-Surveillance at Tiananmen Square
5-4-2001 One of the most interesting but little known efforts of this kind in Asia is the “Shanghai Five Process.” The Shanghai Five process has quietly, but steadily, built up its economic, military and diplomatic relations, and seeks to present itself as more viable counterweight to U.S. influence in Central Asia.
The Shanghai Five consists of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan, and emerged from a series of border demarcation and demilitarization talks which the four former Soviet republics held with China. Since 1996 when the group held its first presidential summit meeting in Shanghai, the five-country group has held annual summits ever since. With each passing year the joint statements to emerge from the summits have signaled greater and greater cooperative efforts in trade, culture, military and security affairs. For example, the statement from the July 2000 Dushanbe summit notes the establishment of a “Council of National Coordinators” which will further foster regularized cooperation amongst the five.
In addition, the joint statements are devoting more space to the group’s view of the international security situation both within and beyond their borders. The Dushanbe statement, for example, pledges the five countries to jointly crack down on liberation movements, terrorism and religious extremism in their borders and, in an interesting quote, to “oppose intervention in other countries’ internal affairs on the pretexts of ‘humanitarianism’ and ‘protecting human rights;’ and support the efforts of one another in safeguarding the five countries’ national independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and social stability.” Chinese President Jiang Zemin, in his speech before the group last year, appeared to go a little farther when he said ” We should strengthen mutual support in safeguarding the national unity and sovereignty of our nations and resist all kinds of threat to the security of the region.”
With these aims in mind the Shanghai Five group has also agreed that their defense ministers should meet on an annual basis (their foreign ministers already hold annual meetings) and their militaries should be more active in conducting joint exercises and training, exchanging information about peacekeeping operations, and holding conferences and other exchanges.
Moreover, in thinly-veiled references critical of U.S. policy, the Dushanbe statement also noted the group’s opposition to “use of force or threat of force in international relations without the UN Security Council’s prior approval and…any countries or groups of countries’ attempt to monopolize global and regional affairs out of selfish interests.” In similar terms the Dushanbe statement also expressed its opposition to U.S. missile defenses by stating its strong support for the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972 and its opposition to “bloc-based” (i.e., US alliance-based) deployment of theater missile defense systems in the Asia-Pacific region, particularly in Taiwan.
The Shanghai Five are quick to point out that the group is not an alliance and is not aimed at any third parties. Indeed the group has a number of internal differences which will likely prevent it from becoming more like an alliance. The two biggest countries in the group—China and Russia—can profess much improved relations over the past 10 years but still harbor long-term strategic suspicions about one another. In addition individual members of the group differ over other important issues, such as relations with various neighbors such as India, Pakistan and Afghanistan’s Taliban, and over how to best exploit the rich reserves of energy and other natural resources in Central Asia. Russia’s President Putin appears to welcome additional members to the group (Uzbekistan, Pakistan, Iran and India have expressed an interest), which, if admitted, would certainly complicate the achievement of consensus within the group.
At the moment the Shanghai Five process has resulted in some impressive achievements, such as settling the parties’ border disputes, introducing confidence-building measures and moving in cooperative ways to combat illicit activities in their region such as terrorism and drug smuggling. They have also stuck together and issued increasingly tough statements in opposition to what they see as U.S. “hegemony.” https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/shanghai-five-an-attempt-to-counter-u-s-influence-in-asia/
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8-13-2018 At a face-to-face meeting two months later, in Istanbul, Clinton returned to the subject of Putin, and Yeltsin made it very clear who he thought would win the election that was scheduled for March 2000. "Putin, of course. He will be the successor to Boris Yeltsin. He's a democrat, and he knows the West," Yeltsin said, speaking of himself in the third person.
Yeltsin warning Bill Clinton his political opponents, then Communists, would take back Crimea if they got in power.
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"I've made it clear I'll do nothing to accelerate NATO. I'm trying to give you now, in this conversation, the reassurance you need. But we need to be careful that neither of us appears to capitulate," Clinton said. In 1997 NATO invited Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic to join….
