Deng's 16 character policy

10-18-2018    Belgian authorities arrested

  Xu Yanjun, a deputy division director of the Sixth Bureau of China's Ministry of State Security (MSS) in Jiangsu, on April 1 in Brussels, based on a warrant issued in connection with a U.S. criminal complaint. ...Like all espionage cases the Xu case began with a shopping list of information that Chinese authorities have directed the Ministry of State Security to collect.  In the case of Chinese intelligence agencies like the MSS this list includes not only intelligence pertaining to political and military developments in countries of interest but also technologies that China wishes to acquire from foreign companies.  Beijing has frequently demonstrated its brazenness in its attempts to obtain such technology.  One such case is the Science and Technology Ministry's long-running National High-Tech Research and Development Program, also known as the 863 Program.  The program provided guidance and funding for the acquisition or development of technology related to information, biology, agriculture, manufacturing, energy and other fields that would have a "significant impact on enhancing China's overall national strengths."  But even if the ministry's website spoke about the domestic development of such technologies, practicalities have long dictated that it is much cheaper and faster to simply acquire them — by hook or by crook, if need be.   More recently, the Chinese government announced a 10-year development plan called "Made in China 2025" in May 2015 to target cutting-edge technologies — namely, aerospace and aviation equipment, new materials, next-generation information technology, high-end numerical control machinery and robotics, maritime engineering equipment and high-tech maritime vessel manufacturing, advanced rail equipment, energy-saving and new-vehicle technology, electrical equipment, biomedicine and high-tech medical devices, as well as agricultural technology, machinery and equipment.

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2018/10/18/a_sting_operation_lifts_the_lid_on_chinese_espionage_113906.html

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11-7-2018   According to the indictment MSS officials in Jiangsu targeted a variety of companies involved in the manufacture of jet engine turbine fans, including U.S. aerospace companies based in Arizona, Massachusetts, Wisconsin, Oregon and California; a technology company in San Diego; and French and British aerospace companies.  The indictment details how the ministry employed a team of hackers who used a variety of techniques against the targeted companies: spear-phishing campaigns, watering hole attacks – an assault in which hackers plant malware on a specific website to infect visitors – and domain hijacking.  The hackers not only stole information but also took advantage of their access to the system to send additional spear-phishing emails to employees of other companies and conduct further watering hole attacks.    https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2018/11/07/chinas_corporate_espionage_looms_large_113946.html

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5-9-2018

Jerry Chun Shing Lee, an American citizen who joined the CIA in 1994 and left in 2007--he was a case officer, and his primary mission was recruiting clandestine human intelligence sources.  Court documents made public Wednesday said the Chinese spies told Lee they had prepared "a gift of $100,000 in exchange for his cooperation and that they would take care of him for life."

  The new charges stop short of explicitly accusing Lee of giving classified information to the Chinese.  Instead they say he agreed to do so, received repeated requests from the Chinese, and made hundreds of thousands of dollars in cash deposits to his personal accounts, even though a business he was operating at the time was failing....an NBC News analyst called the case "a horrific loss for the intelligence community.  And it's not a loss that can be recovered from easily.  Sources, informants, recruitments are built over time."

https://www.nbcnews.com/news/china/ex-cia-officer-jerry-chun-shing-lee-charged-conspiring-spy-n872721

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  This chapter describes the methods by which the PRC attempts to acquire U.S. technology for military purposes.  The types of technology and information that the PRC and individual PRC nationals have attempted to acquire, however, are far more broad.  The PRC appears to try to acquire information and technology on just about anything of value.  Not all of it, by any means, presents national security or law enforcement concerns.

  The PRC's appetite for information and technology appears to be insatiable, and the energy devoted to the task enormous.  While only a portion of the PRC's overall technology collection activities targeted at the United States is of national security concern, the impact on our national security could be huge....

he political, governmental, military and commercial activities of the People's Republic of China are controlled by three directly overlapping bureaucracies:  the Communist Party, the State, and the People's Liberation Army.  Foremost of these, and in ultimate control of all state, military, commercial and political activities in the PRC, is the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).1...
  In 1986 "Paramount Leader" Deng Xiaoping adopted a major initiative, the so-called 863 Program, to accelerate the acquisition and development of science and technology in the PRC.10  Deng directed 200 scientists to develop science and technology goals.  The PRC claims that the 863 Program produced nearly 1,500 research achievements by 1996 and was supported by nearly 30,000 scientific and technical personnel who worked to advance the PRC's "economy and . . . national defense construction." 11
  The most senior engineers behind the 863 Program were involved in strategic military programs such as space tracking, nuclear energy, and satellites.12  Placed under COSTIND's management, the 863 Program aimed to narrow the gap between the PRC and the West by the year 2000 in key science and technology sectors, including the military technology areas of:

� Astronautics
� Information technology
� Laser technology
� Automation technology
� Energy technology
� New materials      

...In 1996, the PRC announced the "Super 863 Program" as a follow-on to the 863 Program, planning technology development through 2010.  The "Super 863 Program" continues the research agenda of the 863 Program, which apparently failed to meet the CCP's expectations.
 The Super 863 Program calls for continued acquisition and development of technology in a number of areas of military concern, including machine tools, electronics, petrochemicals, electronic information, bioengineering, exotic materials, nuclear research, aviation, space, and marine technology.
  COSTIND and the Ministry of Science and Technology jointly manage the Super 863 Program. The Ministry of Science and Technology focuses on biotechnology, information technology, automation, nuclear research, and exotic materials, while COSTIND oversees the laser and space technology fields.13    

  Combine military and civil; combine peace and war; give priority to military production; let civil support military.    https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-CRPT-105hrpt851/html/ch1bod.html
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