understand them. The republics were linked with Russia economically and ethnically. The republican special services found themselves short of personnel, short of necessary equipment, short of appropriate training facilities and relevant teaching personnel, short of ideas and finally short of funds. Russia was willing to help, but its own special services were constantly being restructured, its economy was in a dive and its organs were themselves experiencing difficulties with personnel retention.
One of the substantial problems concerning the co-operation with CIS special services is not only their different political, commercial and security interests but also different legal systems, which may allow the citizens of the countries once belonging to the USSR to sell Russian secrets, an act which is not punishable in their own countries. Special services of the FSU republics involved in combating international crime are often interested in co-operation with Russia but mutual distrust provokes occasionally justified accusations of spying and violating of co-operation agreements. As early as 19 October 1991 the Russians held talks with republican security representatives on creating an inter-republican security system163. At the end of November 1991 Vadim Bakatin, at this stage the head of the new Inter-republican Security Service (MSB), announced that Russia had signed agreements with security services from Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, that agreements with Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan were ready, and agreements with Azerbaijan and Armenia were being prepared . Not all the agreements were officially announced and some included a section which stated that the signatory countries would not carry out subversive acts against each other and did not regard each other as potential adversaries. Such agreements were signed with Uzbekistan and Ukraine. Some of the republics were also ready to cooperate with Moscow on electronic intelligence gathering. Moscow also trained intelligence students from several republics. In mid 1992 Major-General Sergey Stepashin, Deputy Security Minister, announced that Russia had signed agreements on co-operation and interaction of Russian Security Ministry and its counterparts in the majority of the former union republics except the Baltic states164. As the head of FSK Sergey Stepashin said in April 1994 that Russia had made representations to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan about attempts by special services of the two countries to recruit Russian citizens. He added that five members of the Georgian special services had been detained by FSK and sent back to Tbilisi. Four years later the head of FSB Moscow Directorate Colonel-General Aleksander Vasilevich Tsarenko mentioned that in spite of the CIS Almaty Treaty which forbids the signatories to spy on each other, the presence of several CIS special services in Moscow was felt with discomfort165.
The heads of the security bodies of the twelve CIS states met for the first time on 15 March 1995 in Odintsovo near Moscow. The participants agreed that they would meet regularly and set up a co-ordinating secretariat in Moscow. The next such conference was to take place at the end of May 1995 in Tbilisi, where a treaty specifying specific forms of co-operation was to be signed. All participants accepted the need to cooperate in combating organised crime, terrorism and drugs and weapons smuggling. Some participants suggested not only an exchange of information but also joint operations166. The following CIS security summit took place in the Tajik capital Dushanbe at the beginning of April 1996. The participants agreed to set up a single data bank for special services to combat terrorism and drug trade. The participants also took a decision to set up a standing co-ordination council and technical committee working on a data bank167. The leaders of CIS countries’ special services met again in Moscow on 14 April 1997. The participants discussed the joint databank on organised crime on the territory of the former USSR. The new CIS crime data bank contains information on organised crime, drug trafficking, arms smuggling and non-proliferation of nuclear components and has two main parts. The first has information accessible to all interested special services. The second contains operational information. If one of the services does not want certain information to reach a third party an appropriate “no access” procedure can be applied. All special services have equal rights when it comes to access to the database. The technical side is taken care of by reputable foreign companies and has relatively easy security access.16 8 Just before his dismissal in 1998 Nikolay Kovalev said that 15 protocols had recently been signed with various CIS special services on fighting organised crime, smuggling of strategic raw materials, nuclear weapons components and ensuring security of the railroads. It was announced in July 1998 that the first part of the CIS Special Services Databank had been completed169.
The meeting of heads of the CIS security services in Kishinev in October 1997 aimed at improving co-ordination against terrorism and protection and safety of nuclear sites. At this meeting Nikolay Kovalev informed the participants that spies were at work in Russia170. Some of the participants must have wondered if what they heard was meant to be a warning or simply a lecture like in old times.
The CIS law enforcement bodies, tax services, border guards and customs services met in Moscow at the beginning of December 1997 to improve co-ordination between member countries and the services171. The following week Moscow hosted a security conference, “The Russian special services past and present” at FSB Academy, with 160 specialists coming from Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine172. The CIS Council of the heads of security and special forces met again on 30 September and 1 October 1999 in St Petersburg at the 6th Session of the Council. The participants discussed co-operation in combating terrorism. An Uzbek delegation took part in the meeting for the first time. Nikolay Patrushev, new director of FSB, was unanimously elected “Chairman of the Council of the Heads of security services and special forces of the CIS member states”173.