In Washington and other European capitals, fears of another bloodbath, like what happened in the Bosnia wars just a few years earlier, were growing. Clinton and Yeltsin held a more contentious conversation about how to resolve the crisis. "Frankly speaking, I can tell you, Bill, I am having a tough talk with Milosevic," Yeltsin said. "I shall demand that the disproportionate use of force be stopped, but the most important thing is to get his agreement to negotiations. Any use of force by NATO is inadmissible," he went on….In March 1999, however, amid reported ethnic cleansing that drove thousands of Albanians out of Kosovo, NATO intervened and bombed Serb forces in Kosovo and Serbia itself….
"The [Putin] government promotes the idea Russia's being humiliated or taken advantage of, because it fits into the broader political scheme or goal for legitimating Putin's rule, and the classical logic of being a besieged fortress, and only by rallying around Putin can we avoid a return to the past, ”Andrew Weiss said. https://www.rferl.org/a/putin-s-a-solid-man-declassified-memos-offer-window-into-yeltsin-clinton-relationship/29462317.html
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This Russian - Chinese summit of 1996 took place shortly after the G - 7 meeting in Vancouver with Russia’s participation in this meeting as an associated guest. For the first time in Russian-Chinese official dialogue, Moscow claimed for mutual firm stand against "one dominating power" – code word for the United States. The inclination of the both parties to start the new phase of “equal and confidential partnership aimed at the strategic cooperation in the XXI century" - the expression initiated by President Yeltsin - was included in the Joint Declaration of this summit. However the direct naming of any states as the sources of domination were avoided in the text of the Declaration. The NATO expansion issue was also omitted from the text of the Declaration, but was mentioned in the final Communiqué. "China understands Russia's position aimed against the expanding of NATO eastward", Communiqué said. At the same time Russia confirmed its solidarity with the Chinese stand on Tibet and Taiwan problem. 7…
During this summit of 1997 the multilateral agreement among China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan ‘On Confidence Building in the military field in the Border Area’ (CBM-2) was eventually reached. The agreement set the limits for ground troops, air force and air defense planes in the 100 km zone on the both sides of the border line between the former USSR and China.
Notwithstanding the fact that the specifications of the agreement were kept closed to public, Russian analysts were discussing it and they were not unanimous in their comments….The evolution of the negotiations on the CBM-2 agreement shows that Russia, evidently, paid the higher price for it, than the Chinese. The breakthrough in the negotiations, that was being held for more than 7 years, was done only in December 1996 during Li Peng's visit to Moscow. Russia’s effort to speed up the process and gain this important security commitment from China was evidently related to the mounting pressure that Moscow was facing from NATO….
Given the complexity of territorial delineation
between Russia and China starting from the end of the XVII century, China was always reluctant to acknowledge the full legitimacy of Russia's rights for vast territories of Siberia and Far East Region. The scale of this claims has reached its peak during Sino-Soviet rift, especially in the mid-sixties when the Chinese side actually claimed territories up to 1,5 million square kilometers. Border negotiations, started in 1964, and being held for nearly three decades, were fruitless during the period of confrontation….However almost all the governors in the Russian Far East (governors of Primorski and Khabarovski krai, Amurskaya and Chitinskaya oblast) have expressed their dissatisfaction with the agreements. They argue that this agreements were not reflecting the interests of their regions and making too much concessions to the Chinese side. The process of demarcation of the border according to the Agreements of 1991 and 1994 was slowed down and partially blocked by the region authorities regulations. Only after 1996, due to the effort of the central government, the demarcation process was resumed. For the first time in bilateral history the territorial belonging of a plenty of islands on the frontier rivers was defined. Nov. 1998, Yeltsin stated that the border problem between Russia and China is “solved forever”. 15…
China's military modernization requires substantial improvements in its air force, command control and communications, naval power projection and space technology capabilities. Russia has accommodated or appears willing to accommodate China in all these areas. It has sold China a range of electronics, air-to-air and surface to air missiles and air defense systems, armored fighting vehicles and T-72 tanks, and SU-27 fighters (including the license to manufacture this aircraft, provided in 1996). China is reported to place the orders for several "Kilo" class submarines. There are also reports that China is trying to acquire other types of advanced technology, such as the TU- 22m bomber ("Backfire") cruise missile technology, missile guidance and satellite systems, and nuclear weapons related technology. 16
According to existing Russian estimates, the total volume of China’s arms purchase from Russia by 1997 was $ 3,5 bn.17…
Russia needs strict control over Chinese re-export of Russian-made Russian-licensed weapon. The Russian public and legislative branch has all the rights to be informed, who, how legitimately and how competently is dealing with the export of such delicate production to such a delicate buyer. The corruption and shadow lobbying in this matter can bring unprecedented damage to Russia’s security interests.