The second part of the last decade also saw more bilateral meetings and agreements between Russia and its southern neighbours. Russian and Azeri security chiefs met in Moscow in May 1997 to discuss co-operation in combating economic crime and terrorism174. A Kazakh delegation of security officials visited Moscow at the beginning of December 1997. The head o FSB praised cooperation between secret services of the two countries. After a tip-off from their Kazakh colleagues, FSB had been able to close down “a training course organised by a group of Kurds in Russia”175. Vladimir Putin visited Kyrgyzstan in mid September 1998 to discuss security problems with his Kyrgyz counterparts176. At the end of January 2000 the FSB and their Ukrainian counterparts the SBU at a working meeting in Kiev agreed to co-operate in combating organised crime, terrorism, smuggling and recruitment of mercenaries177. A delegation headed by FSB deputy director Colonel-General Vladimir Pronichev visited Georgia at the beginning of February 2000 to talk about joint action against terrorism, the situation on the Russian (Chechen)-Georgian border and about security problems at Russian military bases in Georgia178. Considering the timing and position of General Pronichev, the head of the amalgamated Antiterrorist Department and the Directorate of Constitutional Security, the main reason for the visit must have been infiltration of the Russian- Georgian border by Chechen fighters.
Like many other special services, FSB and predecessors had to look for new ways to use their skills and experience in the post Cold War world but in contrast with them it did not have to look far or for long. Imbued with patriotism, nationalism, Marxism-Leninism and profound ignorance of democratic systems many high-ranking security officers saw their role as pursuing foreign spies and being decently rewarded for their efforts. Instead they were constantly pushed to chase and investigate petty crooks, domestic Mafia, ethnic, religious, political extremists and selected politicians, for which they were neither adequately rewarded or appreciated. Russia in the meantime was becoming a very fine place in which to steal something. It had natural resources, non ferrous metals sometimes hidden in the strategic reserve’s super secret storage sites, sophisticated weapons and many scientific achievements. Vulnerable at first to a multinational contingent of foreign and domestic crooks, Russian business quickly adapted to the situation, becoming more corrupt and brutal than their partners and clients. On the other end of the economic scale highly educated and skilful scientists, constructors and technicians had become poor and resentful. Members of both groups were ready to steal what foreign buyers were willing to buy. In general, the first group wanted to become rich, the second to survive. Several countries have been trying to acquire Russian military technology and scientific achievements both legally and illegally, provoking understandable anxiety which often deteriorated into full- blown Soviet-style paranoia, fed by impressive looking but often irrelevant statistics. Factors which complicate the issue further are the loose interpretation of law and the existing rules, and imprecise use of terminology by Russian security officials.
Details of the threat from foreign spies supported by outlandish statistics are made officially available to the media on a regular basis but even the official MVD paper “Shchit I Mech” stopped publishing comprehensive crime statistics several years ago. In July 1992, Sergey Stepashin the Chairman of the RF Parliament Defence and Security Committee said that foreign intelligence services were working even more brazenly against Russia than before179. In December 1993 Major-General Venyamin Vladimirovich Kashirshikh, deputy chief of the Counterintelligence Directorate of the soon to be renamed Security Ministry, said that some Western special services had very quickly changed the situation in the former Eastern Bloc and some parts of the FSU. Many unnamed countries were now working against Russia. They were mainly interested in scientific information.180 The Russians were not afraid of foreign armies but of hostile foreign intelligence services. They were convinced that after the collapse of the USSR the CIA sent on average 15 agents to each independent state of the FSU181.
In 1994, FSK caught 22 Russian nationals working for foreign special services. It stopped about 60 attempts by Russian nationals to transfer secret materials to representatives of foreign states. FSK would not elaborate as to the difference between “working for” and “transfer” or whether “transfer” meant selling. An unnamed FSK spokesman said that foreign special services were widening their subversive and intelligence activities. He said that foreign special services were mainly interested in nuclear weapons, other modern weapons, reforms of defence systems, advanced technologies and fundamental science studies.