The foreign policy problems, related to export of arms to China, can be even more difficult, than military and commercial considerations. It’s difficult to forecast medium and long-term international consequences of Russian arms sales to China.
Among risk factors in this sense – the uncertainty of political future of China. This uncertainty stems from two main reasons. First of them relates to the character of the political regime of China. Due to the weakness of the representative power and the dominance of the military high command, the role of the individual leader or the narrow group of leaders in China’s foreign and domestic policy is extremely high….Russia’s policy is contrasting (to the US’). The key buyer of Russia’s military production is the state that both, historically and potentially, could not be excluded from the list of Russia’s military competitors….
China has little interest in consolidation of the CIS under Moscow leadership. The more friable and unconsolidated CIS will be, the less problems for Chinese security in the future. Besides, China itself is willing to penetrate into the economic space of the CIS, especially in Kazakhstan and some Central Asian states. Beijing is very interested in raw, and energy resources of these countries, while facing the necessity to expand the resource base of its actively growing economy.
The signing of the Russia – NATO Founding Act in May 1997 was met in Beijing with obvious coolness. Judging by the tone of the some Chinese published commentaries, it was possible to make conclusion, that Beijing was mainly disappointed by a complaisance of Moscow, which has signed the Founding Act on such unfavorable terms.
Official Chinese press was pretty ambivalent in assessing the Founding Act. On the one hand it was stressing the historic importance of this agreement, comparing it with the Versailles and Yalta Treaties and noting that Russia and NATO opened the “critically new phase” in bilateral ties. On the other hand Chinese official media pointedly stressed the fact that Russia failed to sign the really effective and legally solid document with NATO. Thus, it was argued, the Founding Act could not prevent the serious contradictions and frictions of the partners in the future. “Time alone could evaluate the political effectiveness of this Document” - was the dominating tune of the official comments.24 Many Chinese political analysts shared the evaluation of the Founding Act as the amorphous document, unable to prevent the future pressure of NATO on Moscow’s vital military interests….
In June 1998 the next summit between Jiang Zemin and Clinton took place in Beijing and the Chinese-American dialogue has advanced further. During this summit the new agreements were achieved, some of them being similar in essence to those in the Russian-Chinese relations. The US and China have agreed not to orient their nuclear weapons on each other (the similar agreement between China and Russia was concluded in 1994.) Clinton made important statement on Taiwan ( three “no” statement) which was evaluated as the compromising step towards Beijing.27…Speaking about China, Beijing in July 1999 has announced that China has the "know-how" of a neutron bomb and miniaturization of nuclear explosives. It for the first time was stated by the Director of Information Department of the State Council Zhao Qizheng….
The deterioration of the situation in the Taiwan strait indirectly increases the importance of Beijing’s ties with Moscow. During the whole history of its ties with China, Moscow consistently kept loyal to the principle of “one China” and never hesitated in its support of China’s sovereignty over Taiwan. Under current circumstances, in conditions of the strained relations with the US, such support is extremely valuable in Beijing’s eyes. https://www.nato.int/acad/fellow/97-99/troush.pdf
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