The Russians noted also increasing activity by East European and Baltic intelligence services which they said were controlled by their Western counterparts. The activities of special services of unnamed Moslem countries were also on the rise. 90 foreigners working as experts and advisers in Russia were identified in 1995 as having “foreign special service status”182. Thanks to FSK’s work more than 500 accidents had been avoided. The activities of more than 40 armed formations pursuing political goals were uncovered. FSK became aware of 200 mercenary recruiters, 80 of them foreigners. It also gave data concerning its crime fighting successes and the financial value of some of its achievements183. Yuriy Baturin, national security adviser to Boris Yel'tsin, expressed his concern about espionage efforts of North Korea and China in Russia. Russia was especially concerned with the North Korean nuclear programme. In KGB document No 363-K addressed to the leadership of the USSR, Chairman Kryuchkov warned as early as 22 February 1990 that Pyonyang had produced its first nuclear device but had no plans to test it as it would not be able to conceal it184. Moscow was also apprehensive about the spread of Chinese organised crime in the Far East. Baturin said in 1994 that Moscow was interested in an agreement with Kazakhstan which would permit Russia to organise tighter security on its borders185. In July 1994 an unnamed member of the Russian Parliament quoted an unnamed representative of the GRU and declared during close hearings that Turkey, Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan showed interest in the Central Asian republics186. In October 1994 Chairman of Duma’s Security Committee, Viktor Ilyukhin, said that foreign intelligence services were stepping up their activities as Russian security services showed signs of decay. Ilyukhin added that even the intelligence services of Finland and Sweden had become more active in the border area with Russia. He accused German intelligence service of opening intelligence stations in the Baltic republics, criticised USA for its activities in Magadan and Yakutiya and warned, as if hesitating which was more dangerous, that 35,000 businesses in Russia were forced to pay protection money to 135 Russian criminal organisations which had 100,000 criminals at their disposal187. According to Major-General Aleksandr Mikhaylov, head of the FSB PR centre, the Turkish, Polish and German intelligence services were stepping up their activities on Russian territory.188
In 1996 Kovalev spoke of 28 Russian citizens being convicted of espionage in 1995. There were 11 similar convictions by mid 1996. The number of successful interventions of the FSK/FSB to stop Russian citizens selling secrets to foreign bidders increased to 100.189 In a series of statements and interviews given before the anniversary of the Russian security services Nikolay Kovalev said that FSB had identified and placed under surveillance 400 professional secret agents of foreign countries and 39 of their Russian collaborators. He concluded that FSB continued to work against activities of foreign intelligence services within Russia190. In 1997 30 foreign intelligence officers were expelled from Russia and 7 Russian citizens collaborating illegally with foreign powers were apprehended191.
Speaking at FSB collegium meeting on 4 March 1998 Kovalev said that 29 foreign intelligence agents had been exposed in Russia in 1997, 18 Russian citizens were prevented from passing “important state information” and that 400 foreign special services personnel had not yet done anything illegal but were being monitored192. He did not say whether “exposed” meant arrested, detained, expelled or warned, if the “important state information” was actually secret. At the end of the month Kovalev added that although counterintelligence remained FSB’s main activity, economic security, combating terrorism and investment protection were at the top of its priority list194.
During a 1997 graduation ceremony at FSB Academy Nikolay Kovalev stated that activities of foreign special services in Russia were comparable to the WWII period195. The Soviet Union and then Russia regarded the intelligence services of USA, UK, Germany, Israel and France as the most dangerous. In the post Cold War changes Moscow discovered that for political, economic, military and even religious reasons it had become a target of smaller and poorer countries. In July 1997 the Russians accused Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, Egypt, Jordan and Tanzania of “stepping up” their intelligence activities in Russia196 and at the end of the year added Pakistan, Iran, China and Saudi Arabia to this and the usual list of foreign intelligence services operating in Russia197.
FSB director Colonel-General Nikolay Patrushev announced in January 2000 that in 1999 the illegal activities of 65 officers of foreign intelligence services had been cut short and that 30 Russian nationals willing to sell secrets to foreigners were thwarted.198 The number of Russians willing to sell secrets had grown into epidemic proportions, lamented the daily Segodnya in February 199. On occasion FSB releases the names of those caught spying for foreign powers and discusses individual cases, deriding the discrepancy between the money they asked for and the value of what they were selling. The total sum asked by, or offered to, two officers from the Strategic Rocket Forces, three officers working for the GRU Centre for Space Reconnaissance, three Ministry of Foreign Affairs employees and one scientist accused of spying for foreign powers was laughably small.
A Russian national selling a secret may indeed be greedy and dishonest, but he will wonder how the losses incurred by Russia as a result of his betrayal compare with wholesale plunder of the country by corrupt, incompetent and arrogant politicians, state officials and businessmen. In spite of adversarial relations with the special services of several Western countries, the Russian security structures were also ready to cooperate. Co-operation between Western special services and KGB began in the early 1990s. The USA and West Germany were particularly keen to work with USSR against organised crime and drug trafficking. The Americans forecasted correctly that USSR might in the future experience drug problems familiar to those in several Western democracies; the Germans were about to merge with the GDR, inheriting Soviet and East German “stay behind” criminal structures. The Germans also experienced problems with some members of the ethnic German community emigrating from the USSR to Germany. The walls between East and West were crumbling and there was a need for law enforcement bodies to cooperate. The only organisation authorised and competent to talk about security co-operation in Russia was KGB. MVD knew only about domestic crime, had modest foreign contacts, little experience in dealing with transnational crime and was not to be allowed to learn. Foreigners were not to be trusted and only KGB knew how to deal with them.
The combination of Western greed and ideological liberalism permitted a large group of Russia’s undeserving rich to settle in or to visit practically any country of their choice. Co-operation with Russian special services ceased to be an option and became a must. Several KGB generals visited the USA and the heads of both FBI and CIA were invited to Moscow. By mid 1994 FSK had bilateral agreements with Germany, Turkey, Greece, Poland, China, France and Czech Republic and exchanged liaison officers with Germany, France, Poland and Czech Republic. The Russians were surprised and unhappy that the USA did not want to sign a similar agreement. A high ranking Russian security team went to Turkey on at least three occasions and in 1996 bought from the Turks mobile phone eavesdropping equipment200. At the beginning of 1997 FSB co-operated and exchanged information with 30 countries. By the end of the year it had contacts with 80 countries and official representatives.201
As with CIS countries FSB was particularly active in establishing bilateral contacts with the far abroad countries in the second part of the last decade. At the beginning of February 1997, during a visit of FSB director Nikolay Kovalev to the World Economic Forum in Davos, the Russian and French special services agreed on exchanging information on terrorist acts using explosives in Moscow and Paris. A week later Kovalev received the head of the Romanian Information Service Virgil Magureanu to discuss the co-operation of both services in fighting terrorism and organised crime. After British Home Secretary Michael Howard held talks with the director of FSB Nikolay Kovalev on combating terrorism and organised crime, smuggling drugs, weapons and radioactive materials in January 1997, the heads of the FSB and British Security Service met in Moscow in November to discuss further co-operation202. After the Red Mercury affair and mutual public accusation, the co-ordinator of the German special services Berdt Schmidbauer met Nikolay Kovalev and the head of the SVR Vyacheslav Trubnikov on 15 April 1998203.
Kovalev’s last trip abroad as Director of FSB was to Israel. The Russians were concerned about growing Islamic extremism assisted by foreign countries and organisations, especially in Chechnya. The Israelis worried about nine Russian institutes selling sensitive technology to Iran. Both countries agreed to talk about extradition procedures for wanted criminals. In August the Russian Ambassador in Israel, Mikhail Bogdanov, asked Tel Aviv for an exchange of intelligence information on Islamic extremists204. With Vladimir Putin’s assured victory in the 2000 Presidential election Russian Mafia bosses may decide to move to other countries to enjoy their richly undeserved earnings, in which case the value of FSB connections for other special services in Europe and North America could go up. Nikolay Kovalev warned the Davos forum in 1997 that the West was not familiar with the way Russian criminals operate and that the western law enforcement bodies were not accustomed to working with such a “system of coordination.”
Putin’s appointment on 25 July 1998 as new director o FSB was a logical step on Yel'tsin’s political chessboard. Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin graduated from Leningrad University in 1975 and joined the KGB. He had planned to join KGB since he was a boy. After completing secondary education he applied to join KGB and was told to get a degree first206. After graduating and attending specialist security courses Putin worked in the counterintelligence department of Leningrad Directorate of KGB. At the end of 1970s he was transferred to the intelligence department of the directorate207, when he was supervised by General Oleg Kalugin for at least a year.208 Putin’s immediate boss in Leningrad, Feliks Dmitrevich Sutyrin, was transferred to the Intelligence Academy in Moscow at the end of the 1970s. Putin began his studies at the same Academy in either 1982 or 1983209. The transfer to the Intelligence Academy was an important promotion and opportunity. He spent a year improving his German and was sent to the GDR in 1985210. Among the Warsaw Pact countries the GDR was always singled out for special attention from Moscow. The country was divided into 14 districts, each district had a directorate of the Security Ministry of the GDR and each such directorate had a group of KGB officers attached to it. Putin served four years in the Dresden group, where he was promoted twice211.
The reforms of FSB went on before and after Putin’s nomination as head. In April 1998 two directorates of the 4th, Economic Security, Department were divided into several subdivisions and many officers were dismissed. Several heads and the deputy heads of two directorates were also fired212. In the first interview given to the media after he was nominated to the post of FSB director, Putin said that some substructures of the organisation could be merged and that the computer department within the organisation would be strengthened213. In August 1999 Boris Yel'tsin merged the 2nd Department responsible for combating terrorism with the Constitutional Security Directorate, with overall command retained by the head of the 2nd (Antiterrorist) Department General Pronichev. General Zotov, the head of the Constitutional Security Directorate and his first deputy General Zubkov were made redundant214. A Separate Department responsible for the safety of nuclear facilities was set up in FSB in October 1999215.
As a former professional security expert Vladimir Putin may be tempted to undertake another major reform of FSB although Security Council Secretary Sergey Ivanov in February 2000 denied rumours that the FSB, the FPS and FSO were going to merge216. Speaking on 5 November 1998 to the Duma deputies, Vladimir Putin said that the Ministry of Finance allocated so little money to the organisation that even the best of his officers were leaving the force. He called for increased salaries and moral support217. He got a promise that the salaries in FSB would be increased by 25% in 1999218. On 9 August 1999 Yel'tsin appointed Putin acting Prime Minister. He was replaced by Lieutenant-General Nikolay Petrushev.
The SFB’s comparatively modest salaries do not put off many candidates competing for a place in the FSB Academy. A former KGB School, the Academy, situated at 62 Michurinskiy Prospect in Moscow, had at the beginning of the 1990s to change its curriculum, rewrite its manuals and operate with a reduced budget. In 1993 Deputy Security Minister Vasiliy Frolov, speaking at the beginning of the academic year ceremony, said that in spite of the financial problems there would be no money-savings in training the necessary personnel219. The Academy went through lean years at the beginning of the 1990s and in 1992 there was only a little more than one applicant for a place, but by 1997 there were 10 candidates for each place. The Academy has Counterintelligence, Language and Special Departments and an Institute of Cryptography, Communications and Information Technology. It trains students in 11 specialisations including: investigators, lawyers, operatives with foreign languages, interpreters, cryptographers, experts in security of information systems and experts in security of telecommunication systems. The Academy trains specialists for “practically all” power structures220.
Head FSB Counterintelligence Directorate Valeriy Pechenkin said in 1997 that while many experienced personnel left the FSB ranks, young people joining the organisation are highly motivated and do so for patriotic reasons221. In 1997, 600 students graduated from the FSB Academy222.
The best example of how a security service may lose its direction was given by Vadim Bakatin when he announced that the KGB had collected 580 volumes of information on Professor Sakharov223. All the ingredients for future abuses of power are still present in Russian society and even more so in security structures. Threat assessments are too often made by high ranking officials fomed by the old Soviet thinking and with little or no knowledge of the surrounding world. The Draft National Security Concept of 1997, approved by the Russian Federation Security Council, said that “the threat of large scale aggression being unleashed against Russia in the next five to 10 years is unlikely” but warns against “the penetration of Russian, state organs of power and administration, political parties, banking institutions, security facilities and industrial enterprises by foreign intelligence services”. These services conduct “disinformation activities with a view to getting the wrong political decisions made”224.
In 1997 the Federation Council Defence Committee was one of the proponents of the reunification of all special services and organised a roundtable discussion where a member of the committee Nikolay Ryzhak, formerly Major-General and deputy head of the Third Main Directorate of the KGB, complained that Russia had become a Mecca for foreigners, including “hordes of spies”, and that no one was monitoring the movements of foreigners any more.225 Ryzhak said several months later that every person born in England (sic) received a medical card which contains all information about that person, even fingerprints, adding “This is why it is so difficult for our illegal immigrants to take root in England226.
Edict on Secrecy, No 61 of 24 January 1998, lists among secrets dual technology, a vaguely formulated but lengthy list of economic links with CIS countries, including the volume of shipments between Russia and the CIS of rare metals and other, unspecified materials of strategic importance, as well as “information revealing volumes of deliveries of reserves of strategic types of fuel”. The last item covers three ministries, including the Russian Ministry of Agriculture.227 To emphasise the threat, respectable statistical methods are used to calculate losses to the national economy resulting from emigration of Russian scientists. The Russian Ministry of Science and Technology came out with an assessment to show that Russia’s losses for every specialist leaving Russia would be about $300,000 and that through emigration Russia might suffer losses of up to $20bn. How this figure was reached considering Russia's growing unemployment and inefficient The lack of common sense and clear thinking in FSB was in evidence after two explosions in Moscow on 22 September 1999. Bags of suspicious looking mixture with a detonator were found in an apartment building in Ryazan’. The house was inspected at the request of the residents. FSB Director Nikolay Patrushev was obliged to explain that it was all an exercise and the sacks contained sugar. An unnamed FSB officer was quoted three hours later as saying “we are shocked and bewildered by Patrushev’s statement”229. The FSB apologised that afternoon, claiming that the whole incident was the result of the Vikhr antiterrorist exercise. According to FSB statement identical devices were planted in several other cities230. The FSB had continued the exercise even after the two huge blasts in Moscow. An MVD report after the inspection stated that the sacks contained hexogen231.
The obsession with secrecy occasionally leads to an arrest for which the FSB is always blamed, without anyone asking who issued the arrest warrant and for what reason, or why the warrant was not challenged. One such case was the arrest of a scientist Mirzoyanov, who raised the alarm about violation by Russia of a chemical weapons ban treaty. In autumn 1999 the FSB accused a well known Vladivostok based maritime scientist Vladimir Soyfer of revealing state secrets to foreign organisations. The district court of Vladivostok ruled that Soyfer was not a spy and that the documents seized by the FSB during house searches and his passport must be returned to him232. Soyfer was arrested because two contradictory laws were incorrectly interpreted by FSB234. The FSB lost the case, apologised but decided to appeal.
The second Chechen war forced the Russian government and the FSB to pay more attention to information warfare. The smoother, more consequential and harsher information and propaganda campaign conducted by Moscow suggests that during the last few months a substantial amount of money and manpower has been channelled into the operation. The FSB, which at this stage of the conflict is one of the main providers of information for the government from the conflict area, must have developed its public relations and media section considerably. Although the creation of a special structure within the FSB dealing with information and propaganda has been denied by the head of its PR Office General Zdanovich235 its successes, be it to the detriment of a free flow of information, are so evident that the temptation to create it in the near future might become irresistible.
- 4, 5 footnotes. In his memoirs “Chelovek Za Spinoy”, Russlit 1994 p279 Gen Medevedev argues that he obeyed the order of his immediate KGB superior and one of the coup conspirators, Gen Plekhanov, because he worked for the KGB, he was a KGB general, he was paid by the KGB and swore his oath to the KGB, failing to mention that Gorbachev was legally his boss.
- Boris Yel'tsin: Ot Rassveta Do Zakata”, Interbuk 1997, p117. Yel'tsin wanted to disband only the USSR KGB. This would weaken Gorbachev at the time when he, Yel'tsin, was not only the hero of the putsch but controlled also the RSFSR KGB. In accordance with existing laws, on 14 July 1990, the RSFSR State Committee for Public Security for Co- operation with the USSR Ministry of Defence and the USSR KGB had been set up. On the basis of that committee the RSFSR State Defence and Security Committee was established on 31 January 1991(Aleksey Mukhin, “Spetssluzhby I Ikh Predstaviteli V Rossiyskom Obshechestviye”, Moskva 1999). Yel'tsin and Kryuchkov, with Gorbachev’s approval , held talks about the creation of a Russian KGB on 5 May 1991. The next day both signed the protocol on establishing the Russian KGB. The legal justification for the creation of the Russian KGB was that the RSFSR was the only republic without his own KGB. The KGB of the RSFSR was subordinated to the USSR KGB and was to be funded from its budget (Moscow Central Television, 2nd Channel, 11 May 1991 FBIS-SOV-91-092). The central apparatus of the Russian KGB during the August coup had 20 people. V A Podelyakin, First Deputy Chairman of the RSFSR KGB, claimed in an interview for Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 2 November 1991 p7, that there were 23 officers in the central apparatus of the RSFSR KGB during the events of August. Ten days after the coup the number grew to 300. At that time the USSR KGB central apparatus employed 30,000 people (El Pais 1 September 1991 p5. FBIS-SOV-91-175-A).
- https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/96631/00_Mar_3.pdf
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